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ABSTRACT 
 
 
RISKS, CONTROLS AND BUSINESS VALUE OF IT-ENABLED INTERFIRM AND INTRAFIRM PROCESSES 
 
BY 
 
Chaitanya Krishna Sambhara 
 
7/12/2015 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Arun Rai 
 
Major Academic Unit: Center for Process Innovation & Computer Information Systems Department 
 
There have been significant advances in the information systems (IS) literature about the business value that can be 
realized through information technology (IT) investments and the mechanisms through which IT creates different facets of 
business value.  We identify three important gaps in understanding the literature on IT business value.  First, it is unclear 
how risk arising from deficiencies in a firm’s information environment, along with internal and external contextual factors, 
affects a firm’s IT implementation choices.  Second, it is unclear how IT resources in a focal domain need to be combined 
with knowledge resources in the same domain and IT resources in other domains to develop process capabilities and create 
process-level benefits.  Third, it is unclear what risks IT-enabled process innovations create for different process 
stakeholders and what controls can be applied to mitigate these risks.   
 
My dissertation addresses the above three gaps in three essays. The first essay examines the influence of a firm’s 
information risk on its prioritization of accounting enterprise systems (AES) relative to complementary enterprise systems 
and the moderation of this relationship by the weaknesses of internal controls and environmental uncertainty characteristics. 
The second essay focuses on the impact of AES implementation on a firm’s internal controls process, and the 
complementary roles of managerial competence and enterprise systems implemented in other domains related to the internal 
controls process of the firm.  The final essay explores the risk factors that can arise for buyers and suppliers due to the use of 
reverse auctions, and the controls that can be applied to mitigate the key risk factors.  In terms of research methods, the first 
two essays apply econometric analysis to panel datasets constructed from multiple sources and the third essay uses a 
combination of Delphi studies and semi-structured interviews.  
 
Collectively, the essays advance our understanding of (1) the factors underlying a firm’s prioritization of IT 
investment choices; (2) the mechanisms through which IT resources, in combination with human expertise, create business 
value; and (3) the risks introduced for different stakeholders by the adoption of IT-enabled process innovations and the 
controls that can be used to effectively mitigate them. 
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1. Chapter 1— Introduction 
 
Information Technology (IT) investments come at high cost and contribute significantly more than non-
IT investments to firm risk, which is defined as variability of return on investments (Dewan et al. 2007b). In fact, 
the old “productivity paradox” (Brynjolfsson et al. 1993; Carr 2003) is abetted by studies identifying risks 
associated with IT project and information system (IS) implementation failures that result in the loss of billions 
of dollars (e.g., Doms 2004; Keil et al. 2000). On the one hand, firms that underinvest in IT face the risk of 
inefficient processes, low productivity, and deficient competitiveness (Bharadwaj 2000). On the other hand, IT 
investments can lead to the risk of failed implementations, underutilized and ineffective IS, and loss of capital.  
While past studies have expanded our understanding about risks and risk mitigation strategies associated 
with IT initiatives (Benaroch 2002; Persson et al. 2009), there is inadequate understanding about risks, controls, 
and IT initiatives on three fronts. First, while deficiencies in cross-functional business processes introduce 
various firm-level risks, the influence of these risks on IS implementation choices have not been examined. 
Second, while our understanding of how business process capabilities can be developed from IT resources and 
capabilities has expanded (e.g., Rai et al. 2006; Rai et al. 2010), it is unknown how business processes, which 
differ in objectives and nature of activities, are impacted by IT resources and how business processes, in turn,  
affect process performance. Third, although the role of IT in enabling innovative business models and interfirm 
business processes has been explored (Rai et al. 2014), it is unclear how IT-enabled innovation of interfirm 
business processes creates risks for different stakeholders and how controls can be designed to mitigate these 
risks.  
My dissertation addresses the above three gaps in three essays. The essays draw on complementary 
literatures in IS and firm strategy, operations, and accounting and use both quantitative and qualitative methods. 
The first essay focuses on a key firm-level risk (i.e., information risk) that arises due to poor coordination of 
financial reporting activities across several functional domains (e.g., supply chain, customer relationship). It 
examines how information risk drives the prioritization of enterprise systems in the accounting domain, or 
accounting enterprise systems (AES), relative to enterprise systems (ES) in other business domains (e.g., supply 
chains, customer relationship), or complementary enterprise systems (CES). It also examines how the 
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relationship between information risk and the prioritization of AES over CES is affected by a firm’s internal 
controls and by environmental factors. The second essay evaluates how the IS implemented to coordinate 
activities in a functional domain (i.e., AES implemented to coordinate activities in the accounting domain) 
enables the development of process capabilities to address risks (i.e., internal controls) and improve process 
performance. The third essay identifies the intrafirm and interfirm risks that arise prior to, during, and after the 
use of an IS, specifically reverse auctions, that are implemented to coordinate activities in the interfirm sourcing 
process. Table 1.1 summarizes the goal of each essay, theoretical perspectives used, scope, data sources, 
methodology used, and the data summary. An overview of each of the essays is discussed below.  
1.1 Essay 1 
The first essay examines how information risk drives the prioritization of enterprise system 
implementations, specifically AES vs. CES implementations, and how this relationship changes due to 
weaknesses in internal controls and by environmental uncertainty. The essay is informed by resource based 
theory and the economic theory of complementarities, and by the literatures on information risk, internal 
controls, and ES implementations.    
Information risk refers to the likelihood that information provided by a firm pertinent to investor pricing 
decisions is of poor quality. It is an important factor that determines the rate of return premium demanded by 
investors (Francis et al. 2005; Gray et al. 2009). It is important for firms to reduce information risk to avoid 
paying high premiums to their stakeholders (including investors and business partners). Despite the important 
role played by information risk in affecting a firm’s financial performance, the role of information risk in 
affecting a firm’s IT implementation choices has not received much attention.  
This essay evaluates how firms prioritize IT-enabled process capabilities in specific domains and IT-
enabled process capabilities in other complementary domains when faced with information risk. On one hand, a 
firm can implement AES to improve their internal controls. On the other hand, a firm can implement CES to 
improve activities in other business domains and the overall information environment of the firm.  Information 
risk is hypothesized to influence the prioritization of AES vs. CES implementations, and internal controls and 
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environmental uncertainty are hypothesized to moderate the relationship between information risk and the 
prioritization of AES vs. CES implementations. 
Rigorous econometric analyses were conducted on a panel data set that was constructed for 883 firms for 
the period 2004 to 2008. The findings contribute to our understanding on how information risk, internal controls, 
and environmental uncertainty affect the prioritization of AES vs. CES implementations.   
1.2 Essay 2 
Essay 2 builds on essay 1 by examining how AES implementations, together with complementary 
managerial and technological resources, affect the capability of internal control processes and process 
performance.  
Although prior studies have demonstrated the mediating role of business process capabilities in the IT- 
business value causal chain (e.g., Melville et al. 2004, Ray et al. 2004, Kohli and Grover 2008, Rai and Tang 
2010), the complementary roles of domain-specific competence and related IS capabilities are not clear. Drawing 
on resource-based theory and theory of complementarities, this study identifies AES as a critical IT resource to 
improve internal control processes and examines how (a) CES complements AES in improving internal control 
processes and audit process performance, (b) accounting managerial competence complements AES in 
improving internal control processes and audit process performance, and (c) improvements in internal control 
processes affect audit process performance. 
Rigorous econometric and multivariate analysis was conducted on an archival panel data set constructed 
for 314 firms for the period 2004 to 2009. This essay contributes to our understanding of the ways IT-enabled 
process capabilities can be developed and of the resulting process-level business value.   
1.3 Essay 3 
The third essay examines how the adoption, implementation, and use of IT can change intrafirm and 
interfirm relationships, and introduce novel risks that call for novel controls. Specifically, this study shows how 
the use of internet enabled reverse auctions (RAs) can induce risks for buyers and suppliers, and identifies 
several controls that can effectively address the risks.  
15 
 
Prior studies that have examined RAs have primarily researched the buyer perspective and have largely 
focused on (a) the ability of RAs to reduce procurement costs (Jap 2002; Jap 2003; Jap et al. 2002), (b) effective 
design configuration techniques for RAs (Mithas et al. 2007), (c) factors that determine buyers’ intentions to use 
RAs (Hartley et al. 2004; Mithas et al. 2008), and (d) the impact of RAs on buyer-supplier relationships (Daly et 
al. 2005; Jap 2007). Though studies acknowledge that even successful adoption, implementation, and use of RAs 
can induce risks (Giampetro et al. 2007; Smeltzer et al. 2003) , a concentrated effort to identify them has not 
been undertaken.  
Using a qualitative Delphi study, risk factors from both the buyer and supplier perspectives were 
identified. Follow-up semi-structured interviews revealed that input controls are especially important in 
addressing key risk factors. An interpretation of the risk factors reveals that the risks span intangible resources, 
auction process governance, and factors identified in classical theories of governance (i.e., agency, transaction 
cost, and relational).  Interestingly, two factors not suggested by classical theories of interfirm governance – 
reverse information asymmetry (where the buyer has greater information than the supplier) and principal 
opportunism – surfaced as two risk factors, both of which are detrimental to suppliers and can occur due to the 
use of reverse auctions. The set of control actions discovered through the follow-up semi-structured interviews 
provide a basis for firms to mitigate salient risks and effectively utilize RAs.  
16 
 
Table 1.1. Summary of Essays 
Essay Goal of the Essay 
Theoretical 
Perspectives  
Scope 
Data 
Sources 
Methodology   Data Summary 
1 
Examine the impact of information risk on a 
firm’s prioritization of AES vs. CES 
implementations and the role of internal 
controls and environmental uncertainty in 
moderating this influence.    
Resource-based 
theory  
Intrafirm 
• Audit 
Analytics 
• Compustat 
• Computer 
Intelligence 
Database 
• Econometric 
Analysis 
• Multivariate 
Analysis 
2604 firm-year 
observations for 
883 firms in the 
2004 to 2008 period Theory of 
complementarities 
2 
Examine how AES use impacts the capability 
of internal control processes, and the impact of 
the capability of internal control processes on 
audit process performance. Also examine how 
the impact of AES on the capability of internal 
control processes is complemented by CES 
and accounting managerial competence. 
Resource-based 
theory  
Intrafirm 
1481 firm-year 
observations for 
314 firms in the 
2004 to 2009 period Theory of 
complementarities 
3 
Examine buyer and supplier risk factors 
associated with RA use, and the controls that 
can be applied to mitigate risk factors. 
Agency theory 
Intrafirm 
and 
Interfirm 
• Institute of 
Supply 
Management  
• Qualitative 
Delphi Study 
• Semi-
Structured 
Interviews  
• 28 buyers and 31 
suppliers for Delphi 
Study 
• 7 buyers and 7 
suppliers for semi-
structured 
interviews 
Relational theory 
Transaction cost 
theory 
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2 Chapter 2 — Prioritizing Enterprise System Implementations: Role of Information Risk, 
Internal Controls and Environmental Uncertainty 
 
2.1 Abstract 
We examine the influence of information risk on the prioritization of enterprise system (ES) 
implementation by firms and the role of internal controls and environmental uncertainty (EU) in changing 
the nature of this influence. Specifically, we study how increasing information risk faced by firms affects 
the prioritization in the implementation of accounting enterprise systems (AES) and other enterprise 
systems, which we refer to as Complementary Enterprise Systems (CES).   
We construct a multi-source firm-level panel dataset with a sample of 883 firms from 2004 to 
2008 and use econometric and multivariate analysis procedures to test our hypotheses. Our results suggest 
that with an increase in information risk, firms (a) prioritize implementation of AES over CES when 
faced with weak internal controls, and (b) prioritize implementation of CES over AES when operating in 
highly complex and dynamic industry environments. We do not find evidence that firms prioritize 
implementation of either AES or CES when operating in highly munificent environments. The results 
expand our understanding of how a firm’s IS resource allocation to AES and CES is influenced by 
information risk and how internal and a firm’s external environments affect resource allocation to 
enterprise systems under different conditions. 
Keywords: Information Risk, Internal Controls, Environmental Uncertainty, Enterprise System 
Implementation 
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2.2 Introduction 
Information risk is the likelihood that a firm’s financial information that is pertinent to investor 
pricing decisions is of poor quality (Francis et al. 2005). A firm is said to have high information risk when 
its investors lack information or have insufficient information as compared to other stakeholders (i.e., 
insiders within a firm and other investors) regarding the accuracy of its earnings. The higher the 
information risk, the less informed are investors. Information risk can result in a lack of investor 
confidence in a firm’s financial health, investor demands for higher rate of return premiums, and 
increased cost of capital (Francis et al. 2005; Gray et al. 2009).   
It is particularly difficult for firms operating in uncertain environments to address information 
risk. Increasing uncertainty of the operating environment makes firms more prone to information risk 
since (a) it is more difficult to coordinate business units and functional domains when operating 
uncertainty is high, and (b) high operating uncertainty increases transaction costs, the likelihood of 
incurring losses, and incurring drops in market capitalization (Barua et al. 2004; Doyle et al. 2007b; 
Srinivasan et al. 2002).  
Research has shown that firms address financial and operational risks and optimize their 
operations in uncertain environments by implementing and using ES, which are typically large, complex, 
and expensive information systems (IS) (Grabski et al. 2011; Ko et al. 2005). Studies have also shown 
that ES assist firms in reducing coordination and transaction costs, improve information processing 
capabilities, and reduce supply, demand and quality uncertainties (Dorantes et al. 2013; Gattiker et al. 
2005; Ranganathan et al. 2006).  
While it is known that implementing and using ES assists firms in addressing operational risks in 
complex and uncertain operating environments, it is not clear how firms’ ES implementation decisions 
vary according to the nature and the extent of encountered risks. Do firms implement ES differently when 
faced with high level of information risk? Given the high cost and complexity of implementing them, how 
do firms balance the implementation of different ES? This study seeks to answer these questions by 
examining the impact of information risk in driving firms’ ES implementation decisions. Specifically, we 
examine how firms prioritize the implementation of AES and CES (CES collectively refers to Human 
19 
 
Resources (HR), Customer Relationship (CRM), Supply Chain (SC) and any other ES) (Davenport 1998; 
Ranganathan et al. 2006) when faced with information risk. We seek to uncover the conditions under 
which firms prioritize AES implementations over CES implementations and vice versa.  
Although information risk is contingent upon firms’ IS capabilities, it has been examined 
extensively in the domains of accounting and finance, but has been understudied in the IS literature. To 
elaborate,  information risk is a function of a firm’s ability to effectively perform the following two 
activities core to financial reporting: (a) accurately record and process financial data in a timely fashion, 
and (b) coordinate the financial information across business units and functional domains, and 
collectively report it at the firm level in its financial statements (Francis et al. 2005).  
The IS capabilities required to perform both these activities are best provided by AES with 
critical support from CES (InvestopediaReport 2009)
1
. Complementary enterprise systems can support 
AES by enabling a value-chain framework that involves information processing tasks. Each ES within 
CES performs tasks for the processes that it supports. Each such task encompasses the mobilization, 
tabulation, and transmission of data necessary to conduct that process (Barki et al. 2005; Davenport 1998; 
Gattiker et al. 2005).  Accounting enterprise systems coordinate the data across functional domains and 
business units. Accounting enterprise systems integrate accounting, finance and IT operations, segregate 
duties of personnel across business functions to prevent inappropriate access to data, and improve the 
internal information environment by providing fast reporting and analytic capabilities. 
Accounting enterprise systems have gained immense popularity over the years. Strict regulatory 
laws that pressed for increased transparency compelled firms to reduce information risk, to which they 
responded with large-scale AES implementations. Indeed the largest share of the regulatory expenditure 
on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) compliance was spent on AES (InvestopediaReport 2009; 
Kallunki et al. 2011; Zrimesk et al. 2003)
2. The key objective of SOX is to protect investors’ interests. 
Sarbanes-Oxley mandates firms to (a) establish and maintain strong internal controls over financial 
reporting, and (b) test and publicly disclose the quality of the internal controls. Strong internal controls 
                                                 
1 http://www.emrisk.com/services/regulatory-compliance 
2 See http://www.emrisk.com/services/regulatory-compliance 
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provide assurance to investors that the financial information provided by a firm is of good quality and the 
issued financial statements can be relied upon. Access to the information about the true quality of a firm’s 
finances was otherwise privy only to the firms’ management and auditors. Accounting enterprise systems 
facilitate compliance with SOX by digitizing internal controls processes, strengthening internal controls, 
and improving the information environment pertaining to firm finances.  
A firm’s internal controls reflect its ability to accurately collect, assess, and represent its earnings, 
expenditures, assets and liabilities in its financial statements. The internal controls can therefore also 
influence information risk. It is, however, not clear to what extent firms prioritize implementation of AES 
over CES when faced with high information risk and weak internal controls. This leads to our first 
research objective: 
RO1: Examine how weakness in internal controls changes the influence of a firm’s information 
risk on its prioritization of AES implementation versus CES implementation. 
The higher the EU, the more difficult it is for firms to consolidate and accurately report earnings 
and expenditures in their financial statements. Environmental uncertainty (EU) also makes it difficult for 
firms to coordinate and synchronize their supply chains, human resources, customer relationships and 
other operations (Eisenhardt 1989a; Flynn et al. 1999). Thus, unlike internal controls, higher EU may not 
warrant focused attention on AES. However, EU has multiple factors, such as complexity, dynamism, and 
munificence.  Higher levels in each of these EU factors can warrant a different strategy for ES 
implementations. As such, it is not known to what extent firms prioritize AES and CES implementations 
when both EU and information risk are high. This leads to our second research objective: 
RO2: Examine how EU changes the influence of information risk on a firm’s prioritization of 
AES implementation over CES implementation.  
2.3 Background and Research Gap 
We use two perspectives, the resource-based theory and the theory of complementarities, to 
evaluate how firms prioritize between AES and CES implementations when faced with information risk. 
Drawing on the resource-based theory, we identify ES as key IS resources that are implemented to 
address information risk, and examine how firms prioritize AES and CES implementations with 
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increasing information risk. Drawing on the theory of complementarities, we examine how weak internal 
controls and EU change the influence of information risk’s impact on the prioritization of AES versus 
CES implementations.  
Prior research that has drawn on the resource-based theory has developed our understanding of 
how IT resources generate business value for firms. Early research that examined the impact of IT 
resources found that firms that invest in IT resources achieve higher organizational productivity (Hitt et 
al. 1996), higher organizational efficiency (Rai et al. 1997b), and improved market valuation and financial 
performance (Bharadwaj 2000; Bharadwaj et al. 1999). Research in following years (Figure 2.1) focused 
on examining (a) how transaction characteristics, governance practices, and environmental conditions 
moderate the impact of IT resources on firm performance and risk (e.g., Dewan et al. 2007a; Dewan et al. 
2011) , and (b) how IT resources in conjunction with other resources and capabilities improve firm 
performance through mediating processes as elaborated below.  
For example, Barua et al. (2004)  show how supplier-side and customer-side online information 
capabilities mediate the impact of system integrations on firms financial performance. Rai et al. (2006) 
evaluate how cross-functional IT integration capabilities lead to higher supply-chain process integration 
capabilities and improved firm performance. Rai and Tang (2010) examine how process capabilities 
mediate the impact of IT capabilities on improving a firm’s competitive performance.  
Several of these studies (e.g., Rai et al. 2006; Ray et al. 2005) demonstrate the utility of 
distinguishing between different IT resources and capabilities to understand how organizational 
capabilities are developed. Although the ways in which varied IT resources can be leveraged has been 
examined in past work, it is unclear how firms determine which IT resources to prioritize for 
development. We address this gap by evaluating how business needs, conditioned on internal and external 
contingencies, can drive the prioritization of IT resource allocation. Specifically, we examine how 
information risk, conditioned by weak internal controls and EU, influences the prioritization of AES and 
CES implementations.   
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Figure 2.1. Information Systems Literature on Business Value and Resource-Based Theory 
2.4 Research Model and Hypothesis Development 
Figure 2.2 presents our research model and hypotheses.  We now proceed to develop the logic for 
our research model and the hypotheses in the following sequence: (1) elaborate the concept of 
information risk, (2) develop the logic for the influence of information risk on the prioritization of AES 
implementation vs CES implementation, (3) theorize how internal controls moderate the influence of 
information risk on the prioritization of AES implementation vs CES implementation, and (4) theorize 
how EU moderates the influence of information risk on the prioritization of AES implementation vs. CES 
implementation.    
2.4.1 Elaborating on the Concept of Information Risk 
 All public firms are required to release an annual financial statement listing earnings and 
expenses incurred during a revenue cycle. The reported earnings and expenses consist of (a) completed 
transactions for which a firm has already made or received payments, and (b) incomplete transactions for 
which a firm will pay or receive payments in future revenue cycles, otherwise known as accruals. 
Accruals are the estimated earnings and debt in a financial statement. Investors demand higher rate of 
return premiums when they lack confidence in reported numbers and suspect misstatements due to 
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Figure 2.2 Research Model 
incorrect estimation of accruals. This lack of confidence is due to a lack of reliable information (e.g., lack 
of access to sources that can confirm the transactions) regarding the accuracy of the estimated accruals 
(Francis et al. 2005; Gray et al. 2009). Information risk is considered to be high for a firm when its 
investors do not have sufficient information pertaining to the financial statements as compared to other 
stakeholders (e.g., other investors, firm management of a firm.). 
Information risk is estimated by using accruals quality as a proxy. The lower the quality of 
accruals, the higher the information risk (Dechow et al. 2002; Francis et al. 2005). Accruals consist of two 
factors: account payables and account receivables. Account payables are the expenses incurred by a firm 
but not yet paid for. Account receivables are the reported earnings for which a firm is yet to receive 
payments. Accruals quality is used as a proxy for information risk because unlike completed transactions 
that can easily be investigated and accounted for, accruals are not easily verifiable. The quality of the 
accruals—that is, the likelihood that estimated accruals are accurate—represents the extent of information 
risk associated with a firm’s financial statements.   
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Influence of Information Risk on the Prioritization of AES Implementation vs. CES 
Implementation: A firm is considered to be aggressive in attracting investor attention when more than 
expected growth in its earnings is due to abnormally large accruals. While such a firm may attract risk-
seeking investors, its financial statements are considered unreliable by risk-averse investors. Conversely, 
a firm is considered to be conservative when it reports low or negative earnings from accruals. Such a 
firm does not rely on future earnings to attract investors. Moreover, risk-neutral and risk-averse investors 
are likely to view the firm’s financial statements favorably. However, regardless of their risk orientation, 
investors prefer to reduce uncertainty and gather as much information as possible pertaining to firms’ 
finances (Dow et al. 1992; Gray et al. 2009; Leuz et al. 2004).  
Investors secure their investments by demanding higher return premiums. The cost of capital, i.e., 
the minimum returns expected by investors from a firm’s stock, increases with an increase in information 
risk (Francis et al. 2005; Lambert et al. 2007). A higher cost of capital leads to reduced profit margins, 
lower returns for investors, increased liabilities, reduced reserves, and reduced funds for future 
investments that preclude firms from gaining a competitive edge. It is, therefore, important that firms 
improve the internal information environment and reduce the level of information risk. In addition to 
more reliable financial statements, better quality financial information also leads to more effective 
coordination between firms and their investors with respect to capital investment decisions (Leuz et al. 
2004).  
Enterprise systems are suggested as an effective tool to improve a firm’s internal information 
environment (Dorantes et al. 2013). Enterprise systems can facilitate both intrafirm and the interfirm 
coordination by assisting firms in (a) improving core firm processes such as accounting, supply chain, 
human resources, and customer relationship management, and (b) generating the necessary information 
from these processes for managerial decision-making. We differentiate between the roles of CES and 
AES in producing financial reports. Data pertaining to various business transactions (e.g., supply chain, 
human resources, customer relationship management) is generated through and consolidated by using 
CES. In contrast, financial information including earnings estimations is generated by using AES but 
relies on transaction data that is generated through CES use. For example, supply chain ES enables a firm 
25 
 
to track interfirm transactions regarding purchased materials, logistics, and supplier information (Rai et al. 
2006). The relevant information regarding payment schedules and cash transfers is produced by using 
AES. All financial transactions are processed and cumulative financial information is produced by using 
AES (Dorantes et al. 2013). The information environment of a firm, therefore, relies on both AES and 
CES use. 
With increasing information risk, it becomes important for firms to allocate resources to ES 
capabilities to increase the quality of financial information. Although information risk is specific to the 
business domain of accounting and finance, the quality of financial information depends on the quality of 
transaction information from different functional domains.  This dependency is likely to lead firms to 
focus on CES implementations to establish the transaction data resources required to generate quality 
financial information. As such, while AES are the focal technology needed to disclose accurate 
information in financial statements, CES provide critical information to AES for consolidation and 
reporting. These arguments lead to our first hypothesis. 
H1:  With an increase in information risk, the implementation of CES will be greater than the 
implementation of AES 
2.4.2 Moderating Role of Internal Controls 
Both information risk and weak internal controls represent the risk of a misstatement in a firm’s 
financial statement. While information risk refers to misstatements due to the inaccurate estimation of 
expected earnings and expenses, weak internal controls refer to the inability of internal controls to 
eliminate the possibility of material errors in financial statements.  
Internal controls are contingent upon a firm’s accounting, finance, and IT processes pertaining to 
financial reporting. A firm’s disclosure of a material weakness means that its internal controls are weak. 
Firms with weak internal controls are unable to prevent or detect material misstatements in their financial 
statements in a timely manner. Financial statements of firms with weak internal controls are not 
considered to be reliable (Li et al. 2012; Lin et al. 2011).  
Numerous corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom were attributed to weak internal 
controls. Weak internal controls lead to serious risks for firms, their investors, and other stakeholders. 
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Firms become financially unstable (Folkerts-Landau et al. 1998; Ge et al. 2005; Shi et al. 2011), investors 
incur losses (Petrovits et al. 2011; Schneider et al. 2008), business partners fall behind competition, 
customers may not obtain services already paid for, and sensitive information for one or more 
stakeholders can be compromised (COSO-Framework 1992)
3
. For example, weak internal controls at J.P. 
Morgan Chase due to improper trading in 2012 led to a $459 million error in reporting income, loss of 
$5.8 billion in revenue, the layoff of 3000 employees to recover from the losses, and a decline in the 
bank’s risk management reputation4. In 2013 it had to pay an additional $9 billion in fines and penalties 
and $4 billion for consumer relief
5
. Similarly, weak internal controls due to material weaknesses in IT and 
the improper segregation of duties at the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
6
 resulted in a security breach 
of 75 GB of data where 3.8 million social security numbers, 3.3 million bank accounts, 5000 credit card 
numbers and other sensitive information for 699,900 businesses were hacked
7
.  
Clearly, strong controls are crucial for firms to release fair and accurate financial statements, 
protect their investors’ interests, and their reputation in the market. However, sustaining strong controls 
can be burdensome and expensive for firms (Zhang 2007). Strict regulatory laws such as SOX ensure that 
firms place effective internal controls over financial reporting by mandating their managements and 
auditors to independently test and publicly disclose the state of internal controls.  The establishment, 
maintenance, and testing of internal controls require IS that support all the functions underlying financial 
reporting, i.e., accounting, finance, and IT. Accounting enterprise systems facilitate compliance to SOX 
by integrating all the three domains. 
In our first hypothesis, we reasoned why information risk increases the likelihood that firms will 
prioritize CES implementations over AES implementations. We suggest that weak internal controls will 
lead firms facing increasing information risk to place greater emphasis on AES implementations over 
CES implementations.  Although firms with information risk require access to quality transactional 
information across business domains to improve financial reporting and information risk, the accounting 
                                                 
3 See http://smallbusiness.chron.com/signs-symptoms-lack-internal-control-business-51658.html 
4See Fox Business Report at http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2012/08/09/jpmorgan-files-formal-1q-restatement/ 
5 See CNN Money Report http://money.cnn.com/2013/10/19/investing/jpmorgan-settlement/ 
6See Government Accountability Office Report at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589399.pdf 
7 See http://www.pcworld.com/article/2015543/irs-blamed-in-massive-south-carolina-data-breach.html 
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and financial processes provide the capabilities to process the data and generate various financial reports 
including earnings estimates.  As such, in the presence of weak controls, the core processes of accounting 
and finance and its IT enablement through AES implementation will be the focus of management, and 
this focus is likely to be increased when a firm sees increases in information risk.  Thus, when firms with 
high information risk also face weak internal controls, we expect that they will favor AES 
implementations over CES implementations. This leads us to our second hypothesis:   
H2: With an increase in information risk, the implementation of AES will be greater than the 
implementation of CES for firms that have weak internal controls 
2.4.3 Moderating Role of Environmental Uncertainty 
Environmental uncertainty refers to the complexity, dynamism, and munificence of the industry 
environment in which firms operate. The higher the EU, the more difficult it can be for firms to (a) 
coordinate across business units, (b) assimilate accurate transaction information from business units and 
functional domains, (c) determine strategies to capture growth opportunities, (d) ascertain market supply 
and demand, and (e) manage operations and estimate the outcomes of the decisions pertaining to resource 
allocations (Dess et al. 1984; Eisenhardt 1989a; Flynn et al. 1999; Keats et al. 1988; Xue et al. 2011). 
Thus, apart from accurately reporting earnings and expenses, EU presents numerous other challenges that 
span multiple functional domains and business units. Hence, it can be even more difficult to address 
information risk, when EU is also high. Research shows that ES can be an effective technology that help 
firms address these challenges and help them perform effectively in uncertain environments (Dorantes et 
al. 2013; McAfee 2002).  
It is important to adopt a nuanced perspective to understand the role of EU in moderating the 
relationship between information risk and the prioritization of AES implementation versus CES 
implementation. Environmental uncertainty can be unpacked into complexity, dynamism, and 
munificence, with each of them shown to have an idiosyncratic relationship with different facets of IT 
(Xue et al. 2011). Accordingly, we examine how each of the EU factors moderates the influence of 
information risk on the prioritization of AES versus CES implementations.   
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2.4.4 Moderating Role of Complexity 
Complexity of the environment refers to the heterogeneity and the scale of the task environments 
within which a firm operates. The greater the complexity of the environment, the higher the uncertainty 
on the supply/competition side. Firms operating in highly complex environments engage with large 
numbers and variety of stakeholders, which makes the decisions regarding allocation and optimal use of 
resources difficult. Firms have to deal with large amounts of diverse information across functional 
domains and business units. Managing the information and knowledge becomes challenging with the 
increase in the information processing requirements. As such, firms have to depend on an array of IT 
resources to manage their operations and information processing tasks (Dess et al. 1984; Wade et al. 
2004). Dealing with critical contingencies of complexity requires increased use of ES that facilitate the 
flow of information across functional domains and business units, best provided by CES.  
The role of CES expands with the need for better quality and range of information across 
functional domains. Use of complementary enterprise systems helps firms exchange information with 
external stakeholders as well as internal stakeholders across functional domains. For example, customer 
relationship ES can help a firm to engage external stakeholders (customers) by exchanging information 
regarding the range and price of products or services the firm offers. Customer Relationship ES can be 
used to track the history of repeated sales to its customers, perform sales promotion analysis, and estimate 
future sales. The information needed to estimate availability of products or services for future 
consignments to be sent to customers, however, is obtained by using Supply Chain ES (Ranganathan et al. 
2006).  
Complementary enterprise systems can be used to develop a firm’s capability to absorb external 
information and coordinate its competitive responses (Keats et al. 1988; Wade et al. 2004). Accounting 
enterprise systems, on the other hand, can be used to extract information from the corresponding CES 
systems to produce financial information. Thus, access to ES in different domains via CES should take 
priority over AES with increases in environmental complexity, leading us to hypothesize: 
H3: With an increase in information risk, the implementation of CES will be greater than the 
implementation of AES for firms that operate in highly complex environments 
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2.4.5 Moderating Role of Dynamism 
Dynamism refers to the turbulence and unpredictability of the changes in the environment within 
which a firm operates. The greater the dynamism in the environment, the higher the uncertainty on the 
demand/consumer side (Keats et al. 1988; Wade et al. 2004). Firms face progressively difficult 
administrative challenges as dynamism in the operating environment increases. Firms find it difficult to 
buffer input supplies, obtain long-term contracts with their clients, and collude with their competitors to 
control prices.  
Ever since industrial economies have evolved with increased use of technology, the degree of 
interdependence has increased among firms operating within and across industry groups. Firms require a 
greater scope and scale of information to be processed across functional domains to cope with dynamic 
environments. The capabilities and IT assets required to perform effectively in turbulent and 
unpredictable environments are different from those required to do so in relatively stable environments. It 
becomes difficult for firms to predict and plan for changes without a high degree of interconnectedness 
between systems and cross-functional information across business units (Dess et al. 1984; Wade et al. 
2004).  
Complementary enterprise systems can enable a firm to expand its capacity to effectively and 
efficiently processing large volumes of information and interconnected capabilities across functional 
domains (Karimi et al. 2007b; Ranganathan et al. 2006). While AES use can provide useful support to 
firms to function in dynamic environments, it is CES use that can enable firms to develop the ability to 
quickly identify and respond to fluctuating and turbulent consumer demand and expectations.  Thus, we 
hypothesize: 
H4: With an increase in information risk, implementation of CES will be greater than 
implementation of AES for firms that operate in highly dynamic environments 
2.4.6 Moderating Role of Munificence 
Munificent environments are characterized by rapid yet sustained and stable growth opportunities 
for firms (Dess et al. 1984). Munificence is measured by the extent of growth in firm sales and income. 
Unlike complex and dynamic environments, in munificent environments, firms’ shift their focus from 
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survival in the market to strengthening their competitive position. Firms are able to attract large number 
of investors in munificent environments. To keep investors informed of their financial health, it is 
important for firms to reduce agency risk by tracking accruals, and accurately estimating and disclosing 
earnings (Biddle et al. 2009).  
Firms are scrutinized by investors when they report higher than expected earnings through 
accruals. Since munificent environments are considered stable, domain specific information challenges 
can be relatively subdued. Firms concentrate on meeting the expectations of their investors and providing 
them with accurate financial information (Ball et al. 2008). Using AES enables firms to effectively and 
efficiently collect and process financial information. Thus, with an increase in the level of munificence in 
the environment, firms are likely to prioritize the implementation of AES over CES.  
Conversely, it can also be argued that with strong growth, firms find new business partners and 
expand their client base in munificent environments. In such situations, they are more likely to expand 
their IT capabilities to keep up with the growth. With the increase in the number of stakeholders, firms’ 
information processing needs also increase (Wade et al. 2004). Firms may be required to have access to 
sophisticated and interconnected systems such as CES. Thus, we recognize munificence to be a factor of 
EU but do not hypothesize its relationship in favor of either AES or CES. We, however, evaluate its 
influence on the relationship between information and risk and the prioritization of AES vs. CES 
implementation.    
2.5 Data Collection and Analysis  
2.5.1 Panel Dataset Construction 
A panel dataset was constructed using data from the following three sources: (1) CI Technology 
Database (CI) which provides data on AES implementations, CES implementations, and other IT 
variables; (2) Audit Analytics (AA) which provides data for internal controls; and (3) Compustat (CS) 
which provides data about EU and firms’ financial variables.  
We first collected data on SOX 404 reports from AA. Our initial sample included 62,828 firm-
year observations for 16,765 firms for the years 2004 through 2012. We then matched the AA data with 
data available in CS. This resulted in 45,303 firm-year observations for 8,901 firms between the years 
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2001 and 2012 and for which CS had corresponding EU and financial metrics data available. Next, we 
matched these firm-year observations with data available from CI about all ES (i.e., AES, and CES). This 
exercise produced 2,604 firm-year observations for 883 firms between the years 2004 and 2008 and 
resulting in a four-year panel data set.  
Measures: Table 2.1 summarizes the constructs for the dependent and the independent variables. 
The constructs and their measurements are elaborated next.  
Table 2.1. Constructs, Measures and Descriptions 
Construct Measure and Description 
Balancing between 
enterprise systems 
Difference between the extent of AES implementations and the extent of CES 
implementations  
Information risk 
Total current accruals regressed on the cash flow, revenue, and changes in 
revenues, property, plant and equipment. Then the standard deviation of the 
residuals over the last five years. 
Weak internal 
controls 
1 if a firm had a material weakness in its internal control processes either in the 
past or during the current year; 0 otherwise. 
Complexity 
Four Firm Concentration: Log of the reciprocal of the ratio of the sales of the 
top four firms in an industry to the sales of all firms in that industry in the given 
year. 
Herfindahl Index: Log of the reciprocal of Herfindahl index for each industry. 
Dynamism 
Sales Volatility: Natural logarithm of total sales of four digit SIC industries 
regressed against an index variable of years over the five years of the sample.  
Then, the antilog of sales standard error at an industry level. 
Income Volatility: Natural logarithm of total operating income of four digit SIC 
industries regressed against an index variable of years over the five years of the 
sample. Then, the antilog of income standard error at an industry level. 
Munificence 
Sales Growth: Natural logarithm of total sales of four digit SIC industries 
regressed against an index variable of years over the five years of the sample. 
Then, the antilog of sales coefficient at an industry level. 
Income Growth: Natural logarithm of total sales of four digit SIC industries 
regressed against an index variable of years over the five years of the sample. 
Then, the antilog of income coefficient at an industry level. 
 
Dependent Variable: Our dependent variable is the difference between the implementation of 
AES and CES in firms. It was measured using the following two-step approach: (1) computing AES and 
CES implementation scores, and (2) computing the difference between AES and CES implementations.  
Step 1: Computing AES and CES Implementation Scores: Data related to ES implementations and 
other IT variables were collected from the CI database for Fortune 1000 firms. The CI database includes 
data collected at the site level of a firm for sites with at least 50 employees. Five classes of ES identified 
in the CI database are: Accounting, Human Resources, Supply Chain, Customer Relationship, and other. 
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Enterprise system implementation scores for each of the five types of ES were computed as the ratio of 
the number of sites of a firm that implemented ES to the total number of firm sites.  Thus, the AES 
implementation score was computed as the ratio of the number of sites of a firm that had implemented 
AES to the total number of firm sites. The complementary enterprise system implementation score was 
computed as the average of implementation scores for the following types of ES: human resources, supply 
chain, customer relationship, and other ES.  
Step 2: Computing the Difference between AES and CES Implementation Scores: 
AESdifferenceCES is the difference between the extent of AES implementation and CES implementation. 
The intuition is that when the coefficient of a predictor variable in the regression is positive, it affects the 
ES implementation balance decision in favor of AES. When the coefficient is negative, it leads to 
increased prioritization for implementation of CES over AES. A non-significant coefficient suggests that 
the predictor variable either has no impact or it has a similar impact on both the AES and the CES 
implementations. 
Independent Variables: Our independent variables were information risk, weakness of internal 
controls, and the three EU factors: complexity, dynamism, and munificence.  We now discuss each of 
these measures.   
Information Risk: Accruals quality was used as a proxy for information risk. We computed 
accruals quality following Francis et al. (2005). To calculate accruals quality, a firm’s total current 
accruals were regressed on its cash flows. The residuals obtained from the regression were then used to 
determine the accruals quality. The residuals are unknown factors that contribute to the total current 
accruals. The more the unknown factors fluctuate, the more difficult it is for investors to rely on a firm’s 
estimated accruals. The standard deviation of the residuals is used as a measure for accruals quality. The 
higher the standard deviation, the lower the accruals quality, and the higher the information risk.  
Measuring Weak Internal Controls: Weak internal controls is measured by material weakness 
in the internal controls processes. We classified a firm as having weak internal controls if it reported a 
material weakness in its internal controls either in the current or in any of the previous years within our 
sample. For example, if we have data for a firm for the years 2005 through 2008, and it reported a 
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material weakness only in the year 2007, then it is coded to be a firm with weak internal controls in the 
years 2007 and 2008 (WeakControls =1). For the years 2005 through 2006, the variable WeakControls is 
coded as 0 for the firm.     
Measuring Environmental Uncertainty: We followed Xue et al. (2011) to compute the 
measures for each of the three EU factors and discuss these measures below.  
Complexity was assessed using two measures of market concentration: a four-firm concentration 
ratio and Herfindahl index. We use the log value of the reciprocal of the four-firm concentration and 
Herfindahl index, so that large values of these measures indicate more complexity and small values 
indicate less complexity. Both measures were computed for the four-digit SIC codes of the firms in our 
sample.  
Dynamism was measured by the volatility of the industry’s income and sales. Natural logarithms 
of operating income and sales of four-digit SIC industries were regressed on an index variable of years, 
for a five-year period. Dynamism was then computed by taking the antilog of the standard error of the 
two regressions. The idea is that the standard error provides an estimate of the turbulence and uncertainty 
of the income and sales growth rate. 
Munificence was measured by the growth in industry income and sales. Natural logarithms of 
operating income and sales of four-digit SIC industries were regressed on an index variable of years, for a 
five year period. Munificence was then computed by taking the antilog of the regression coefficient of the 
two regressions. The idea is that the regression coefficient provides an estimate of the income and sales 
growth rates. 
We evaluated the convergent and discriminant validity of the EU measures through principal 
component analysis. Specifically, we used Varimax Rotation to extract the dimensions of EU represented 
by the measures. The factor loadings indicate strong support for the three identified EU dimensions 
(Table 2.2). We computed an index score for each factor by computing a unit mean of the measurement 
items
8
.  
                                                 
8 We also computed single item measures using a weighted average of the measurement items (weighted by factor loadings). Since the factor 
loadings are nearly equal in all cases, the values of single item measures using an average and the values using weighted average were identical 
up to four decimal points for each EU dimension. 
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Table 2.2 Measurement of Environmental Uncertainty 
Measure         Correlations Varimax Loading 
  Mean Std. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 CPX DYN MUN 
Complexity
9
      
(CPX)                         
1. 4-firm 
concentration 
0.25 0.28 0.00 1.94           0.97 -0.03 0.06 
2. Herfindahl 
index 
1.44 0.66 0.03 4.37 0.91         0.98 -0.02 0.04 
Dynamism    
(DYN) 
                        
3. Sales 
volatility 
1.04 0.10 1.00 3.75 -0.06 -0.07       -0.08 0.72 0.09 
4. Income 
volatility 
1.08 0.13 1.00 2.54 -0.03 0.00 0.18     0.04 0.81 -0.03 
Munificence 
(MUN) 
                        
5. Sales 
growth 
1.07 0.10 0.66 1.65 0.07 0.05 0.09 -0.06   0.01 -0.04 0.91 
6. Income 
growth 
1.10 0.18 0.60 3.11 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.12 0.63 0.08 0.11 0.89 
Average Variance Extracted 0.95 0.60 0.82 
 
Control Variables: Following prior literature, we include a set of control variables in our model 
(Dewan et al. 2011; Feng et al. 2009; Li et al. 2012; Zhang 2006). Firms that are older are more likely to 
have implemented ES and are experienced in devising IT implementation strategies. Hence, we control 
for firm age (FirmAge), measured by the number of years a firm has been traded on a stock exchange 
(Zhang 2006). The more profitable a firm, the more likely it is to invest in ES. Thus, we control for sales 
growth (SalesGrowth: growth in sales from year t-1 to year t) and leverage (Leverage: ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets) (Li et al. 2012). Firms that have several operational and geographical segments 
are more likely to have an ES implementation strategy in place. We include a natural log of total 
segments (SegmentsLn) as a control variable. Firms with foreign transactions are likely to rely on various 
ES. We include a binary measure for foreign (Foreign: 1 if a firm has foreign transactions in year t, 0 
otherwise). Firms’ ES implementation decisions can change based on whether they experience large 
changes in the return on assets. We include absolute change in ROA (ABSCHGROA) from year t-1 to 
year t, as a control variable. Since we are examining the role of information risk in ES implementations, it 
                                                 
9 We also evaluated dynamic concentration as a measure for complexity. Its loadings were 0.24 with complexity, -0.64 with munificence and 0.09 
with dynamism. It was dropped due to low loading with complexity and cross-loading with munificence. 
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is important to control for firm risk’s impact on ES implementations. We control for firm risk (FirmRisk), 
calculated as the standard deviation of quarterly ROA of the year following the year of observation 
(Dewan et al. 2011). Firms that have large IT capital are also more likely to have implemented ES and 
have mature ES implementation strategies. Thus, we control for IT capital (IT_Capital) measured as 
(computer capital + 3* IT labor cost)/ total assets (Dewan et al. 2007b). Lastly, we include year dummies 
as controls. We did not include total assets due to high VIF. However, we include several variables 
(Leverage, SegmentsLn etc.) that account for total assets and address the size of the firm. The mean VIF 
was 2.29 and all VIFs were less than 9. Table 2.3 shows the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations 
of the variables. 
2.5.2 Empirical Specification 
The empirical specification of our model is shown below
10
 in equation 1. The subscript i denotes 
a firm and the subscript t denotes the year. We evaluate the dependent variable in year t+1 and the 
independent variables and control variables in year t. The data for the dependent variable was for years 
2005 through 2008, and the data for the independent variables and control variables was for years 2004 
through 2007.  
Equation 2-1 
AESdifferenceCESi(t+1) =  β0 + β1 (Controls)(it) + β2 InfoRisk (it)+ β3 WeakControls(it) + β4 CPX(it) + β5 
DYN(it) + β6 MUN(it)+ β7 InfoRisk X WeakControls(it)+ β8 InfoRisk X CPX(it) + β9 InfoRisk X DYN(it) + β10 
InfoRisk X MUN(it) + ε(it) 
                                                 
10 Information risk, complexity, dynamism, and munificence are mean centered 
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Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
# Variable Mean StDev Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 AESdifferenceCES 0.33 0.22 -0.75 1.00
2 FirmAge 30.45 20.52 1.00 82.00 -0.09*
3 Leverage 0.56 0.22 0.05 2.32 -0.08* 0.12*
4 SegmentsLn 2.13 0.79 0.00 4.39 0.01 0.09* -0.07*
5
Foreign 0.01 0.02 -0.10* 0.50*
6 ABSCHGROA 
(x100)
0.76 1.09 0.00 9.35 0.01 -0.09* 0.08* 0.04* 0.03
7 FirmRisk (x100) 0.82 1.21 0.00 17.68 0.01 -0.07* 0.12* -0.01 0.00 0.56*
8 SalesGrowth 0.12 0.20 -0.59 2.80 0.03 -0.10* -0.08* 0.05* 0.03 0.04* -0.06*
9 IT_Capital 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.81 -0.02 -0.11* -0.04* -0.09* -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.08*
10 InfoRisk 0.00 0.07 -0.06 1.95 -0.02 -0.15* -0.01 -0.05* -0.03 0.18* 0.09* 0.12* 0.01*
11
WeakControls 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.05* 0.05* 0.14* 0.11* -0.07* 0.08* 0.06*
12 CPX 0.00 0.57 -1.07 2.07 -0.01 0.07* 0.08* -0.11* -0.10* -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.08* -0.02 -0.04*
13 DYN 0.00 0.07 -0.05 1.36 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06* 0.02 0.04* 0.07* 0.03 0.06* 0.01 0.10* 0.01 -0.07*
14 MUN 0.00 0.11 -0.46 0.95 0.02 -0.05* -0.12* 0.13* 0.10* 0.03 0.00 0.19* -0.01 0.07* -0.03 0.01 0.15*
15 InfoRisk X 
WeakControls
0.00 0.03 -0.06 0.58 0.02 -0.08* 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.08* 0.06* 0.04* 0.05* 0.42* 0.10* 0.01 0.04* 0.02
16 InfoRisk X  CPX 0.00 0.04 -0.42 1.14 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.07* 0.08* 0.03 0.05* 0.02 -0.01 0.17* 0.02 -0.15* -0.01 0.04* 0.13*
17 InfoRisk X  DYN 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.09 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.05* 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.14* 0.00 -0.01 0.45* 0.10* -0.04* -0.11*
18 InfoRisk X  MUN 0.00 0.01 -0.06 0.19 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.08* -0.01 0.42* -0.01 0.04* 0.08* 0.15* 0.03 0.22* 0.02
* Significant at 0.05 level
0  (44.78%) 1 (55.22%)
0  (83.22%) 1 (16.78%)
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2.5.3 Analysis and Results 
 We first conducted the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test that confirmed the panel structure 
of the data. Then, we conducted the Hausman test that ruled out a fixed-effects model. Our data has an 
unbalanced panel structure. Since the dependent variable is computed as the difference between two ratios 
(i.e., function of fractions), we use the Generalized Least Square regression
11
 (Wooldridge 2009). Table 
2.4 shows the results. Column 1 shows the baseline control model. Column 2 shows the main effects 
model. The results of the full model are shown in column 3. The main effect of information risk is 
negative and significant, suggesting that with an increase in information risk firms prioritize the 
implementation of CES over AES. Thus, H1 is supported. 
 The interaction effect of information risk and internal controls is positive and significant, and 
supports H2. The interaction plot is shown in Figure 2.3. As hypothesized in H2, the positive sloping line 
shows that firms that have weak internal controls prioritize implementation of AES over CES when faced 
with increasing information risk. The negative sloping line, on the other hand, is for firms that do not 
have weak internal controls, i.e., WeakControls = 0. This line represents the main effect of information 
risk. It shows that with an increase in information risk, implementation of CES is greater than 
implementation of AES. 
The coefficients of the interaction effects for complexity and dynamism with information risk are 
negative and significant, supporting H3 and H4, respectively. Negative sloping lines in Figures 2.4 and 
2.5 are for firms that operate in highly complex and dynamic environments. Our findings, thus, show that 
with an increase in information risk, implementation of CES is greater than implementation of AES for 
firms that operate in environments that are highly complex and dynamic. The slopes for firms that operate 
in environments that are low in complexity and dynamism are relatively flat and do not suggest 
prioritization in implementing AES or CES.  
 
 
                                                 
11 We use the STATA command xtgls. Several prior studies have used GLS. For example see Kwortnik et al. (2009), Rai et al. 2009, and Poppo 
and Zenger (2002) 
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Table 2.4. Generalized Least Square Regression Results 
AESdifferenceCES 
  1 2 3 
InfoRiskXWeakControls   0.2760092 
(0.1616874)** 
InfoRiskXCPX   -0.2330299 
(0.123159)** 
InfoRiskXDYN   -2.563356 
(1.141959)** 
InfoRiskXMUN     0.2186323 
(0.6561455) 
InfoRisk  -0.085693 
(0.0620863) 
-0.1514203 
(0.0779323)** 
WeakControls  -0.0021188 
(0.0119066) 
-0.0034575 
(0.0119197) 
CPX  0.0013154 
(0.0078103) 
-0.0011166 
(0.0079193) 
DYN  -0.0179748 
(0.0607048) 
0.0455527 
(0.0680116) 
MUN   -0.0170688 
(0.0406479) 
-0.0115454 
(0.0408195) 
FirmAge -0.0009412 
(0.0002188)*** 
-0.0009872 
(0.00022)*** 
-0.000973 
(0.00022)*** 
Leverage -0.0694223 
(0.0202503)*** 
-0.0686036 
(0.0203721)*** 
-0.0695092 
(0.0203472)*** 
SegmentsLn 0.0050031 
(0.0064934) 
0.0051051 
(0.0065409) 
0.0053819 
(0.006531) 
Foreign -0.0041684 
(0.0101731) 
-0.0044467 
(0.0101765) 
-0.0044218 
(0.0101717) 
ABSCHGROA (x100) 0.0005837 
(0.0049152) 
0.00177 
(0.0049775) 
0.0025034 
(0.0049984) 
FirmRisk (x100) 0.0016539 
(0.0044437) 
0.0020641 
(0.0044426) 
0.001998 
(0.0044415) 
Sales Growth 0.0175003 
(0.0226017) 
0.0317454 
(0.0233172) 
0.0299978 
(0.0232856) 
IT_Capital -0.1705878 
(0.1227994) 
-0.1333595 
(0.1238308) 
-0.1465438 
(0.1237201) 
YearDummies Included Included Included 
Constant 0.3834111 
(0.0188716)*** 
0.3605929 
(0.021802)*** 
0.3610951 
(0.0217905)*** 
Wald Chi-square 36.42*** 51.19*** 61.54*** 
Log Likelihood 216.64 223.91 228.97 
Firms (Firm-year observations) 883 (2604) 883 (2604) 883 (2604) 
***p<0.01   ** p<0.05   * p<0.1; one-tailed test given directional effects are hypothesized 
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Figure 2.3. Interaction Effect of Information Risk and Internal Controls 
 
Figure 2.4. Interaction Effect of Information Risk and Complexity 
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Figure 2.5. Interaction Effect of Information Risk and Dynamism 
Although we did not hypothesize an interaction between information risk and munificent 
environments, we evaluated the interaction and found it to be non-significant.  
2.5.4 Robustness Tests 
Prioritization of AES vs. CES may be endogenous. It is likely that how firms prioritize AES 
implementation vs. CES implementation influences information risk. It is also possible that in addition to 
AES and CES implementations, other factors influence information risk, and thus AES and CES 
implementations may be endogenous. As endogeneity can lead to biased estimates (Greene 2003; 
Wooldridge 2009), we performed a two-stage Heckman analysis to evaluate for the presence of 
endogeneity (Heckman 1979; Shaver 1998). The results of the stage 1 Heckman analysis indicate that 
prioritization of AES is endogenous. After correcting for endogeneity in stage 2 of the Heckman analysis, 
the coefficients and directions of all the independent variables were consistent with the original analysis. 
The details of the Heckman analysis are discussed in Appendix 2.A.  
2.6 Discussion 
2.6.1 Implications for Theory 
Our results reveal how information risk influences the prioritization of AES and CES 
implementations and how this influence changes with a firm’s internal controls and the characteristics of 
its external environment. Our results have three key implications for our understanding of the factors that 
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lead firms to prioritize the allocation of IT resources to a focal process domain (AES for accounting and 
financial processes) or to complementary process domains (CES for supply chains, customer relationship, 
human resources, and others). 
First, our study extends our understanding of a firm’s characteristics that affect IT 
implementation choices by revealing the significant role played by information risk, a salient 
consideration for a firm’s external stakeholders.  Our findings reveal that information risk is associated 
with a firm prioritizing the implementation of CES over AES. The level of information risk depends on 
firms’ ability to collect financial and performance information across functional domains. When firms are 
unable to collect and integrate this information, their ability to accurately estimate earnings and expenses 
is compromised. Consequently, firms’ investors and stakeholders are likely to perceive them to be risky 
investments. Our findings suggest that firms faced with information risk place greater emphasis on 
improving their information environment by prioritizing the implementation of CES to collect cross-
domain transaction information that is critical to core accounting and financial processes that present 
financial information to external stakeholders.  
Second, the findings from our study show that internal controls moderate the influence of 
information risk on the prioritization of AES versus CES implementations. Although past work has 
examined the impact of ES on internal controls and information risk (Bedard et al. 2012; Dorantes et al. 
2013), our study shows that a firm’s choices to prioritize ES in the accounting and finance domains or in 
complementary business domains are jointly influenced by information risk and internal controls. To 
elaborate, information risk means that firms’ expected earning and expense estimates may not be 
accurate.  Although we found that a firm faced with information risk prioritizes CES implementations to 
expand access to quality transaction information from across business domains in order to improve the 
quality of financial statements and earnings information, weak internal controls point to concerns about 
the accounting and financial processes of the firm. When a firm faces increases in information risk and its 
internal controls are a source of weakness, it faces a greater need to improve the quality of its core 
accounting and finance processes. Under these conditions, firms are more likely to prioritize ES 
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investments in the core processes (i.e., AES investments) relative to prioritizing ES investments in 
complementary process domains that are sources of transactional information to the finance and 
accounting process.  
Third, our study expands our understanding about how firm-specific factors and environmental 
factors jointly influence a firm’s ES implementations.  Our findings reveal that high levels of 
environmental complexity and environmental dynamism amplify the effect of information risk to 
prioritize CES implementations over AES implementations.  These finding suggest that the environmental 
context moderates the influence of a firm-specific factor (i.e., information risk) on the firm’s IT choices.   
Firms operating in complex environments have a need to collect and process complex 
information.  This need to process complex information arises due to the large number of 
interdependencies within and across a firm. Our results suggest that firms with high information risk 
situated in complex environments prioritize CES implementations over AES implementations as they 
have a greater need to digitize cross-functional processes and establish an integrated view of information 
across domains that is relevant to the financial and accounting processes.  
Firms operating in dynamic environments need the ability to respond to fluctuating consumer 
demands. Firms need to have access to a wide variety of information pertaining to their customers’ 
buying behaviors. They also need to pass on real-time information to their suppliers in order to minimize 
order lead-times (Cotteleer et al. 2006). We find that firms with high information risk situated in dynamic 
environments prioritize CES implementations over AES implementations since they need to collect cross-
domain information from their customers, and share information with their suppliers.  
The interactions of information risk with environmental complexity and with environmental 
dynamism expand our understanding of how the influence of a firm-specific characteristic on the firm’s 
IT choices depends on the environmental context in which the firm is situated.  This idea is consistent 
with Johns’ (2006) observation that context can change the relationship between variables and is a 
powerful way to elaborate theoretical understanding in a domain.    
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Cumulatively, our study extends past work that has examined how environmental characteristics 
(e.g., volume and technology uncertainty) and organizational characteristics (e.g., top management 
support, firm size, and firm complexity) affect IT adoption and implementation choices (Mishra et al. 
2007; Rai et al. 1997a; Rai et al. 2009). 
2.6.2 Implications for Practice  
Our study has two important implications for practitioners. First, our study provides insights on 
how firms can prioritize the allocation of resources to a system that enables a function or a business 
process (e.g., accounting and financial reporting) or to systems that enable complementary functions or 
business processes (e.g., supply chain and customer relationship). Confronted with information risk, 
particularly in complex environments and in dynamic environments, firms need to recognize the 
importance of prioritizing CES implementation to establish the access to and quality of information 
resources required for the effective execution of interfirm processes.   
Second, when firms are confronted with weak internal controls, they need to recognize the 
importance of prioritizing AES implementation to enable the core processes of accounting and finance 
that are commonly associated with information risk. They need to inform this decision not only by 
considering information risk but also by understanding how the IT-enablement of complementary 
business processes can be useful in reducing information risk and by understanding the external 
environment in which the firm operates. They can develop this understanding through collaboration 
among executives in accounting, finance, IT and other functional domains.  
2.6.3 Limitations and Future Research 
This study has important strengths. It uses rigorous econometric analysis on a rich data set and 
simultaneously evaluates the impact of firm-specific factors and environmental factors in driving firms’ 
ES implementations. Notwithstanding the strengths, the study has some limitations. First, we do not 
examine the role of firms’ governance structures and long-term goals —factors that may be important 
determinants of how firms prioritize IT resource allocation among a set of choices. Second, IT-enabled 
business practices evolve and change over time and the set of technologies and services that can enable 
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business processes continues to see rapid change. For example, big data, and cloud and mobile 
technologies are being touted to influence firms’ digital strategies for the coming years. Future research 
can examine how information risk, internal controls, and environmental characteristics affect a firm’s 
decisions to invest in ubiquitous mobile and cloud-based technologies. Future studies can extend our 
work by considering the roles of these factors in affecting how firms prioritize the allocation of resources 
to the IT enablement of a core business process or to the IT enablement of complementary business 
processes.   
2.7 Conclusion 
Our study examines how firm-specific internal factors and industry-specific external factors lead 
firms to prioritize ES implementations in core or complementary processes. Our findings reveal that firms 
prioritize CES implementation over AES implementation when faced with high information risk and high 
EU, specifically complexity and dynamism. We also find that when increases in information risk are 
accompanied by weak internal controls, firms are likely to prioritize AES implementations over CES 
implementations. Our study extends the resource-based theory by showing that conditions underlying a 
core business process and a firm’s external environment jointly influence the firm's prioritization in 
allocating IT resources (a) to enable the work activities in the core business process or (b) to enable the 
work activities of complementary business processes. 
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2.8 Appendix 2.A — Two-Stage Heckman Analysis 
We performed a two-stage Heckman analysis (Heckman 1979) to identify and correct for 
endogeneity. Our goal was to examine and correct for endogeneity arising from one or more of the 
following reasons:  (a) prioritization of AES vs. CES implementation influences information risk and our 
model suffered from reverse causality, (b) other factors affect ES implementations and information risk, 
and our model had omitted variable bias issues, and (c) firms that implement ES are likely not random as 
certain firm characteristics may influence ES implementations and lead to self-selection bias. We used the 
two-stage Heckman analysis to evaluate and correct for endogeneity. 
For the first stage, we divided our sample into two groups per Shaver (1979). The first group 
included firms with information risk above the median (i.e., high information risk) and was coded as 1 
(InfoRiskMedian=1). The second group of firms had information risk below the median (i.e., low 
information risk) was coded as 0 (InfoRiskMedian=0). Prior studies have used similar coding schemes to 
divide their samples (e.g., see Bharadwaj et al. 2007; Hsieh et al. 2011).   
Drawing on Dichow and Dichev (2002), we identified the predictors of information risk. Dichow 
and Dichev list a comprehensive set of observable firm characteristics that predict information risk. 
Francis et al. (2005) build on Dichow and Dichev’s specifications to compute information risk. Thus, 
Dichow and Dichev provide a reliable set of information risk predictor variables that can be used in the 
first stage of a Heckman analysis. The descriptions and descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2.5. We 
estimated a Probit model using maximum likelihood estimation where the information risk predictors, 
control variables, and the dependent variable of our model –  AESdifferenceCES – were regressed on 
InfoRiskMedian. The dependent variable in this model  – InfoRiskMedian –  was in year t+1. All other 
variables were in year t. 
The correlations are shown in Table 2.6. The results of the Heckman analysis are shown in Table 
2.7. Following stage 1 of the Heckman analysis, we computed the Inverse Mills Ratio and used it as an 
additional control variable for stage 2 of the Heckman analysis. For comparison, we include the results of 
the original analysis in the first column. The results were consistent with the original analysis. After 
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correcting for endogeneity, the coefficients of information risk, IT capital, and the interaction of 
information risk and dynamism become stronger and more significant. The coefficient for the Inverse 
Mills Ratio is negative and significant, suggesting that both the independent variable and the dependent 
variable of the original model are affected by the predictors of the Heckman stage 1 model (Shaver 1998 
p. 582). Thus, factors that affect information risk also affect firms’ strategies to balance AES and CES 
implementations. 
Table 2.5 Descriptions and Descriptive Statistics of Information Risk Predictors 
# Variable Description 
Mean 
(StDev) 
Min Max 
1 LnAT Natural log of assets in 
year t 
7.717 
(1.546) 
4.210 12.397 
2 SalesStDev Standard deviation of sales 
for years t-4 through t 
0.163 
(0.154) 
0.004 2.743 
3 CFOStDev 
Standard deviation of cash 
flow from Operations for 
years t-4 through t 
0.033 
(0.026) 
0.002 0.383 
4 ΔWCStDev 
Standard deviation change 
in working capital from the 
previous year for years t-4 
through t 
0.025 
(0.022) 
0.001 0.289 
5 EarnStDev 
Earn = Long term accruals 
computed as CFO + ΔWC, 
standard deviation years t-4 
through t 
0.028 
(0.026) 
0.001 0.437 
6 
Average   
|ΔWC|  
Average of absolute value 
of working capital years t-4 
through t 
0.005 
(0.024) 
-0.149 0.454 
7 EarnNegRatio 
Proportion of earnings that 
are negative for each firm  
0.026 
(0.129) 
0.000 1.000 
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Table 2.6 Correlations for Control Variables and Information Risk Predictors 
 
  
# Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 LnAT
2 SalesStDev -0.13*
3 CFOStDev -0.27* 0.29*
4 ΔWCStDev -0.37* 0.27* 0.62*
5 EarnStDev -0.20* 0.24* 0.72* 0.44*
6 Average |ΔWC| -0.09* 0.06* 0.09* 0.08* 0.07*
7 EarnNegRatio -0.14* 0.02 0.23* 0.19* 0.30* 0.01
8 FirmAge 0.40* -0.13* -0.15* -0.14* -0.13* -0.01 -0.04*
9 LEVERAGE 0.26* 0.01 -0.07* 0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.13* 0.12*
10 SegmentsLn 0.17* -0.11* -0.06* -0.10* 0.0 0.01 -0.10* 0.08* -0.10*
11 Foreign 0.03 -0.07* 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.10* 0.50*
12
ABSCHGROA 
(x100)
-0.16* 0.06* 0.29* 0.23* 0.35* 0.01 0.23* -0.10* 0.08* 0.04* 0.03
13 FirmRisk (x100) -0.14* 0.03 0.21* 0.19* 0.21* -0.01 0.21* -0.10* 0.12* -0.01 0.00 0.60*
14 SalesGrowth 0.03 0.14* -0.01 -0.10* 0.05* 0.02 -0.11* -0.10* -0.10* 0.05* 0.03 0.04* -0.10*
15 IT_Capital -0.33* 0.11* 0.15* 0.21* 0.06* 0.00 0.04* -0.11* -0.04* -0.10* -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.10*
* Significant at 0.05 level
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Table 2.7. Heckman Analysis Generalized Least Square Regression Results 
  Original Model Heckman Stage 1 Heckman Stage 2 
Dependent Variable → 
AESdifferenceCES 
(AES-CES in year 
t+1) 
InfoRiskMedian 
(t+1) 
AESdifferenceCES 
(AES-CES in year 
t+1) 
Predictor Variables ↓       
LnAT   -0.1709836***   
SalesStDev   4.369819***   
CFOStDev   7.743752**   
ΔWCStDev   7.119727**   
EarnStDev   3.121658   
Average |ΔWC|   1.739785   
EarnNegRatio   0.4693851   
InfoRiskXWeakControls 0.2760092**   0.2939539** 
InfoRiskXCPX -0.2330299**   -0.2490121** 
InfoRiskXDYN -2.563356**   -2.932529*** 
InfoRiskXMUN 0.2186323   0.8396706 
InfoRisk -0.1514203**   -0.3305465*** 
WeakControls -0.0034575   -0.0091549 
CPX -0.0011166   0.0104609 
DYN 0.0455527   0.0029809 
MUN -0.0115454   -0.0334958 
Inverse Mills Ratio     -0.0739453*** 
FirmAge -0.000973*** -0.0011502 -0.0006064*** 
Leverage -0.0695092*** 0.3219383 -0.0617505*** 
SegmentsLn 0.0053819 0.0848266 0.0070742 
Foreign -0.0044218 -0.051869 -0.0024968 
ABSCHGROA (x100) 0.0025034 0.2380521*** -0.0073669 
FirmRisk (x100) 0.001998 -0.0417628 0.0011594 
Sales Growth 0.0299978 0.6354368*** 0.0031672 
IT_Capital -0.1465438 -2.074415 -0.225711** 
YearDummies Included Included Included 
Constant 0.3610951*** -0.1214858 0.4101772*** 
Wald Chi-Square 61.54 218.57 103.65 
Log likelihood 228.97 -1316.14 247.88 
Firms (Firm-year 
observations) 
883 (2604) 883 (2601) 883 (2601) 
***p<0.01   ** p<0.05   * p<0.1; one-tailed test given directional effects are hypothesized 
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3 Chapter 3 — Uncovering the Business Value Creation Mechanisms of Enterprise Systems in 
the Internal Control Processes Context 
3.1 Abstract 
This study examines how the use of enterprise systems (ES) in a focal business process can be 
combined with competence in the business domain and the use of complementary enterprise systems 
(CES) in other process domains to achieve conflicting process performance objectives. We situate the 
theory development and empirical investigation in the context of a firm’s internal control processes. We 
conceptualize internal control processes as a robust set of managerial and operational processes that 
safeguard against material weaknesses (MWs). Drawing on the resource-based theory, theory of 
complementarities, and the process-mediated IT business value perspective, we develop a model to 
explain the mechanisms through which Accounting Enterprise Systems (AES) in combination with other 
IT (CES) and non-IT (accounting managerial competence) resources can enable a firm to develop capable 
managerial and operational internal control processes, and improve the audit process performance. 
We construct a multi-source firm-level panel dataset on a firm’s AES use, CES use, material 
MWs, audit process performance measures, and a range of firm and industry control variables. We apply 
econometric and multivariate analysis procedures to test our model using a sample of 314 firms’ data 
from 2004 through 2009 periods. 
Our results reveal multiple mechanisms through which AES creates business value, assessed at 
the process level. First, we find AES use complemented by CES use improves process performance 
(specifically reduction in audit fees and delays) through improvements in managerial internal control 
processes but not through operational internal control processes. Second, we find AES use adversely 
affects internal control processes when firms lack strong accounting managerial competence. Third, above 
and beyond the previous two mechanisms that involve process capability as a mediator in the AES-
process performance causal chain, we find AES use and accounting managerial competence to have 
countervailing effects in reducing audit delays. Although firms that lack accounting managerial 
competence can reduce audit delays by increasing AES use, it weakens their internal control processes. 
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Collectively, the results expand our understanding of creating IT business value at the process level and 
leveraging AES to develop efficient and effective internal control processes.  
Keywords: Internal Controls, Enterprise Systems, Audit Process Performance, Business Value of IT, 
Managerial Competence 
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3.2 Introduction 
While scholars have examined both the direct (e.g., see Bharadwaj et al. 1999; Hitt et al. 1996; 
Rai et al. 1997b) and the process mediated relationships of IT on firm performance (e.g., see Barua et al. 
2004; Barua et al. 1995), the growing trend in recent years has been to examine the impact of IT on 
process performance instead. The underlying argument is that firm performance is a highly aggregated 
measure comprised of factors that are inconsistent across firms. In actuality, though, process performance 
corresponds directly to the use of IT. Further, the business value of IT derived through the process 
performance is often mediated by the business processes (BPs) (Drnevich et al. 2013; Ray et al. 2004), 
which are defined as a set of logically related tasks performed to achieve a defined business outcome 
(Davenport et al. 1990; Overby 2008). 
Business processes digitized by IT are faster, cost efficient, and less prone to manual errors as 
compared to non-digitized BPs (Overby 2008) and enable firms to respond to market fluctuations and 
improve their ability to adapt to supply and demand uncertainties (Barua et al. 2004; Rai et al. 2006; Rai 
et al. 2010). Several conceptual papers (e.g., see Dehning et al. 2002; Kohli et al. 2008; Melville et al. 
2004) therefore advocate, and empirical studies evaluate (Karimi et al. 2007a; Kohli et al. 2012; Tallon 
2007), the value created by IT, especially ES, through innovations and improvements to the BPs that they 
digitize. For example, Cotteleer and Bendoly (2006) find that ES implementation leads to improved order 
lead time; Ayal and Seidman (2009) find that ES implementation results in improved billing, diagnostic 
quality, and film reduction processes; and Dorantes et al. (2013) find that ES implementation leads to 
improved forecasting accuracy.  
 In spite of advances that have increased our understanding through the adoption of a process-
driven approach to examining IT business value in different technology and process contexts, there are 
two important gaps that we identify and focus on addressing.  First, there is the need to extend the 
literature by examining how a given class of IT (e.g., ES) can influence different types of BPs. Indeed, 
this point was initially made in earlier business process reengineering literature that noted that the 
influence of IT on BP depends on the nature of process activities (Davenport et al. 1990).  Drawing upon 
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Varadrajan and Yadav (2002), and Piller and Stotko’s (2002) conceptualization of digitizability, we 
suggest that processes—like products—differ in the extent to which they can be digitized. Each BP 
consists of one or more process activities (Benner et al. 2003; Davenport et al. 1990), and the extent to 
which IT can digitize a BP depends on whether the activities are predominantly operational or managerial 
(Davenport et al. 1990). The influence of IT on BP digitization is likely to differ between managerial and 
operational BPs, where operational BPs are more amenable to digitization. However, it is not yet 
understood whether there is any difference in the benefits derived by managerial and operational BPs, and 
whether the impact of these BPs on process performance varies.  
The second aspect where research falls short is in a sufficient understanding of how BPs in 
conjunction with other complementary resources impact process performance. While digitization can 
improve the performance of intermediate BPs (Barua et al. 2004; Rai et al. 2006), the nature of 
improvement in process performance is unclear. Indeed, the proportionality of BPs’ impact on process 
performance is contingent on other factors. These factors may include the managerial level at which the 
process operates (Beneish et al. 2008; Rai et al. 2006), the number of stakeholders impacted by the 
process (Davenport et al. 2003), the standardizability of the process (Stetten et al. 2008), and alignment of 
the process with the firm’s business operations (Rai et al. 2012; Ray et al. 2005). 
To study the extent of IT’s influence on BPs and its business value, this research examines how 
AES affect internal control processes, and how the internal control processes affect audit process 
performance. We specifically examine the internal control processes, and the associated business value 
generated by AES for two major reasons. First, internal control processes are distinctive not only because 
a firm is said to have poor internal control capabilities if it has one or more Material Weaknesses (MWs) 
(defined as a significant deficiency, or combination of significant deficiencies, that results in more than a 
remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will not be 
prevented or detected) in its internal control processes, but also because both the firm’s management and 
external auditors are required to test them and unlike other processes their outcomes are publicly 
disclosed. Second, public firms responded to the stringent requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
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2002 (SOX) by making large-scale investments in their regulatory infrastructures. The largest share of 
this expenditure has been spent on information systems, specifically AES (InvestopediaReport 2009; 
Kallunki et al. 2011; Zrimesk et al. 2003)
12
. Since ES are typically known to be the large, complex, and 
highly demanding information systems to implement, AES consume a significant share of the regulatory 
infrastructure expenditures (Grabski et al. 2011). 
Accounting enterprise systems can play a critical role in facilitating compliance with SOX by 
strengthening the internal control processes through digitization (Grabski et al. 2007; Grabski et al. 2011; 
Hyvönen 2003). However, in spite of the capabilities provided by AES and widely reported investments 
in them, their success has been uneven. While some firms have been successful in improving their 
internal control processes (Dorantes et al. 2013), others have had moderate to no success with AES 
(CIMA-Report 2004; DefenseSystemsReport 2012; Grabski et al. 2007; Granlund et al. 2002). More 
generally, research shows that firms incur major losses and lose their competitive edge when they fail to 
achieve the desired objectives from expensive ES implementations
13
 (Davenport 1998; Davenport 2000). 
It is therefore important to examine why some firms that have implemented and used AES are able to 
strengthen their internal control processes and generate business value as compared to others who also 
have implemented and used AES and yet had MWs.  
In order to understand why firms differ in the benefits they derive from the use of AES, it is 
important to examine how they leverage AES for their internal control processes.  Research that takes the 
process-driven approach to examine the business value of ES emphasizes the importance of identifying 
the specific BP capabilities through which ES creates value (e.g., Ayal et al. 2009; Cotteleer et al. 2006). 
We draw on Davenport and Short’s (1990), Benner and Tushman’s (2003), and Davenport’s (2005) 
classification of BPs as operational or managerial. While a BP can be a mix of managerial and operational 
process activities, it is considered to be operational or managerial depending on the managerial or 
operational predominance of the activities that constitute it. We classify the internal control processes as 
operational or managerial and examine the impact of AES on them. Business processes can significantly 
                                                 
12 See http://www.emrisk.com/services/regulatory-compliance 
13 See http://www.pcworld.com/article/246647/10_biggest_erp_software_failures_of_2011.html 
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differ from one another in their orientation towards managerial or operational activities. Since not all BPs 
can be equally impactful on process performance (Grover et al. 2000; Kettinger et al. 1997; Mani et al. 
2010), we examine the impact of AES on audit process performance mediated by internal control 
processes.   
Drawing on the economic theory of complementarities (Milgrom et al. 1995; Tanriverdi 2006), 
we first evaluate the role of a firm’s CES resources to assimilate AES into the managerial and operational 
internal control processes. A firm’s CES resources reflect the emphasis given to IT within a firm and the 
level of preparation a firm takes to adopt and assimilate newer technologies. The more a firm emphasizes 
IT, the more pervasive it is across functional domains. The pervasiveness of IT across functional domains 
improves the technical know-how and lowers the barriers for implementing and successfully operating 
elaborate and complex cross-functional technologies (Attewell 1992; Brynjolfsson et al. 2000; 
Brynjolfsson et al. 1996).  Thus, it is important to understand how firm performance will vary across 
firms with high and low CES resources.  
Second, prior studies and auditing guidance suggest that no matter how well the internal control 
processes are conceived and operated, they cannot provide absolute assurance against misstatements. 
Internal control processes are exposed to possible faulty decision-making and breakdowns due to simple 
errors and mistakes. Internal control processes may not only be intentionally or unknowingly 
circumvented and overridden; they may also be constrained due to a lack of resources—specifically 
knowledge resources—or high costs of implementation and testing. Thus, over and beyond the 
capabilities of internal control processes, a firm’s accounting managerial competence plays an important 
role in building strong internal control quality (COSO-Framework 1992; Lin et al. 2011).  
However, it is unclear as to the nature of the relationship between managerial and operational 
internal control processes and human resource competence in affecting business performance. Sigglekow 
(2002) notes that resource allocation decisions in capability development (e.g., processes or human 
resource competence) needs to be based on an understanding of the complementary or substitutive effects 
that the given capabilities have on business performance.  On one hand, it can be argued that process 
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capabilities and human resources are substitutive and therefore weaknesses in process controls are 
compensated by human resource competence.  On the other hand, it can be argued that internal control 
processes and human resource competence are complementary, with the marginal returns from one of 
them increasing with the level of the other.  Accordingly, we examine the complementarities of AES-
enabled managerial and operational internal control processes with a firm’s accounting managerial 
competence in affecting audit process performance. Our research objective is as following: 
RO: Examine how AES use along with complementary resources impact audit process 
performance through the enablement of managerial and operational internal control 
processes 
3.3 Background and Hypotheses Development 
We use two perspectives (resource-based theory and theory of complementarities) to understand 
how AES use affects audit process performance. Drawing on resource-based theory, we identify AES as 
an IT resource and examine how it affects audit process performance through intermediate BPs, 
specifically internal control processes.  Drawing on the theories of complementarities, we examine the 
complementary roles of 1) CES use in affecting how internal control processes are developed from AES 
use and how they affect the process performance and 2) accounting managerial competence in affecting 
the process performance benefits of internal control processes.  
Resource-based theory has informed several studies that examine the business value of IT. Early 
works drawing on the resource-based theory (1) differentiated between IT infrastructure, human IT 
resources, and IT-enabled intangibles (Bharadwaj 2000); (2) observed that IT resources create value for 
firms by increasing efficiency and productivity (Barney 1991; Bharadwaj 2000), and (3) concluded that 
the sustained effective use of IT enables firms to generate benefits that overcome costs (Kohli et al. 
2003). However, since IT sources are increasingly ubiquitous and not rare or inimitable, they may not 
provide sustained competitive advantage and value to firms (Tanriverdi et al. 2010). In particular, due to 
the broad-scale availability and adoption of standardized information systems like ES, the link between IT 
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investments and firm-performance has weakened (Chae et al. 2013). Firms therefore constantly seek 
innovative ways of using IT to improve process performance (Chae et al. 2013; Kohli et al. 2003; 
Leonardi et al. 2008). Thus, it is no longer a question of whether investing in IT can improve firm 
performance, but it is a question about how IT capabilities can be combined with non-IT capabilities to 
generate business value (Karimi et al. 2007b; Kohli et al. 2003). Consequently, studies that examine the 
business value of IT, and specifically complex systems such as ES, have shifted focus from studying the 
direct effects of BPs to examining BPs and the technologies that help them technologies generate business 
value (e.g., see Ayal et al. 2009; Cotteleer et al. 2006; Dorantes et al. 2013). 
The process-driven approach of examining process performance outcomes has garnered attention 
since it shifts focus to a set of capability-development considerations that are not addressed by examining 
the direct link from ES investments to firm performance. First, it focuses attention on how firms that have 
successfully implemented ES realize benefits. The process-driven approach requires focus not only on 
benefits from ES implementations but also on how BP capabilities mediate the relationship between ES 
and benefits (Kohli et al. 2008; Melville et al. 2004). Second, it requires making distinctions among types 
of BP capabilities that are enabled by ES.  This approach enables researchers to examine ES 
implementation success across a set of BPs with respect to various outcomes (e.g., efficiency, 
effectiveness and flexibility) (Gattiker et al. 2005; Karimi et al. 2007a).  
3.3.1 Capabilities of Internal Control Processes 
 We contextualize the study to AES and the internal control processes (Table 3.1). Our first step is 
to identify the internal control processes that are facilitated by AES. We specifically examine AES and 
capabilities of internal control processes for two reasons. First, internal control processes are the key 
processes facilitated by AES (Gorka 2012; IFAC-Guidance 2012; Masli et al. 2010). They reflect firms’ 
abilities to manage their financial accounting and reporting structures, achieve effective and efficient 
operations, and comply with laws and regulations (COSO-Framework 1992; Feng et al. 2009). Large-
scale AES investments in public firms were primarily driven by the need to strengthen the internal control 
quality and comply with SOX (InvestopediaReport 2009). Second, unlike process capabilities that are 
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subject to varying interpretations and measurement (Barua et al. 1995; Bharadwaj et al. 1999; Mooney et 
al. 1996), internal control processes are thoroughly tested and their outcomes are publicly reported under 
Section 404 of SOX.  
Table 3.1. Constructs and Operationalization 
Constructs/Variables Corresponding Operationalization 
Enterprise system use Accounting enterprise systems use 
Capabilities of internal control processes 
Material weaknesses of managerial and 
operational internal control processes 
Audit process performance 
• Percentage increase in audit fees 
• Percentage increase in audit delays 
 
 While both Sections 302 and 404 of SOX require MWs to be disclosed, we examine the MWs 
in internal control processes reported under Section 404. Section 404 requires management to certify the 
state of its internal control quality. Unlike Section 302, Section 404 requires (1) both the auditors and the 
firm’s management to independently test and document the effectiveness of internal control processes, 
and (2) auditors to provide a separate opinion on the effectiveness of internal control processes.  Thus, 
management thus has less discretion under Section 404 to determine whether or not an internal control 
deficiency is an MW. Since Section 404 has more stringent requirements than Section 302, prior studies 
have used Section 404 disclosures (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Hoitash et al. 2009; Lin et al. 
2011). 
 We first identify the reported MWs under Section 404 and map them to internal control 
processes. The reported MWs represent the failure of an internal control process activity where there is 
more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement cannot be prevented or detected (Lin et al. 
2011).  As such, MWs provide an objective basis to evaluate the capabilities of internal control processes.  
This objective measurement overcomes the critique rendered on the capabilities literature of embedded 
tautologies with performance measures (Rai et al. 2012; Williamson 1999).  
 Drawing on the literature that examines the internal control processes and BPs, we classify MWs 
into the following five mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive categories of internal control 
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processes: (i) establishment of and compliance to policies and procedures; (ii) erroneous 
disclosures/filings, restatements and investigations;  (iii) design, implementation, and review of internal 
control processes; and (iv) information technology. The fifth category represents accounting managerial 
competence. 
3.3.2 Existing Classification of Material Weaknesses  
There have been different approaches to classifying MWs (see Bedard et al. 2012; Goh 2009; 
Johnstone et al. 2011). The classification criteria used by prior studies is based on (a) Moody’s (2004) 
suggestion to examine the level at which an MW occurs, and (b) the internal control components 
suggested in the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) 
framework (1992). Moody’s classification categorizes MWs as either account-specific or entity-level. 
Account-specific MWs occur over specific accounts or transactions whereas entity-level MWs affect the 
overall financial reporting capability of a firm. While account-specific MWs are identifiable by auditors 
through substantial testing and are comparatively less severe in magnitude, entity-level MWs are difficult 
to test and audit and are more severe (Bedard et al. 2012; Goh 2009). In contrast, the COSO framework 
defines five interrelated internal control components: (a) the control environment, (b) risk assessment, (c) 
control activities, (d) information and communication, and (e) monitoring. Per the COSO framework “the 
five components are derived from the way management runs a business, and are integrated with the 
management process.” It is important to clarify that the term “management process” used by the COSO 
framework does not refer to the management practices associated with internal control processes but 
rather to how a firm strengthens its internal control quality. 
 Studies that use Moody’s classification of MWs and the COSO framework of internal control 
components have examined the role of corporate governance in the remediation of MWs. For example, 
Goh (2009) examines the role of the audit committee and board of directors in monitoring internal control 
processes and remediating MWs. Johnstone et al.  (2011) examine how remediation of MWs when 
aligned with changes in governance structures—that is, the board of directors, audit committee, and top 
management—improve internal control processes.  Bedard et al. (2012) examine the variation in the 
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remediation rates of MWs depending on whether the MWs were reported in account-specific or entity-
level activities. Bedard et al. (2012) further suggest that entity-level problems are comparatively difficult 
to resolve, take longer to remediate, and require large investments in IT and personnel.  
 In contrast to the above works that have drawn on Moody’s classification and the COSO 
framework to investigate the role of governance structures and financial characteristics in relation to 
MWs, the objective of this study is to examine the impact of AES on firm performance through the 
capabilities of internal control processes.  As such, our objectives require the classification of MWs in 
internal control processes according to the type of process.  Moody’s (2004) and COSO’s internal control 
components are insufficient to identify the correspondence between MWs and business processes for 
three reasons. 
 First, Moody’s classification suggests that entity-level MWs are more difficult to audit, have 
greater impact on a firm’s ratings, and are difficult to remediate. Bedard et al. (2012), however, find that 
certain account-specific MWs may be more challenging to remediate than entity-level MWs and can have 
greater impact than some entity-level MWs. This difference can be partly explained by the fact that firms 
differ in the operationalization of their internal control processes (COSO-Framework 1992). Depending 
on the size of a firm, scale of its operations, and level of diversification, a given internal control 
deficiency can be classified as an account-specific MW for one firm and as an entity-level MW for 
another. Given the objectives of our study to focus on internal process control capabilities, we require a 
consistent basis to map MWs to processes.  
 Second, all MWs are internal control deficiencies but of larger magnitude than a significant 
deficiency (Ge et al. 2005). When a control deficiency is classified as an MW, it means that even though 
the MW may be specific to an account or a transaction, it is material for a firm to suggest that its financial 
statements cannot be relied upon and that a material error may go undetected. As a given BP may result in 
MWs at the account and entity levels, we focus on MWs associated with a process and do not 
differentiate between MWs at the account and entity levels.   
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 Third, the COSO framework provides guidance—not rules—for firms to establish internal control 
processes and gives them room to interpret and implement internal control process components 
differently so that they meet firms’ needs (page 4. COSO-Framework 1992). As firms can interpret and 
operationalize internal control process components differently, we classify MWs according to the 
business processes to which they belong, where each internal control process provides an abstract of the 
underlying activities that can be consistently applied to map MWs across firms. We, therefore, use the 
COSO framework components to guide the categorization of MWs to the extent possible.  
3.3.3 Classification of Material Weaknesses into Capabilities for Internal Control Processes 
 We identified five categories – four process categories and managerial competence – related to 
internal controls into which we classify the MWs. Drawing upon Davenport and Short (1990) and Benner 
and Tushman (2003), we identified the internal control process categories that provide a high level 
abstract using the following approach.  First, we used the title and definition provided by Audit Analytics 
(AA) for each of the 21 different types of MWs to determine the process activities they represents. 
Second, we classified the process activities into distinct categories depending on their characteristics such 
that each category represents a BP and consists of process activities that share a common objective. The 
literature on internal control processes, SOX clauses, and audit and accounting guidance were used as 
informing sources to identify the internal control process categories. Third, we conducted a structured Q-
sorting exercise to ensure the convergent and discriminant validity for the MW categories (Moore et al. 
1991). Our six sorters were doctoral students in the accounting department at a major research university. 
All of them had prior industry experience and knowledge of auditing. Eighty nine percent of the MWs 
were correctly classified into the categories by the sorters. The results suggest good quality measures. The 
MW categories, the informing sources, and definitions are shown in Table 3.2. Four of the five categories 
represent an internal control process and one category represents the accounting managerial competence 
of a firm. All five categories are elaborated below. 
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Table 3.2. Material Weakness Classification into Capabilities of Internal Control Processes 
Internal Control 
Processes 
Category: 
Material 
Weakness 
Classification 
Informing Sources Material Weakness Full Material Weakness Description 
Establishment of 
and compliance to 
policies and 
procedures 
(Managerial) 
COSO-Framework 
(1992),SOX (2002)  
Section 302 (4A, 4C, 
4D) and 404, 
Chenhall (2003), Ge 
and McVay (2005) 
Accounting 
documentation, 
policy and/or 
procedure 
Represents material weaknesses deriving from 
internal control systems that do not contain 
adequate documentation, policies or other 
means of justifying account balances. These 
issues may also include failures to ensure that 
accounts are recorded based on GAAP, SAB, 
FASB and/or the appropriate accounting 
methodology is followed. They may also 
include failures in policies or procedures 
designed to gather the correct information on a 
timely basis or problems with the year-end 
close process. It also includes failures to 
employ proper procedures over journal entries, 
non-routine transactions and other common 
procedural failures. 
Ethical or 
compliance issues 
with personnel 
Consists of problems with personnel in the 
areas of compliance with policies, maintenance 
of ethical standards, fraud and intentional acts 
that lead to (or could lead to) misstated account 
balances or financial reports. 
Ineffective 
regulatory 
compliance issues 
Consists of internal control deficiencies 
associated with failures to meet regulatory 
requirements other than taxes. 
Erroneous 
disclosures/filings, 
restatements and 
investigations 
(Managerial) 
SOX (2002) Section 
302 (5A, 5B, 6), 303 
and 404, Wolfe et al. 
(2009), Rose et al. 
(2010), Goh and Li 
(2011), Dechow et 
al. (2011) 
Material and/or 
numerous auditor/ 
YE adjustments 
Represents circumstances where one of the 
explanations for a material weakness opinion 
was the number and/or size of year-end 
adjustments including those proposed by the 
auditor. These adjustments also consider 
footnote and related errors that need to be 
corrected by the auditor at year-end. Too 
many, or auditor initiated, year-end 
adjustments are considered prima facie 
evidence of a potential material weakness in 
financial reporting. 
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Internal Control 
Processes 
Category: 
Material 
Weakness 
Classification 
Informing Sources Material Weakness Full Material Weakness Description 
Erroneous 
disclosures/filings, 
restatements and 
investigations 
(Managerial) 
SOX (2002)Section 
302 (5A, 5B, 6), 303 
and 404, Wolfe et al. 
(2009), Rose et al. 
(2010), Goh and Li 
(2011), Dechow et 
al. (2011) 
SEC or other 
regulatory 
investigations 
and/or inquiries 
An SEC or related investigation into company 
affairs is often evidence of accounting or 
financial reporting issues that point to internal 
control deficiencies. This category seeks to 
identify circumstances where registrants have 
indicated in their 404 assertion that an SEC 
investigation or inquiry is underway. 
Restatement of 
previous 404 
disclosures 
Represents circumstances where a company 
has had to restate its 404 opinion because of 
some event (most likely a restatement of 
financials) that has occurred subsequent to 
filing. 
Untimely or 
inadequate account 
reconciliations 
In reviewing internal control assertions or 
opinions, it is often the case that inadequate 
account reconciliations are identified as the 
reason for material or numerous adjustments. 
This category seeks to specifically identify 
such circumstances. 
SAB 108 
adjustments noted 
This item is checked when the internal control 
disclosure identifies that a SAB 108, as 
opposed to a financial restatement, process is 
used to correct the beginning retained earnings 
balances associated with previous period 
accounting errors. 
Management / 
Board / Audit 
Committee 
investigations 
Consists of internal control reports indicating 
that an internal investigation is underway 
relative to accounting and/or financial 
reporting matters. This item is demographic in 
nature. 
Restatement or non-
reliance of company 
filings 
Consists of material weakness opinions 
deriving from problems that led to 
restatements. Restatements are often evidence 
of prima-facie internal control deficiencies. 
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Internal Control 
Processes 
Category: 
Material 
Weakness 
Classification 
Informing Sources Material Weakness Full Material Weakness Description 
Design, 
implementation, 
and review of 
internal controls 
(Operational) 
COSO-Framework 
(1992), SOX (2002)  
Section 302 (4B, 4C, 
4D, 5A), and 404, 
Abernethy et al. 
(2004), Ge and 
McVay (2005), Feng 
et al. (2009), Li et al. 
(2012) 
Segregations of 
duties/design of 
controls (personnel) 
This category covers internal control 
deficiencies associated with the design and use 
of personnel within an organization. It 
primarily deals with segregation of duty issues, 
such as clerks having access to both the cash 
receipts and the bank reconciliation. It may 
also deal with more sophisticated design of 
control issues relating to executives, such as 
having the ability to change customer records. 
Journal entry 
control issues 
This category is checked whenever the 
description given by the audit firm or company 
refers to deficiencies or issues associated with 
the journal entry process. This category is not 
checked when there is a journal entry error that 
originates from control deficiencies in other 
areas. 
Inadequate 
disclosure controls 
(timely, accurate, 
completeness) 
Represents control deficiencies related to the 
adequacy of information flow that should 
result in a required disclosure. 
Non-routine 
transaction control 
issues 
This category is checked whenever a registrant 
specifically describes one of their control 
deficiencies as emanating from non-routine 
types of transactions. These could include 
acquisitions, asset sales, establishment of new 
systems and other. 
Treasury control 
issues 
N/A 
Scope (disclaimer of 
opinion) or other 
limitations 
A material weakness opinion may derive from 
assertions from the company or auditor that the 
company had not completed its own review of 
internal controls and therefore these controls 
could not be audited. These limitations could 
come about for any number of reasons. 
Information 
technology 
(Operational) 
Wolfe et al. (2009),  
Masli et al. (2010), 
Li et al. (2012) 
Information 
technology, 
software, security 
and access issues 
Deficiencies in this category include deficient 
program controls, software 
programs/implementation, segregation of 
duties associated with personnel having access 
to computer accounting or financial reporting 
records and related problems with 
oversight/access to electronic data/programs. 
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Internal Control 
Processes 
Category: 
Material 
Weakness 
Classification 
Informing Sources Material Weakness Full Material Weakness Description 
Competence 
weakness 
(Accounting 
managerial 
competence) 
COSO-Framework 
(1992), Hoitash et 
al.(2009), Lin et al. 
(2011), Li et al. 
(2012) 
Accounting 
personnel resources, 
competency/ 
training  
Consists of problems with accounting 
personnel resources, competency, training, 
experience and/ or adequacy in any way. To 
meet these criteria, such an indication would 
have to be contained in the filing or in the 
remediation plan. 
Ineffective or 
understaffed audit 
committee 
Represents circumstances where an audit 
committee may not have the personnel, expert, 
experience and/or resources to perform their 
duties to the extent required by Sarbanes Oxley 
or their charter. 
Senior management 
competency, tone, 
reliability issues 
This category has been established to identify 
circumstances where internal control 
weaknesses are attributed directly to 
potentially improper or negligent conduct of 
the current or former senior management of the 
company. This does not necessarily mean that 
the assertion is correct, just that such language 
exists in the filing. 
Insufficient or non-
existent internal 
audit function 
Indicates circumstances where a company has 
stated that its internal audit function was 
insufficient in identifying and/or advising in 
the correction of internal control deficiencies. 
It cannot also identify circumstances where a 
registrant has identified a failure to have an 
internal audit department at all, as an internal 
control failure. 
 
 Establishment of and compliance to policies and procedures: MWs classified to this category 
result from (1) either a lack of internal polices or a lack of compliance to internal policies that ensure that 
accounts are documented and recorded per standardized (GAAP, SAB etc.) procedures and (2) ethical 
issues and failure in adhering to regulatory processes.  
Referred to as a mechanistic form of governance by Chenhall (2003), the establishment and 
documentation of policies and procedures is the foundation of a strong internal control environment 
(COSO-Framework 1992). As SOX Sections 302 and 404 note, it is important that firms (a) determine 
their internal control policies, (b) formulate procedures and routines that guide personnel to follow the 
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policies, and (c) document accounts per standard accounting methodologies in order to comply with 
regulatory laws. Usually attributed to new and financially weak firms, lack of established policies and 
procedures is the most commonly reported form of MW (Ge et al. 2005). However, in spite of well-
established policies and procedures, firms are prone to material errors in their financial statements when 
rules are bypassed or due to personnel’s intentional unethical behavior for personal gain (Leuz et al. 
2008). Often classified as entity-level problems (Goh 2009), material errors due to fraud have the most 
damaging impact on firms’ reputations. 
  Erroneous disclosures/filings, restatements, and investigations: MWs classified to this category 
include (1) erroneous disclosures and filings of financial and internal control statements and  (2) SEC, 
auditor, and management investigations over financial reporting matters. This category reflects process 
activities that entail corrections and adjustments to previously issued financial statements, internal control 
reports, and circumstances that lead to the need for corrections. Since investors’ perceptions of investment 
risk is significantly affected by MW reports (Rose et al. 2010), some firms may project a stronger internal 
control environment and show themselves to be financially stronger than they actually are. Indeed, some 
firms try to persuade external auditors to lower their assessment of control deficiencies (Francis et al. 
2005; Wolfe et al. 2009). They can also use tactics such as an abnormal reduction in number of 
employees to improve short-run earnings, maintain/increase investor confidence, and demonstrate 
competitive success (Dechow et al. 2011). To curtail such behaviors, SOX mandates that firms disclose 
significant changes in internal control processes or factors that may significantly affect the ability to 
detect misstatements even after the internal control processes have been evaluated. Sarbanes-Oxley also 
make it unlawful for any person or party to fraudulently influence, manipulate, coerce or mislead 
personnel or activities for the purpose of rendering financial statements misleading.  
 Since the enactment of SOX, several firms have restated their financial statements and internal 
control reports. The majority of these firms were unable to identify the material errors and problems in 
their internal control processes in a timely manner (Goh et al. 2011). A firm’s internal control assertion is 
considered unreliable when it is discovered that its accounts are either not reconciled in a timely manner 
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or inadequately reconciled. The auditors under such conditions are mandated to report it as an MW and 
such firms are required to (a) restate their financial statements and internal control reports and (b) disclose 
the MWs in the process activities for which previously did not account. The inability of a firm to report 
internal control issues and material errors discovered after the release of financial statement and an 
internal control report can lead to internal or SEC investigations. Such investigations are usually initiated 
when there is sufficient suspicion that extraneous circumstances influenced the accuracy of the disclosed 
financials. 
 Design, implementation and review of internal control processes: MWs classified to this category 
result from poor design, ineffective implementation, and untimely or inaccurate review of controls over 
process activities that record and report financial data. This category encapsulates MWs associated with 
process activities for the flow of cash or financial data across business functions within a firm or with a 
firm’s trading partners (Abernethy et al. 2004). Effective design and implementation of internal control 
processes impact not only the reliability of financial statements and regulatory compliance, but also the 
efficiency and effectiveness of a firm’s operations (COSO-Framework 1992; Feng et al. 2009). The 
factors that determine the design of internal control processes include the materiality of a process activity 
over which controls are required, the number of controls required, and the personnel who implement the 
controls (Feng et al. 2009).  Firms are expected to (a) implement adequate controls to ensure the accuracy 
of information recorded in journals, (b) have sufficient oversight over personnel responsible for handling 
cash or capable of modifying financial data, and (c) verify that critical non-routine transactions are carried 
out according to the stipulated laws where experienced and trusted personnel from top management 
monitor transactions to ensure their fairness and integrity (COSO-Framework 1992; Ge et al. 2005; Li et 
al. 2012). It is also equally important to review the design and implementation of internal control 
processes through timely and accurate tests. Despite having well designed and effectively implemented 
controls, firms cannot rule out the possibility of a material misstatement if the controls are not regularly 
reviewed. This is why SOX 404 mandates that both management and auditors independently evaluate and 
attest to the effectiveness of a firm’s internal control processes.  
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Information technology: MWs classified to this category represent inadequate data processing 
integrity, insufficient system access security, and inappropriate system structure and usage. Research 
studies and auditing standards underscore the importance of IT for internal control processes as it is 
essential to ensure the reliability of data, safeguard that the security of sensitive information is not 
compromised, and improve the efficiency of day-to-day operations (Li et al. 2012). Consequently, IT for 
internal control quality needs to be effectively designed, implemented and reviewed (Li et al. 2012; Masli 
et al. 2010; Wolfe et al. 2009). Given the key role of IT processes in internal control processes, firms in 
their internal control reports identify IT MWs and discuss plans to remediate them. Research studies (e.g., 
Haislip et al. 2014; Li et al. 2012) have also examined IT controls and IT MWs by differentiating them 
from other internal control processes and MWs. 
Accounting managerial competence: MWs classified to this category arise due to insufficient 
human and material resources, and/or a lack of accounting skills, training, competence in management, 
staff, and audit committee to identify and remediate internal control deficiencies. Accounting competence 
and resources differentiate firms that are able to build strong internal control processes from others that 
are not (COSO-Framework 1992). This is the only category that entails a firm’s human resource 
capabilities rather than internal control processes as it focuses on the accounting competence of a firm, 
including strong and capable top management, internal audit function, management board, audit 
committee members, and accounting/audit personnel of a firm. Prior research suggests that firms with 
strong accounting competence and resources are less likely to have MWs in their internal control 
processes.  Hoitash et al. (2009) find that board and audit committee characteristics influence the internal 
control quality of a firm, and firms that have a higher concentration of audit committee members with 
accounting and supervisory experience have a lower likelihood of disclosing SOX 404 MWs. More 
education and experience among members in the internal audit function and the resources (infrastructure 
necessary to implement and test internal control processes,  such as technology capabilities, office space) 
available to accounting, audit and IT personnel also are negatively related to the likelihood of a firm 
disclosing MWs (Li et al. 2012; Lin et al. 2011). 
 68 
 
Our research model shown in Figure 3.1 is grounded in our theory development and is designed 
to address our research objectives. We now proceed to discuss our hypotheses.  
AES Use
MWs in Managerial 
Internal Control 
Processes
Competence Weakness 
(MWs in Accounting 
Managerial 
Competence) 
Internal Control Processes
MWs in Operational 
Internal Control 
Processes
· Audit Fees
· Audit Delays
CES Use
H1
H2
H3
Audit Process Performance
H4a
Direct effect of AES use on audit process performance
H4 b: AES                                                        à Audit Process Performance
Moderation of AES use on audit process performance direct effect
H4 c: AES Use  x CES Use                             à Audit Process Performance
H4 d: AES Use  x Competence Weakness      à Audit Process Performance
Accounting Managerial Competence
 
Figure 3.1 Research Model 
3.3.4 Capabilities of Managerial and Operational Internal Control Processes 
 Managerial BPs in the context of internal control processes are the processes that require human 
action and judgment where: (i) the firm’s management formulates policies and procedures for employees 
to follow, (ii) management and personnel comply with the policies and procedures, and (iii) management 
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and auditors investigate and take actions to correct prior errors. All these steps rely on human expertise 
and intervention. Material weaknesses in managerial BPs arise primarily due to human error, lack of 
expertise, or intentional bypassing of rules and regulations. Indeed, for these reasons, the detection of 
errors and remediation of MWs in managerial BPs is difficult (Bedard et al. 2012; COSO-Framework 
1992; Hoitash et al. 2009). The use of accounting enterprise systems can assist managerial BPs by 
facilitating access to necessary information but cannot replace or reduce the need for human judgment 
and knowledge. Thus, the establishment and compliance with policies and procedures, and erroneous 
disclosures/filings, restatements and investigations are managerial internal control processes. 
 In contrast, operational BPs require less human intervention, supervision, and scrutiny than 
managerial BPs (Zuboff 1988). By virtue of being more easily and extensively digitized, operational BPs 
generate digital information that can be used to detect errors and rectify MWs. Operational internal 
control processes that can either be fully digitized or digitized to a large extent include IT, and design, 
implementation and review of internal control processes. Accounting enterprise systems provide inbuilt 
capabilities to restrict access to treasury data, segregate duties of personnel, digitize journal entries, 
enable timely review of internal control processes, and facilitate information flow across the firm to 
ensure adequate disclosure of internal control processes.   
The use of accounting enterprise systems can influence the capability of the managerial and 
operational internal control processes. The use of these systems can improve the operational internal 
control processes by extensively digitizing them. The use of accounting enterprise systems can also help 
improve managerial internal control processes by making critical information easily accessible and 
facilitating decision-making within a firm. The above arguments lead us to our first hypothesis:  
H1:  Increase in AES use will reduce MWs in managerial and operational internal control processes 
3.3.5 Role of Complementary Enterprise Systems 
 A firm’s existing IT capabilities facilitate faster diffusion of new technologies across different 
business functions (Milgrom et al. 1995; Tanriverdi 2006). A higher proportion of CES use reflects how 
much a firm emphasizes IT and also indicates prior experience implementing ES. Firms with a higher 
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level of CES use, by virtue of prior experience with the implementation of information systems, are likely 
to have better managerial know-how to assimilate new technologies and mature IT project management 
capabilities (Attewell 1992; Brynjolfsson et al. 2000; Brynjolfsson et al. 1996). Early adopters of 
technology and firms with pre-existing IT resources, thus, are better able to assimilate newer information 
systems and realize their benefits (Attewell 1992; Bharadwaj et al. 1999). We, therefore, suggest that the 
extent of AES use combined with CES use enables firms to combine their AES capabilities with other 
technologies to redesign and innovate their internal control process activities. Thus, we have the 
following hypothesis: 
 H2: The beneficial impacts of AES use in mitigating MWs related to managerial and operational 
internal control processes are greater for firms with high CES use than for those with low CES 
use 
3.3.6 Role of Accounting Managerial Competence  
Material weaknesses due to a lack of accounting managerial competence negatively affects 
process performance, raises concerns among investors regarding the costs a firm may have to incur to 
remediate the MWs, and adds to the sternness with which a firm is negatively evaluated by its 
stakeholders (Hammersley et al. 2008). It suggests that a firm might have additional errors in its financial 
statements that might not have been identified and corrected. Specifically, the quality of management and 
auditors is critical in determining how firms are evaluated by their stakeholders (Hoitash et al. 2009; 
Krishnan et al. 2007; Krishnan 2005). Disclosing MWs due to a lack of accounting managerial 
competence in addition to MWs in internal control processes, therefore, reflects poorly on a firm’s ability 
to manage its internal control processes as well as its ability to govern its personnel and maintain strong 
accounting and audit functions.  
When a firm reports MWs due to accounting managerial competence and managerial and 
operational internal control processes, it sends a signal that not only the management of the firm was 
unable to take proper decisions in regards to the concerned BPs, but also that the firm did not have 
personnel with the skills, experience, education and resources necessary to maintain internal control 
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processes and govern the firm to profitability (Hoitash et al. 2009; Lin et al. 2011).  Accordingly, we 
hypothesize: 
 H3: Material weaknesses related to accounting managerial competence in firms will diminish the 
beneficial impacts of AES use in MWs in managerial and operational internal control processes 
3.3.7 Impact of Capabilities of Internal Control Processes and AES Use on Audit Process 
Performance 
Since a key expected benefit of BP digitization is improvement in process performance, we 
evaluate how AES use, by digitizing internal control processes, leads to better audit process performance, 
specifically audit fees and delays. Digitization of internal control processes through AES use can help 
firms improve (a) evaluation and documentation of internal control processes, (b) management and 
communication of internal control assurance activities, (c) overall risk assessment capabilities, and (d) the 
tracking of audit process trails (Masli et al. 2010). In particular, the time-cost benefits provided by AES 
due to these improvements can reduce the required audit effort. These improvements, therefore, are 
critical for firms to avoid MWs and strengthen the internal control processes.  Therefore, COSO (2009a) 
recognizes technologies such as AES as  “control monitoring tools” as well as “process management 
tools”. Thus, digitization of internal control processes is important to reduce MWs and comply with SOX. 
When internal control processes are not digitized, it is difficult for firms to audit the trails of 
errors in financial statements and clearly identify and disclose the causes that led to MWs. When firms are 
unable diagnose the root cause of errors and provide clear descriptions of the MWs in 10K reports, they 
are more likely to be penalized by the market in the form of negative stock price reactions (Hammersley 
et al. 2008). For MWs in managerial internal control processes, firms can find it difficult to collect the 
accurate information needed to analyze what led to error(s) in decision-making by their personnel. For 
MWs in operational internal control processes, it can be difficult for firms to identify the stage in the 
process at which errors occurred. Such problems can lead to expensive and delayed audit cycles to 
identify and correct for MWs in the internal control processes (Masli et al. 2010). Thus, we hypothesize 
that: 
 72 
 
 H4(a):  Material weaknesses in managerial and operational internal control processes will 
adversely affect audit process performance (increased audit fees and audit  delays) 
As previously discussed, AES are focal technology that can improve internal control processes by 
digitizing them. The automation effect of AES also helps firms improve process performance by 
facilitating human communications (a) across functional domains and business units, and (b) between 
internal and external auditors, both of which can be otherwise time consuming and error-prone.  For 
instance, when a manufacturer procures parts, the supply-chain management system can automatically 
inform the accounts payable and inventory management systems to adjust inventory levels by the number 
of items approved for purchase, reducing the likelihood of human error in payment and inventory 
management (Mukhopadhyay and Kekre 2002).  The use of accounting enterprise systems also helps 
eliminate human error in information processing by automatically checking against pre-defined data 
formats and input parameters (e.g., standard unit measurements for inventory) and providing on-demand 
exception reports.  Dechow and Mouristsen (2005, p.709) provide an illustration in a quote provided by a 
study company’s (“TimeCorp”) manager, who comments, “…our people sometimes entered the wrong 
numbers when counting inventories – you know instead of entering actual value, they accidentally entered 
their employee ID.  Our old systems didn’t monitor it.  Our SAP [a leading ES vendor] system does.”  
Auditors can leverage these ES capabilities to more effectively and efficiently test the reasonableness of 
input parameters that affect account valuations (e.g., inventory valuations) and identify outliers/anomalies 
in transaction data (Alles et al. 2006).  
The process performance improvement effect of AES use requires managers and employees to 
follow system-imposed procedures to manage internal control processes.  In other words, when managers 
and employees perform tasks pertaining to internal control processes by using AES, they follow 
procedures pre-defined and programmed in the AES. Use of AES helps auditors track tasks performed for 
internal control processes using data generated by AES. When auditors are able to track tasks, it 
substantially increases the level of assurance they can place on the accuracy of the information. It reduces 
the amount of substantive (detailed) testing the auditor must do. Thus, increased AES use will lead to (a) 
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increased audit efficiency, thereby reducing auditor fees, and (b) improved timeliness of the audit process, 
thereby reducing audit delays. Drawing on the complementarity logic of AES use with CES use and with 
accounting managerial competence as previously discussed, we expect the direct effect of AES use on 
process performance to be amplified with increasing levels of CES use and to be mitigated when there are 
weaknesses in managerial competence (H4c).  Accordingly, we suggest the following hypotheses: 
 H4(b):  Use of accounting enterprise systems will improve audit process performance (i.e., reduced 
audit fee and delays) 
 H4(c): Use of complementary enterprise systems will enhance the beneficial impact of AES use on 
audit process performance 
 H4(d): Material weaknesses in accounting managerial competence will diminish the beneficial 
impact of AES use on audit process performance 
3.4 Data Collection and Analysis 
3.4.1 Panel Dataset Construction 
A panel dataset was constructed using data from three sources: (1) CI Technology Database (CI), 
which provided data on AES implementations and use, CES implementations and use, and other IT 
variables; (2) Audit Analytics (AA), which provided data on internal control processes (MWs), audit fees, 
and audit delays; and (3) Compustat (CS), which is a source of data on firms’ financial variables. 
We first collected data on SOX 404 reports from AA. Our initial sample was 62,828 firm-year 
observations for 16,765 firms for the years 2001 through 2012. We then matched the AA data with data 
available in CS. This resulted in 45,303 firm-year observations for 8901 firms for the years 2001through 
2012 for which CS had corresponding financial metrics data available. We then matched these firm-year 
observations with data obtained from CI. This exercise produced 6392 firm-year observations for 1651 
firms for the years 2003 through 2009 and resulted in a six-year panel data set where the independent 
variables AES and CES were from 2003 through 2008, while the dependent variables on internal controls 
and audit performance were from 2004 through 2009. Of the 1651 firms in our sample, 1337 with 4911 
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firm-year observations had never disclosed any MWs in their internal control processes. In other words, 
1337 firms had always had strong internal controls within the period of our study. The remainder 314 
firms with 1481 firm-year observations had disclosed MWs at least once between 2004 and 2009, which 
constitutes the sample for our study.  
Table 3.3 Constructs, Definitions, and Measures 
Construct/Variable Variable Name Definition Measurement 
AES use AES_Use 
Extent of use of an integrated 
enterprise system for a firm's 
accounting process 
∑ 𝐴𝐸𝑆𝑖/𝑁
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1   
Where N= total number of a 
firm’s sites where each site has 
at least 50 employees, AES =1 if 
site i uses AES; 0 otherwise 
 
CES use CES_Use 
Extent of use of enterprise systems 
that are complementary to AES 
[ ∑  𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑆𝑖/𝑁𝑖=𝑁𝑖=1  + 
∑ 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝐸𝑆𝑖/𝑁
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1  + 
∑ 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝐸𝑆𝑖/𝑁
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1   + 
∑ 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑆𝑖/𝑁
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1  ] / 4 
where each ES use is computed 
similar to AES_Use 
MWs in internal 
control processes 
ICPrWeak 
Inability of a firm's internal 
controls processes to prevent or 
detect material misstatements in a 
firm's financial statements in a 
timely manner 
Count of the number of MWs in 
internal control processes 
(maximum 17) reported under 
SOX section 404 
MWs in managerial 
internal control 
processes 
MngPrWeak 
Inability of a firm's managerial 
internal controls processes to 
prevent or detect material 
misstatements in a firm's financial 
statements in a timely manner 
Count of the number of MWs in 
managerial internal control 
processes (maximum 10) 
reported under SOX section 404 
MWs in operational 
internal control 
processes  
OprPrWeak 
Inability of a firm's operational 
internal controls processes to 
prevent or detect material 
misstatements in a firm's financial 
statements in a timely manner 
Count of the number of MWs in 
managerial internal control 
processes (maximum 7) reported 
under SOX section 404 
MWs in accounting 
managerial 
competence  
CompWeak 
Level of knowledge and skills 
deficiency in accounting-related 
human expertise 
1 if a firm reported an MW due 
to a lack of accounting 
managerial competence under 
SOX section 404; 0 otherwise 
Percentage increase 
in audit fees 
FeeIncrease 
Increase in the audit fees incurred 
by a firm as compared to the 
previous year 
Percentage increase in the audit 
fees from year t-1 to t 
Percentage increase 
in audit delays  
DelayIncrease 
Increase in the audit delays 
incurred by a firm as compared to 
the previous year 
The number of days between the 
audit report date and the fiscal 
year end. Percentage change 
from year t-1 to t 
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Only firms that had MWs were included in our sample so that we could examine how AES use 
can improve internal control processes by reducing MWs. Given the archival panel structure of our data, 
it was not possible to measure improvement in the internal control processes for firms that have not had 
MWs during the given time period of our sample. After the removal of firm-year observations with 
missing values, our final sample for data analysis was 278 firms with 1237 firm-year observations. As 
will be discussed later, we used a fixed-effects model to analyze the data. Because we used fixed-effects, 
the number of firm-year observations varies for each regression analysis depending on the dependent 
variable being estimated.  
The constructs, construct definitions, and measures are shown in Table 3.3. Managerial and 
operational internal control processes are measured as count variables. Accounting managerial 
competence, however, is measured as a binary variable, because all the firms that had MWs in accounting 
managerial competence had the MW “Accounting personnel resources, competency/training”. Other 
accounting managerial competence MWs (less than 20 percent of such cases) appear only in addition to it. 
The complete distribution and patterns of MWs in our sample can be found in Appendix 3.A.  
Control Variables: Following the prior literature (Doyle et al. 2007a; Doyle et al. 2007b; Ge et 
al. 2005; Li et al. 2012), we included a set of control variables in our models that can affect firms’ internal 
control processes and audit process performance. Firms that face high levels of information risk 
(likelihood that a firm’s financial information pertinent to investor pricing decisions is of poor quality) 
(Francis et al. 2005) ) may not have strong IT capabilities to manage their internal control processes. 
These firms may be more likely to have material weaknesses in their internal controls (Doyle et al. 
2007a). Hence, we control for accruals quality (AccrQual) – a well-established proxy measure for 
information risk (Dechow et al. 2002; Francis et al. 2005).  Large firms are more likely to develop 
resources and capabilities to establish strong internal control processes and audit process performance. 
Thus, we include revenue (Revenue) and leverage (Leverage: ratio of liabilities to assets) in our model. 
Prior studies (Doyle et al. 2007a; Doyle et al. 2007b; Ge et al. 2005; Li et al. 2012) also suggest that loss 
making firms (Loss: 1 if firm had loss in the fiscal year; 0 otherwise), firms with a large number of 
 76 
 
geographical and operational segments (LnSegments: natural logarithm of total number of geographical 
and operational segments), firms that have foreign operations (Foreign: 1 if a firm had foreign operations; 
0 otherwise), and firms that have gone through a merger (Merger: 1 if a firm had a merger in that fiscal 
year; 0 otherwise) are likely to have MWs in their internal controls. We also include IT capital (ITCapital: 
[computer capital + 3* IT labor cost]/ total assets (Dewan et al. 2007b) ) since firms with large IT capital 
are likely to have better infrastructure to digitize internal control processes and have better audit 
performance. Lastly, we include year dummies as controls.  
More than 99 percent of the firms in our data had one of the big four auditors. Hence, we did not 
include it as a control variable. We did not include total assets because of high variance inflation factor 
(VIF). However, we include several variables (Revenue, Leverage, LnSegments) that address the size of a 
firm. The mean VIFs for all our models were less than 4. No individual variable had a VIF higher than 8.  
Table 3.4 shows the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations. Frequency distribution is shown for 
the following binary variables: Loss, Foreign, Merger, and CompWeak. 
3.4.2 Empirical Specification 
Equation 1 is specified to test hypotheses H1, H2 and H3. Equation 2 is specified to test H4 (a, b, 
c and d). The letter i denotes a firm and t denotes year. The variables AES_Use and CES_Use were mean 
centered. 
We first conducted a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test to confirm the panel structure of the 
data. We then conducted a Hausman test that led us to use fixed-effects models. Our data has an 
unbalanced panel structure. Due to the fixed-effects model, the statistical software dropped data for firms 
that did not have any “within” variations.  Since the dependent variables in equation 1 are count variables, 
negative binomial regression was used
14
. The analysis was performed using STATA statistical software. 
                                                 
14 The variance in the dependent variables i.e., MWs in the managerial and operational internal control processes, was four times higher than the 
mean. We used negative binomial regression over Poisson regression since Poisson regression requires the mean and the variance to be 
statistically equal. The likelihood ratio test of alpha was highly significant (1% level), suggesting that the variance and mean were not equal, 
supporting the use of negative binomial regression.   
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Table 3.4. Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations 
 
 
 
 
# Variable Mean StDev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 AccrQual 0.089 0.117
2 Revenue 1053.75 3678.67 -0.06*
3 Leverage 0.655 2.039 0.10* 0.02
4 Loss 0  (70.43%) 1 (29.57%) 0.05 -0.03 0.08*
5 LnSegments 2.165 0.813 -0.12* 0.10* -0.05 -0.01
6 Foreign 0  (42.55%) 1 (57.45%) -0.09* 0.06* -0.04 -0.01 0.53*
7 Merger 0  (53.61%) 1 (43.61%) -0.05 0.06* -0.04 -0.11* 0.15* 0.17*
8 ITCapital 0.025 0.058 0.06* -0.05* -0.03 0.01 -0.10* -0.03 -0.03
9 AES_Use 0 0.339 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07* 0.01 0.06* -0.02 0.01 0.05
10 CES_Use 0 0.212 0.07* -0.04 0.09* -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06* 0.58*
11 CompWeak 0  (81.7%) 1 (18.3%) 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.09* -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.06* -0.05
12
AES_Use X 
CES_Use
0.042 0.080
0.13*
-0.09* -0.18* 0.01 -0.08* -0.06* -0.08* -0.01 -0.02 0.24* 0.01
13
AES_Use X 
CompWeak
-0.008 0.144
-0.07*
-0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.43* 0.26* -0.12* -0.05
14 FeeIncrease 0.389 1.147 0.05 -0.04 0.13* -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.13* -0.03 0.23* -0.01 -0.08*
15 DelayIncrease 0.159 0.838 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06* -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.07* -0.02 0.26* 0.02 -0.08* 0.44*
*Significant at 5% level
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Equation 3-1 
ICPrWeakSi(t+1) / MngPrWeakSi(t+1) / OprPrWeakSi(t+1)=  β0 + β1 AES_Usei(t) + β2 CES_Use i(t) + β3 
CompWeaki(t+1)+ β4 AES_Usei(t)  X CES_Usei(t) + β5  AES_Usei(t)  X CompWeaki(t)  + (Controls)i(t) +(Year 
Dummies) + U i(t)      
Equation 3-2 
FeeIncreasei(t+1) / DelayIncreasei(t+1) =  β0 + β1 MngPrWeak i(t+1) + β2 OprPrWeakii(t+1)  + β3 AES_Usei(t) + β4 
CES_Usei(t) + β5 CompWeaki(t+1)+ β6 AES_Usei(t)  X CES_Usei(t) + β7 AES_Usei(t)  X CompWeaki(t+1)  + 
(Controls)i(t) +(Year Dummies) + Vi(t)      
3.4.3 Robustness Tests 
To ensure the robustness of our findings, we conducted the following analyses: (1) Heckman, (2) 
difference-in-difference, and (3) binary Logit and Probit. The results from all three analyses were consistent with 
our results. Given the nature of our data, it is likely that our results could be affected by endogeneity issues. 
While difference-in-difference, Logit, and Probit analyses were performed to confirm the consistency of the 
models using different estimation approaches, Heckman analysis was conducted to examine and either rule out 
or correct for endogeneity issues. Thus, we report only the Heckman analysis findings in Appendix 3.B.  
3.4.4 Analysis and Results 
The results of the fixed-effects regression for equations 1 and 2 are shown in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. The 
directions of the control variables are consistent with the prior literature. Hypothesis1 predicted AES use led to a 
reduction in MWs in managerial and operational internal control processes. Our findings show that with 
increases in AES use, firms report fewer MWs in managerial internal control processes. However, the coefficient 
for the AES use is significant at the 10 percent level on a one-tailed test. We could not find evidence that AES 
use leads to a reduction in MWs in operational internal control processes. Thus, H1 is partially supported.  
Hypothesis 2 predicted that CES use will enhance the impact of AES use in reducing MWs in 
managerial and operational MWs. Findings for H2 show that CES use enhances the impact of AES use on 
managerial internal control processes, but not for operational internal control processes. When examined 
collectively for the combined internal control processes, CES use is found to enhance the impact of AES use. 
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Table 3.5. Negative Binomial Regression Results  for Material Weaknesses (H1, H2 and H3) 
  All Processes MWs Managerial processes MWs Operational processes MWs 
AES_Use X CES_Use 
 1.841995 
(1.268933)* 
 1.86165 
(1.307809)* 
 0.5681504 
(2.510623) 
AES_Use X CompWeak 
  1.13353 
(0.4341078)*** 
  1.210855 
(0.4393116)*** 
  0.5816631 
(0.8223274) 
AES_Use 
 -0.4883279 
(0.4090474) 
 -0.6013405 
(0.4107188)* 
 -0.6696314 
(0.8992656) 
CES_Use 
 -0.7742901 
(0.65303) 
 -0.3946908 
(0.6704778) 
 -1.241832 
(1.36949) 
CompWeak 
  3.144593 
(0.1634875)*** 
  3.027571 
(0.1651167)*** 
  2.767203 
(0.2706933)*** 
AccrQual 
1.828649 
(1.067055)** 
1.281123 
(1.263347) 
1.903199 
(1.180477)* 
1.433402 
(1.386928) 
5.143847 
(2.219401)*** 
3.919351 
(2.53529)* 
Revenue 
-0.0000316 
(0.0000667) 
0.0000422 
(0.0001206) 
-0.0000453 
(0.000069) 
0.000015 
(0.0001269) 
0.0005094 
(0.0003122)* 
0.0000776 
(0.0003439) 
Leverage 
1.426079 
(0.3032241)*** 
0.4898936 
(0.3917467) 
1.461441 
(0.3244319)*** 
0.4394599 
(0.3946708) 
1.730363 
(0.6156577)*** 
1.134045 
(0.6205264)** 
Loss 
0.3867948 
(0.1382477)*** 
0.3458788 
(0.1414772)*** 
0.3552558 
(0.1397026)*** 
0.3186315 
(0.1452735)** 
0.3698686 
(0.1977728)** 
0.3691025 
(0.2107678)** 
LnSegments 
-0.3482546 
(0.1337149)*** 
-0.2692694 
(0.1332316)** 
-0.3647121 
(0.1406402)*** 
-0.3199343 
(0.1439127)** 
-0.3082569 
(0.2083136)* 
0.0018744 
(0.2409163) 
Foreign 
-0.0759276 
(0.1574795) 
-0.2545408 
(0.1691777)* 
-0.087078 
(0.1589106) 
-0.2621311 
(0.1730028)* 
-0.1504392 
(0.2436526) 
-0.0501026 
(0.2906312) 
ITCapital 
-0.4068719 
(1.533278) 
-0.0517122 
(1.627413) 
-0.5605377 
(1.546238) 
-0.4417234 
(1.644958) 
2.603459 
(3.360352) 
2.550134 
(4.202987) 
Merger 
0.1574733 
(0.1365146) 
0.0360728 
(0.1409169) 
0.1539983 
(0.137547) 
0.0218624 
(0.1447513) 
0.3661501 
(0.1954217)** 
0.1608916 
(0.2152708) 
Constant 
-1.124209 
(0.3925533)*** 
-1.620433 
(0.4463547)*** 
-0.8559309 
(0.410565)** 
-1.268366 
(0.4659583)*** 
-0.0396213 
(0.7404441) 
-1.33864 
(0.8961804)* 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firms (Firm-year 
observations) 
251 (1993) 251 (1993) 251 (1194) 252 (1194) 118 (552) 119 (552) 
Log likelihood -834.639 -607.177  -774.324  -563.343 -274.53064 -193.7182 
***p<0.01   ** p<0.05   * p<0.1; one-tailed test given directional effects are hypothesized 
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Figure 3.2. Interaction Effects of AES Use X CES Use 
The interaction effects of AES use and CES use are shown in Figure 3.2. The graph on the left shows the 
interaction effect for managerial internal control processes and the graph on the right shows the interaction 
effects for the combined managerial and operational internal control processes. As evident from the graphs, firms 
with high CES use have fewer MWs as compared to firms with low CES use. With an increase in AES use, the 
number of MWs declines for both high and low CES use firms. However, these interaction effects are significant 
at the 10 percent level on a one-tailed test. Hypothesis 2 is partially supported since the interaction effects of 
AES use and CES use are not significant for operational internal control processes. 
 Hypothesis 3 predicted that competence weakness, i.e., MWs due to a lack of accounting managerial 
competence, mitigates the effectiveness AES use in reducing MWs in managerial and operational internal control 
processes. Interestingly, we find that competence weakness, instead adversely affects the impact of AES use. In 
other words, AES use leads to an increase in MWs in managerial internal control processes for firms with a 
competence weakness. Although the interaction effect of AES use and competence weakness was not significant 
for operational internal control processes, it was highly significant overall for managerial and operational internal 
control processes combined. Thus, it can be suggested that use of technology is a complement and not a 
substitute for managerial competence. Use of accounting enterprise systems leads to worse outcomes for firms 
that do not have capable accounting and audit personnel, or have an ineffective audit committee and board, or 
have unreliable top management. Figure 3.3 shows the interaction effect of AES use with competence weakness 
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for managerial internal control processes on the left and the combined managerial and operational internal 
control processes on the right. For managerial internal control processes, and for internal control processes as a 
whole, an increase in AES use results in worse outcomes pertaining to MWs.  
 
Table 3.6 Panel Data Regression Results Testing for H4 (a, b, c, and d) 
  Percentage increase in audit fee Percentage increase in audit delays 
MngPrWeak 
 0.1237832 
(0.0331751)*** 
 0.1625719 
(0.0268106)*** 
OprPrWeak 
  0.1574115 
(0.0624603)*** 
  0.1032756 
(0.0505068)** 
AES_Use X CES_Use 
  0.1906236 
(0.8028661) 
  0.2615435 
(0.6497114) 
AES_Use X CompWeak 
  -0.3202466 
(0.2614908) 
  -0.4392432 
(0.2116272)** 
AES_Use 
  -0.1217415 
(0.2047219) 
  -0.0628539 
(0.1656593) 
CES_Use 
 -0.4636846 
(0.4501636) 
 0.0243414 
(0.3640633) 
CompWeak 
  -0.0789019 
(0.1189063) 
  -0.012782 
(0.0962499) 
AccrQual 
-0.4736786 
(0.6892326) 
-0.7056829 
(0.6777025) 
-0.3309093 
(0.5721216) 
-0.628132 
(0.5487729) 
Revenue 
-0.0001311 
(0.0000746)** 
-0.0001536 
(0.0000733)** 
-0.0000723 
(0.0000619) 
-0.0000991 
(0.0000593)** 
Leverage 
-0.7014407 
(0.2651413)*** 
-0.7848503 
(0.2615998)*** 
-0.3721781 
(0.2171437)** 
-0.4735231 
(0.2090771)** 
Loss 
-0.0650569 
(0.0820517) 
-0.0801546 
(0.0806099) 
-0.1277545 
(0.0679081)** 
-0.1457376 
(0.0650742)** 
LnSegments 
-0.3135154 
(0.1263163) 
-0.2831892 
(0.1245775)** 
-0.2545191 
(0.1048246)*** 
-0.2095873 
(0.1008676)** 
Foreign 
0.0328003 
(0.0912499) 
0.0226347 
(0.0895724) 
0.0339559 
(0.0755084) 
0.028353 
(0.0723077) 
IT Capital 
0.7951194 
(0.8844275) 
0.8444639 
(0.8700964) 
0.1741694 
(0.7341878) 
0.3242913 
(0.7046018) 
Merger 
0.0951932 
(0.0801616) 
0.0775143 
(0.0787788) 
-0.0009018 
(0.0665487) 
-0.027417 
(0.0637965) 
Constant 
3.005869 
(0.3397167)*** 
2.698783 
(0.338639)*** 
1.650257 
(0.2801657)*** 
1.307846 
(0.2727675)*** 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included 
Firms (Firm-year observations) 277 (1234) 277 (1233) 278 (1237) 278 (1236) 
R-Squared 0.2021 0.2219 0.0582 0.1244 
***p<0.01   ** p<0.05   * p<0.1; one-tailed test given directional effects are hypothesized 
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Figure 3.3. Interaction Effects of AES Use X Competence weakness for MWs 
 Hypothesis 4 examines how managerial and operational internal control processes, and AES use 
along with CES use and competence weakness, impact audit process performance. Hypothesis 4 (a) 
predicts that MWs in managerial and operational internal control processes will lead to an increase in 
audit fees and audit delays. The coefficients for managerial and operational internal control processes for 
both fee increases and delay increases are positive and significant, suggesting strong support for H4 (a). 
These findings show that MWs in managerial and operational internal control processes lead to firms to 
incur higher audit costs. These firms also incur longer delays in releasing audit reports. Thus, it is 
important for firms to improve internal control processes in order to reduce audit fees and shorten audit 
delays.  
The other three hypotheses H4 (b, c, and d) examine how AES use along with CES use and 
competence weakness impact audit process performance. Hypothesis 4 (b) predicts that AES use will help 
firms reduce audit fees and audit delays. Although the coefficients for AES use for both fee and delay 
increases are negative as predicted, they are non-significant. Hypothesis 4 (b), thus, is not supported since 
we do not find evidence that AES use directly influences audit fees and delay increases. Hypothesis 4 (c) 
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evaluates the complementary relationship between AES use and CES use in reducing audit fees and 
delays. Like the main effects of AES and CES, the coefficients of the interaction effect of AES and CES 
for fee and delay increases are also non-significant. Hence, H4 (c) is not supported either. 
Hypothesis 4 (d) predicts that competence weakness diminishes the impact of AES use in 
reducing increases in audit fees and delays. The interaction effect of AES use and competence weakness 
is non-significant for audit fees. We do not find statistical evidence to suggest that AES use and 
competence weakness together influence an increase in audit fees. For audit delays, however, as shown in 
Figure 3.4, the results are counter-intuitive to our expectations as discussed in H4 (d). Although, the  
 
Figure 3.4. Interaction Effect of AES Use X Competence weakness for Audit delay 
statistically significant evidence supports the interaction effect of AES use and competence weakness in 
influencing audit delays, we find that firms with competence weakness, i.e., firms that have MWs in 
accounting managerial competence, have shorter audit delays as compared to firms that have strong 
accounting managerial competence. Table 3.7 summarizes the hypotheses and findings.  
 
 
 
1.30 
1.28 
1.32 
1.30 
1.26
1.27
1.28
1.29
1.30
1.31
1.32
1.33
Low AES Use High AES Use
Percentage 
increase in 
audit delay 
Substitutive Direct Effect: 
AES use X Competence weakness → Audit delay 
Weak competence Strong competence
 84 
 
 
Table 3.7. Summary of Hypotheses and Findings 
Hypothesis 
Managerial internal 
control processes 
Operational internal 
control processes 
H1 
Increase in AES use will reduce MWs 
in managerial and operational internal 
control processes 
Supported partially 
for managerial 
internal control 
processes 
Not Supported 
H2 
The beneficial impacts of AES use in 
mitigating MWs related to managerial 
and operational internal control 
processes are greater for firms with 
high CES use than for those with low 
CES use 
Supported partially 
for managerial 
internal control 
processes 
Not Supported 
H3 
Material weaknesses related to 
accounting managerial competence in 
firms will diminish the beneficial 
impacts of AES use in MWs in 
managerial and operational internal 
control processes 
Supported. Adverse 
impact of AES use on 
managerial internal 
control processes in 
the absence of 
accounting 
managerial 
competence 
Not Supported 
  
Percentage increase 
in audit fee 
Percentage increase 
in audit delay 
H4 (a) 
Material weaknesses in managerial and 
operational internal control processes 
will adversely affect audit process 
performance (increased audit fees and 
audit  delays) 
Supported Supported 
H4 (b) 
Use of accounting enterprise systems 
will improve audit process 
performance (i.e., reduced audit fee 
and delays) 
Not supported Not supported 
H4 (c) 
Use of complementary enterprise 
systems will enhance the beneficial 
impact of AES use on audit process 
performance 
Not supported Not supported 
H4 (d) 
Material weaknesses in accounting 
managerial competence will diminish 
the beneficial impact of AES use on 
audit process performance 
Not supported 
Opposite results 
found. Firms with 
competence weakness 
have shorter audit 
delays with increases 
in AES use 
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3.4.5 Sobel Mediation Test 
We conducted a Sobel mediation test (Baron et al. 1986; COSO 2009b) to examine whether 
internal control processes mediate the impact of AES use along with CES use and competence weakness 
on audit process performance. Several studies (e.g., see Kallunki et al. 2011; Mithas et al. 2011; Tallon et 
al. 2011) have used the Sobel mediation test due to its reliability in assessing the strength of mediation  
Table 3.8. Sobel Mediation Test Results 
Audit Fees Percentage Increase 
  Managerial Internal Control Processes Operational Internal Control Processes 
  
Sobel Test Statistic         
(One-tailed 
Significance) 
Type of Mediation 
Sobel Test Statistic         
(One-tailed 
Significance) 
Type of 
Mediation 
AES use -1.36 (0.085)* Full Mediation -0.71 (0.235) 
No Mediation 
CES use -0.58 (0.28) No Mediation -0.85 (0.195) 
AES use X 
CES use 
1.33 (0.09)* 
Full Mediation 
0.22 (0.41) 
Competence 
Weakness 
3.66 (0.001)*** 2.44 (0.007)*** Full Mediation 
AES use X 
Competence 
Weakness 
2.21 (0.013)** 0.68 (0.245) No Mediation 
Audit Delays Percentage Increase 
  Managerial Internal Control Processes Operational Internal Control Processes 
  
Sobel Test Statistic         
(One-tailed 
Significance) 
Type of Mediation 
Sobel Test Statistic         
(One-tailed 
Significance) 
Type of 
Mediation 
AES use -1.42 (0.075)* Full Mediation -0.69 (0.24) 
No Mediation 
CES use -0.58 (0.275) No Mediation -0.83 (0.2) 
AES use X 
CES use 
1.38 (0.08)* 
Full Mediation 
0.22 (0.41) 
Competence 
Weakness 
5.74 (0.001)*** 2.01 (0.02)** Full Mediation 
AES use X 
Competence 
Weakness 
2.5 (0.006)*** Partial Mediation 0.66 (0.25) No Mediation 
***p<0.01   ** p<0.05   * p<0.1; one-tailed test given directional effects are hypothesized 
 
mechanism. The summary of findings from the Sobel mediation test is shown in Table 3.8. Managerial 
internal control processes fully mediate the impact of AES use and its interaction effect with CES use on 
audit fees and delays.  Although managerial internal control processes fully mediate the impact of the 
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interaction effect of AES and competence weakness on audit fees, they only partially mediate the impact 
on audit delays. Operational internal control processes were not found to mediate the impact of interaction 
effects on audit fees and delays. Although we do not hypothesize the main effects of CES use and 
competence weakness (i.e., accounting managerial competence), we find that CES use is not mediated by 
internal control processes. However, the impact of competence weakness is fully mediated by both 
managerial and operational internal control processes. 
3.5 Discussion 
3.5.1 Implications for Theory 
The key theoretical contribution of the study is that the findings surface the effects, including 
countervailing ones, through which IT creates business value.  We now discuss four key effects and how 
they extend our understanding of the mechanisms through which IT and related knowledge resources 
create business value.    
First, our findings surface that AES use creates business value through the enablement of 
business processes, what we term the technology enablement effect. While we find AES use improves 
managerial internal control processes, we do not find AES use improves operational internal control 
processes as assessed by reductions in MWs. Our results underscore that AES use creates value through 
informing managerial processes and suggest that mitigating MWs in operational internal control processes 
is not a value-chain creating mechanism.  
Interestingly, we find that the impact of AES use on audit process performance is fully mediated 
by managerial internal control processes. Although both managerial and operational internal control 
processes were found to affect audit process performance, we find only managerial internal control 
processes mediate the impact of AES use in reducing audit fees and delays. By considering both 
managerial and operational internal control processes and surfacing the role of AES in creating business 
value through the enablement of managerial internal control processes, our study contributes to the prior 
literature that called for closer examination of intermediate business processes (e.g., Barua et al. 1995; 
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Rai et al. 1997b; Rai et al. 2006; Ray et al. 2004), and expands our understanding of the process enabled 
mediators through which IT creates business value.   
Second, we find the impact of AES use in strengthening managerial control processes to be 
amplified by CES use. We also find CES use to enhance the impact of AES use on audit process 
performance through full mediation by managerial internal control processes. These findings collectively 
reveal that CES use provides critical information resources from other business domains (e.g., supply 
chain, customer relationships, human resources) to amplify the positive impacts of AES use on 
managerial internal control processes and on increases in audit fees and delays. The use of AES and CES 
moderately correlates in our dataset (r = 0.58). This is not surprising as AES and CES are not stand-alone 
systems and firms are likely to co-develop them, consistent with our findings that AES use and CES use 
can generate complementarity benefits. To elaborate, CES collect business information from various 
functional and process domains, which is a critical input resource to AES. Our study suggests that 
although AES are the focal technology used to improve managerial internal controls and audit process 
performance, CES also play a complementary role in attaining these improvements, which we term as the 
complementarity effect of supporting technology.  
Third, we build on the recent studies (e.g., Mehra et al. 2014; Tambe 2014)  that call for 
emphasizing human capabilities and skill development along with investments in IT. Our findings 
highlight the importance of accounting managerial competence, and suggest that competence is a key 
factor in driving improvement in internal control processes. The impact of accounting managerial 
competence on audit process performance we considered (i.e., increase in audit delay and audit fee) is 
fully mediated through managerial and operational internal control processes. Although AES use was 
found to show improvements in managerial internal control processes, interestingly, we find that in the 
absence of accounting managerial competence, i.e., weak competence, AES use adversely affects 
managerial internal control processes. Thus, our study shows that the benefits of AES use can only be 
derived when a firm has competent and capable (a) accounting and audit personnel, (b) audit committee 
and audit boards, and (c) top management, which we term as the knowledge effect.   
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Lastly, we extend the findings from prior studies in the accounting and auditing literature that 
examine the interdependence among the internal control processes, audit process performance, and 
control monitoring technology (Dorantes et al. 2013; Masli et al. 2010). We find that AES use can reduce 
audit delays through improvement in internal control processes for both strong and weak competence 
firms. Interestingly, however, we find that the direct (non-mediated) effect of AES use decreasing audit 
delays to be stronger for those firms that do not have strong accounting managerial competence. That is, 
firms, with weak competence are likely to emphasize AES use for speed and not for the development of 
managerial internal control processes. We term this as a countervailing effect of AES use. This suggests 
that although firms with weak competence can demonstrate the benefits of AES use by shortening audit 
delays, it comes at a heavy cost. Increased AES use for such firms leads to increases in managerial MWs. 
Thus, the benefits of AES use leading to shorter delays without being leveraged to improve the 
capabilities of managerial control processes are questionable. Based on these findings, we show that the 
benefits of AES use when not examined through mediating internal control processes can be 
misunderstood. It is very important that firms strengthen their accounting managerial competence and not 
focus only on a process outcome to determine the business value of AES. 
3.5.2 Implications for Practice 
This study has three key implications for practice. First, we show that firms can create value from 
ES use though BP capability formation. Firms can innovate BP capabilities by infusing ES functionalities 
into managerial internal control processes by leveraging IT and business partnerships.  In addition, since 
AES use cannot act as a substitute to improve internal control processes unless firms have strong 
accounting managerial competence, firms can create value from AES use by complementing AES 
functionalities with accounting managerial competence to develop managerial internal control processes. 
Second, above and beyond developing capable BPs, firms should improve process cycle-times by 
evaluating activities that can be automated. Improvement in the audit cycle does not equate to 
improvement in the internal control processes. Instead, firms should focus on the internal control 
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processes. Improvement in the internal control processes will then lead to improvements in the audit 
cycle. 
Third, firms should establish ES in related process domains and information-exchange interfaces 
with the systems in those domains. Although ES in related process domains may not directly pertain to 
internal control processes, effective use of CES in these domains reinforces the effectiveness of AES. 
3.5.3 Limitations and Future Research 
This study is not without its limitations. We identify four major limitations. First, although our 
study was based on a rich dataset of internal control processes, we are unable examine how firms that 
have strong internal controls and managerial competence derive benefits from AES use, nor do we 
examine the ability of AES use in addressing significant deficiencies. Firms are not required to publicly 
report or acknowledge significant deficiencies, and thus, due to the limitations of data, we were unable to 
examine how AES use can reduce significant deficiencies in internal control processes or strengthen 
existing internal control processes that were not considered to have MWs.  
 Second, prior studies (e.g., Hoitash et al. 2012; Hoitash et al. 2009; Krishnan et al. 2007; Lin et 
al. 2011) have called for closer examination of how governance practices of firms influence internal 
control processes and audit process performance. Accounting, finance and IT governance structures and 
practices may also influence firms’ ability to maintain internal controls. We do not evaluate the role of 
governance practices in firms. Future research can evaluate the role of governance practices in deriving 
value from AES use and CES use and building strong accounting managerial competence.   
Third, how internal control processes are designed and managed varies from firm to firm and so 
does the utilization of technology (COSO-Framework 2011). Firms might also have other small scale 
systems that could be equally effective in designing and maintaining internal control processes. We do not 
examine such systems. However, since we use fixed-effects models, we only examine within firm 
variation. Thus, we address this limitation to some extent.  
Last, this study focuses on the business value derived from the use of AES by measuring its 
impact on addressing MWs. The benefits and business value from AES use may not be limited to internal 
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control processes and audit process performance. There could be other benefits from the use of AES that 
are not addressed by this study. Researchers can examine other aspects of AES use that might create value 
for firms at the process and firm levels.  
3.6 Conclusion 
This study examines how AES use complemented by CES use and accounting managerial 
competence affects internal control processes and audit process performance. Our findings show that 
although a focal technology is important in creating business value, it needs critical support from 
complementary technologies. This study also underpins the importance of domain-specific competence 
and knowledge in creating value through IT implementation and use. We find accounting managerial 
competence to be a key driver of improvement in internal control processes, and increased use of 
technology to have an adverse effect on internal control processes in the absence of strong competence.   
We also highlight the importance of examining intermediate BPs rather than only focusing on 
process performance when examining IT business value. While, there could be improvements in process 
performance, it can come at a heavy cost if firms (a) do not focus on developing capable personnel and 
improving competence, and (b) overlook the impact of technology use on the intermediate BPs. Overall, 
our study contributes to the literature in IT business value, and accounting and auditing.  
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3.7 Appendix 3.A — Material Weakness Distribution Pattern 
 
Figures 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 show the distribution patterns of MWs in internal control processes and accounting managerial competence in 
our sample of firms between the years 2004 and 2009. Accounting documentation, policy and/or procedures were the most common MWs found in the 
managerial internal control processes. Information technology was the leading cause of MWs in operational internal control processes. Accounting 
personnel resources, competency and training issues were the most common reasons for MWs due to accounting managerial competence.  
 
Figure 3.5. Material Weaknesses in Managerial Internal Control Processes 
479 
319 
213 
174 
73 
35 
20 
3 3 1 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Accounting
documentation,
policy and / or
procedure
Material and/or
numerous auditor/
YE adjustments
Restatement or
non-reliance of
company filings
Untimely or
inadequate
account
reconciliations
Restatement of
previous 404
disclosures
Ethical or
compliance issues
with personnel
Management /
Board / Audit
Committee
investigations
Ineffective
regulatory
compliance issues
SEC or other
regulatory
investigations
and/or inquiries
SAB 108
adjustments noted
MW 
count 
 92 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Material Weaknesses in Operational Internal Control Processes 
 
Figure 3.7. Material Weaknesses in Accounting Managerial Competence 
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3.8 Appendix 3.B — Two-Stage Heckman Analysis 
We performed a two-stage Heckman analysis (Heckman 1979) to identify and correct for 
endogeneity. Our goal was to examine and correct for endogeneity if (a) MWs cause firms to 
increase AES use and our model suffers from revere causality; (b) other factors affect MWs and 
AES use, and our model has omitted variable bias issues; and/or (c) firms that use ES are likely 
not random. Certain firm characteristics may influence ES use, and our model may suffer from 
self-selection bias. The two-stage Heckman analysis helped us address these issues. We find that 
the IT budget model developed by Kobelsky et al. (2008) identifies various factors that can affect 
ES use in firms, and hence we structured the first stage of the Heckman analysis based on this 
model. We also included a binary variable MaterialWeakness (1 if a firm had an MW in internal 
control processes; 0 otherwise) in the first stage to address reverse causality.   
As recommended by Shaver (1998), we divided our sample into two groups in the first 
stage of the Heckman analysis for the AES selection model. The first group had firm-year 
observations for which AES use was above the median value (i.e., high AES use). A new variable 
AESMedian was created and was coded as 1 (AESMedian=1) for these firm-year observations. 
The second group had firm-year observations with AES use below the median (i.e., low AES use) 
and was coded 0 (AESMedian =0). Prior studies have used similar coding schemes to divide their 
samples  (e.g., see Bharadwaj et al. 2007; Hsieh et al. 2011). We estimated a Probit model where 
the constructs from the Kobelsky et al. (2008) IT budget model and MaterialWeakness were 
regressed on AESMedian. The descriptions and measurements of the constructs are shown in 
Table 3.9. Results of the Heckman stage 1 AES selection model are shown in Table 3.10. The 
dependent variable, i.e., AESMedian, was in the year t+1 and the independent variables were in 
year t. We then computed the Inverse Mills Ratio and used it as an additional control variable for 
the second stage of the Heckman analysis. 
 
  94 
 
Table 3.9. Heckman Stage 1 AES Selection Model Constructs and Measures 
Construct Measure 
AESMedian 1 if a firm's AES use was above the median value; 0 otherwise 
MaterialWeakness 
1 if a firm had a material weakness in its internal control process in year 
t; 0 otherwise 
Concentration 
Four-firm industry concentration at the four-digit SIC level (Compustat 
item: SALE) 
Uncertainty 
Standard deviation of firm i's net income for the previous five years, 
scaled by sales (Compustat items: IB and SALE) 
Rel_Diverse 
Related diversification measure for the extent to which firms operate 
across multiple four-digit SIC code that are within a two-digit SIC code 
(Dewan et al. 1998) (Compustat item: SALE) 
Unrel_Diverse 
Unrelated diversification measure for the extent to which firms operate 
across two-digit SIC codes (Dewan et al. 1998) (Compustat item: SALE) 
Profit Operating income scaled by sales (Compustat items: OIBDP and SALE) 
DebtRatio Long-term debt divided by total assets (Compustat items: DLTT and AT) 
AvgSalesGr 
Average sales growth of the current and previous years (Compustat item: 
SALE) 
Automate 
1 if a firm belongs to automate industries according to Chatterjee et al. 
(2001) and Anderson et al. (2006); 0 otherwise 
Transformate 
1 if a firm belongs to transform industries according to Chatterjee et al. 
(2001) and Anderson et al. (2006); 0 otherwise 
HighTech 
1 if a firm belongs to a high tech industry according to Francis and 
Schipper (1999); 0 otherwise 
LowTech 
1 if a firm belongs to a low tech industry according to Francis and 
Schipper (1999); 0 otherwise 
LogSale Natural logarithm of sales (Compustat item: SALE). 
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Table 3.10. Heckman Analysis: Stage 1 Selection Model Results 
 Probit AES Selection Model 
Dependent Variable → AESMedian 
MaterialWeakness 0.0571537 
(0.2717743) 
Concentration 
-1.01441 
(1.569788) 
Uncertainty 
-0.1106154 
(0.9184354) 
Rel_Diverse 
0.2217253 
(1.067462) 
Unrel_Diverse 
2.086777 
(0.8721476)** 
Profit 
2.460017 
(2.256125) 
DebtRatio 
-1.752316 
(1.034966)* 
AvgSalesGr 
-0.0168008 
(1.07771) 
Automate 
-0.2488001 
(0.8630936) 
Transformate 
-2.30146 
(1.186595)** 
HighTech 
4.90408 
(2.204048)** 
LowTech 
4.020263 
(2.05561)** 
LogSale 
-0.2096769 
(0.2617206) 
Constant 
-1.896128 
(2.589099) 
Year Dummies Included 
Firms (Firm-year observations) 222 (651) 
Log likelihood -288.900 
Wald Chi-Square 27.41 
 Prob > Chi Square        =     0.0371 
***p<0.01   ** p<0.05   * p<0.1; one-tailed test given directional effects are hypothesized 
 
In the second stage of the Heckman analysis, we included the Inverse Mills Ratio as an 
additional control variable to the original models. The results of the Heckman Analysis stage 2 
are shown in Table 3.11. The coefficient of the Inverse Mills Ratio was non-significant in all the 
regression models. Coefficients for all the variables were consistent with our original findings. 
The results show that our findings did not suffer from endogeneity issues.  
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Table 3.11. Heckman Analysis:  Stage 2 Negative Binomial Regression Results 
  
All processes 
MWs 
Managerial 
processes MWs 
Operational 
processes MWs 
AES_Use X CES_Use 
0.9439726 
(1.493288) 
0.7432408 
(1.545159) 
0.6195074 
(2.975531) 
AES_Use X CompWeak 
0.8333847 
(0.5055426)** 
0.8924068 
(0.5123292)** 
-0.1499978 
(1.032033) 
AES_Use 
-0.3260583 
(0.4764617) 
-0.381056 
(0.4809597) 
0.1492827 
(1.103902) 
CES_Use 
-0.7302812 
(0.761891) 
-0.4081799 
(0.7891358) 
-1.115412 
(1.613947) 
CompWeak 
3.034046 
(0.1860155)*** 
2.931846 
(0.1882902)*** 
2.714221 
(0.3306603)*** 
Inverse Mills Ratio 
-0.2258847 
(0.1841918) 
-0.1669862 
(0.1902912) 
-0.551203 
(0.3670201) 
AccrQual 
1.955948 (1.4981) 2.160371 
(1.657024) 
5.96612 
(2.883282)** 
Revenue 
0.0002053 
(0.0001468) 
0.0001848 
(0.000153) 
0.0002451 
(0.0003739) 
Leverage 
0.6899816 
(0.4535291) 
0.7183808 
(0.4545611) 
0.9915284 
(0.7183629) 
Loss 
0.3371627 
(0.1584142)** 
0.3212818 
(0.1627438)** 
0.325412 
(0.2505035) 
LnSegments 
-0.414143 
(0.1775806)*** 
-0.5087203 
(0.1963939)*** 
-0.160917 
(0.3501821) 
Foreign 
-0.316844 
(0.211402) 
-0.3340962 
(0.2170812) 
-0.0501736 
(0.3750163) 
IT Capital 
-0.0143261 
(1.654611) 
-0.3229444 
(1.672279) 
0.4730586 
(4.735077) 
Merger 
0.0932301 
(0.1617982) 
0.0595798 
(0.1691274) 
0.2580484 
(0.2559068) 
Constant 
-1.198531 
(0.5266003)*** 
-0.8576929 
(0.5543818) 
-0.6937035 
(1.066732) 
Year Dummies Included Included Included 
Firms (Firm-year 
observations) 
199 (922) 199 (922) 88 (393) 
Log Likelihood -457.26 -420.858 -140.967 
***p<0.01   ** p<0.05   * p<0.1; one-tailed test given directional hypothesized effects  
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4 Chapter 4 — Risks and Controls in Internet Enabled Reverse Auctions: Perspectives 
from Buyers and Suppliers 
4.1 Abstract 
Internet enabled reverse auctions (RAs) have been touted as a means of making the 
procurement process more effective and efficient, but as is often the case with information 
technology (IT), there can be negative consequences about which firms and their managers need 
to be aware and mitigate. We examine the risk factors that can arise due to the use of RAs. Using 
the Delphi methodology, we identify both buyer and supplier perspectives on the risk factors 
associated with the use of RAs. The Delphi study was followed by semi-structured interviews to 
identify the controls used to address the key risk factors. We find that risk factors map to (1) 
inadequacy in intangible resources, (2) auction process governance, and (3) interfirm governance 
(i.e., agency, transaction and relational risk factors). Our findings extend the theory of 
relationship constraints by recognizing and providing empirical evidence for reverse information 
asymmetry and principal opportunism as salient risk factors. Last, we find that buyers and 
suppliers consider input controls to be effective in addressing key risk factors associated with the 
use of RAs.  
Keywords: Reverse Auctions, Risk Factors, Process and Interfirm Governance, Controls 
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4.2 Introduction 
A reverse auction (RA) is a real time, dynamic, procurement mechanism used by a buyer 
with multiple suppliers. Unlike forward auctions in which buyers compete by increasing the bid 
price to purchase a product, in RAs suppliers compete by reducing their bid price for products or 
services, to win the buyer’s business. The use of internet enabled RAs (hereafter RAs) emerged in 
the mid-1990s and has profoundly impacted how firms procure products and services. With about 
$1.4 trillion
15
 worth of goods and services procured electronically worldwide per year, RAs have 
been found to reduce this cost by 5 to 15 percent (Jap 2003).  
The use of RAs requires significant resource investments. Reverse auctions are a part of 
buyers’ and suppliers’ long term planning and are strategically important for both parties 
(Fredrickson et al. 1984; Jap 2002). Reverse auctions are important for buyers because they 
reduce purchasing costs and can provide an efficient means for identifying new suppliers. They 
are important for suppliers because they can help suppliers expand their business and generate 
new sources of revenue.  
Despite their touted benefits (Jap 2003; Stein et al. 2003), the adoption of RAs has been  
uneven. Although some firms have been successful with them and have expanded their use (Wyld 
2011a), others have either encountered resistance (Peng et al. 2012) or have shunned them due to 
the long term damage that RAs can have on interfirm relationships (Ruytenbeek 2012). In 
numerous cases, buyers have not accrued expected savings; suppliers have incurred significant 
preparatory costs and yet not won a client’s business; and both parties have reported the 
destruction of mutual trust. As a result, the role of RAs as an effective procurement mechanism 
has been questioned (Charki et al. 2008; Reese 2004).  
The apparent paradox of some firms increasing their use of RAs while other firms are 
discontinuing them motivates our study. Inspired by studies that have examined similar paradoxes 
(Brynjolfsson 1993; Cameron 1986; Lüscher et al. 2008), we suggest that using RAs is a 
                                                 
15 http://reverseauctions.gsa.gov/reverseauctions/reverseauctions/ 
  99 
strategically important business decision embedded with risks—defined as the probability of 
adverse consequences of an outcome (Adebanjo 2010; Baird et al. 1985; Kostamis et al. 2009). A 
risk is a result of one or more contributing risk factors (Sutton et al. 2008). These risk factors can 
be addressed through the use of controls. Thus, firms that identify and control the risk factors of 
RAs are better equipped to realize the benefits of using them. Firms that do not address the risk 
factors are more likely to suffer losses and are more likely to abandon the use of RAs (Das et al. 
2001; Jap 2007; Jemison 1987). Against this backdrop, we suggest that achieving effective use of 
RAs requires (a) identifying the risk factors associated with using RAs and (b) understanding the 
controls that mitigate key risk factors.   
Prior studies that examine RAs have primarily focused on the benefits and issues from 
the buyer perspective, while the supplier perspectives and the impact of risk factors on buyers and 
suppliers use of RAs remain underexplored. To address these gaps, we first use the Delphi 
methodology to identify the risk factors from both the buyer and supplier perspectives. Drawing 
on theories of governance, we classify the risk factors into three dimensions: (1) inadequacy in 
intangible resources, (2) auction process governance, and (3) interfirm governance. We interpret 
and differentiate between buyers’ and suppliers’ appraisals of the risk factors in each of these 
dimensions. We then conduct semi-structured interviews with a subset of Delphi panelists to 
identify the controls that mitigate the key risk factors. Our study addresses three research 
questions. 
RQ1: What are the risk factors associated with the use of RAs? 
RQ2: How do buyers and suppliers differ in their perspectives of the risk factors associated 
with the use of RAs? 
 
RQ3: What controls can address key risk factors associated with the use of RAs? 
4.3 Literature Synthesis of RA Risk Factors 
The risk factors discussed in the literature are directed towards the impact of RAs on (1) 
buyer-supplier relationships, (2) transaction characteristics, and (3) auction design issues. We 
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categorized the most frequently featured risk factors into these three perspectives and discuss 
them now.  
Buyer-supplier relationships: Prior studies have found that RAs weaken buyer-supplier 
relationships (Emiliani et al. 2004; Jap 2002; Jap 2007; Smart et al. 2003). Suppliers often regard 
RAs as a tool that can damage the prospects of a long-term relationship. They consider the use of 
RAs as a convenient means by which buyers can achieve short-term benefits over suppliers’ 
financial interests, particularly when suppliers are coerced into participating in them (Giampetro 
et al. 2007). As a result, suppliers are not trustful of buyers who frequently engage in RAs and are 
reluctant to make any relationship-specific investments (Charki et al. 2008). Hence, in addition to 
losing suppliers’ willingness to make relationship-specific investments, buyers also risks 
significant damage to their reputation among suppliers (Carter et al. 2004; Elmaghraby 2007; 
Griffiths 2003).  
Transaction characteristics: In the limited time available for suppliers to prepare for 
RAs, suppliers have to (a) comprehend a buyer’s requirements, (b) accurately estimate the cost 
for providing goods/services, and (c) determine their bid price. If requirements for 
products/services are not specified correctly and in detail, a buyer and a supplier may have a 
difficult time negotiating contracts after an RA has been conducted (Beall et al. 2003; Kauffman 
et al. 2004; Smeltzer et al. 2003). It can also be difficult for a buyer to hold suppliers accountable 
to the agreed upon price if suppliers were to indicate after the RA that the offered bid price 
pertained to specifications that do not correspond to the buyer’s actual requirements.  
When suppliers win business from a buyer after offering low bid prices in an RA, they 
may compromise on the quality of products and services in order to recover their profit margin. 
Suppliers can even retaliate against the buyer by either over charging or by refusing to 
accommodate any changes in post-contract specifications (Emiliani et al. 2004; Jap 2007). 
Although it may not be feasible to recognize all possible post-contract contingencies, the 
transaction cost theory (Williamson 1979) emphasizes drafting an optimal contract where both 
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buyer and suppliers put forward as many concerns and conditions they can, to address price issues 
pertaining to quality and delivery of products and services. 
However, a buyer faces risk factors prior to the contract as well. When using RAs for 
innovative products or products of strategic importance, buyers have reported concerns regarding 
suppliers sharing sensitive information about the buyer with the buyer’s competitors (Charki et al. 
2008). Suppliers may also form cartels and collude to control the price, especially when the buyer 
uses RAs with a relatively small base of suppliers (Carter et al. 2004; Emiliani 2005; Emiliani et 
al. 2002; Talluri et al. 2004). It is, therefore, important for the buyer to assess the market by 
examining the number of viable suppliers available and the current supply and demand. Unless all 
the conditions are favorable, the buyer is not likely to be able to generate competition in the RAs 
(Smeltzer et al. 2003). Unfavorable market conditions and lack of competition can result in the 
failure of an RA, thus resulting in wasted preparation and expenses (Beall et al. 2003; Kauffman 
et al. 2004).  
Auction design issues: When planning for an RA, the products and services that are 
auctioned by a buyer are usually partitioned into lots. A different number of suppliers may 
compete for each lot. It is incumbent upon the buyer to design lots that maximize the number of 
competing suppliers. If a lot is too large, competent but smaller suppliers will not be able to 
compete against large suppliers. On the other hand, large suppliers may not be willing to invest in 
smaller lots (Smeltzer et al. 2003). The buyer, therefore, will be unable to effectively utilize the 
RA if it does not structure lots effectively and identify suitable suppliers to bid on them. 
While it is important to consider the capability of suppliers when designing lots, it is 
equally important to account for suppliers’ competencies. Often, due to the way RAs are 
designed, innovative and cost-efficient suppliers do not get the opportunity to differentiate 
themselves (Smart et al. 2003). When suppliers’ non-price attributes are ignored, the offered bid 
price becomes the primary focus and auctioned products and services are treated as commodities. 
When products and services with non-price attributes are treated as commodities, the buyer loses 
  102 
out on the opportunity to gain better business partners and can also end up incurring higher 
overall costs.  
For suppliers, alternatively, the auction design issues correspond to formulating and 
adhering to their bidding strategies. When award terms are not communicated, suppliers tend to 
assume that the lowest bidder will be awarded the business. This assumption can lead to 
aggressive bidding in an RA. Suppliers who do not fix their lowest bid price may get carried 
away in the frenzy of competition and bid beyond their means — a phenomenon known as 
auction fever. Such suppliers may later find it difficult to honor their bid price. Since suppliers are 
expected to abide by their offered auction price, they cannot later adjust a bid that was deemed to 
be too low (Jap 2002; Smart et al. 2003; Smeltzer et al. 2003). 
Gaps in the literature: While past work has identified some risk factors associated with 
the use of RAs, there has been no systematic effort to identify and examine these risk factors. 
Only a handful of RA risk factors have been identified thus far and the literature lacks 
comprehensive guidance on the important risk factors as perceived by buyers and suppliers and 
effective methods to mitigate them. There are three critical gaps that need to be addressed. First, 
the literature does not explore the differences in the perceptions of risk factor between buyers and 
suppliers and therefore falls short of providing a theoretical explanation for perceptual differences 
that may exist. Second, the theoretical interpretation of RA risk factors remains underexplored. 
Last, prior studies do not identify risk mitigation strategies that firms can use to address risk 
factors. To address these gaps we first conduct a Delphi study with buyer and supplier panels and 
develop two lists of top-ranked risk factors —one for each panel. Drawing on agency theory, we 
characterize a buyer as a principal and the supplier as an agent to theorize the difference in their 
perception of risk associated with an RA. We categorize the identified risk factors based on (1) 
inadequacy in intangible resources, (2) auction process governance, and (3) interfirm governance 
(agency theory, transaction cost theory, and relational theory) to theoretically interpret the risk 
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factors. Finally, using semi-structured qualitative interviews we identify the controls that can be 
used to mitigate the key risk factors.  
4.4 Data Collection and Methodology 
4.4.1 Delphi Study 
 Developing a comprehensive list of risks factors requires participants with expertise in 
the field of sourcing and procurement to identify buyer risk factors, and with expertise in business 
development, sales and marketing to identify supplier risk factors. Considering the exploratory 
nature of the research questions, the ranking-type Delphi methodology seemed to be the most 
appropriate choice. The Delphi methodology was developed by the RAND Corporation in the 
1950s to (a) define important issues, (b) elicit opinions from a panel of experts through iterative 
controlled feedback, and (c) reach consensus among the experts on the panel. It has since been 
widely used in studies that have sought the aid of domain experts to identify issues and reach 
consensus on relative importance (e.g., Heminger et al. 2005; Liu et al. 2010; Schmidt et al. 
2001). For this study, two separate Delphi panels were formed, one comprised of buyers and the 
other comprised of suppliers.  Figure 4.1 shows the three phases of the Delphi methodology 
procedure.  
Composition of the panels: Delphi studies require focused and committed participation 
over a period of time and typically do not have more than 25 participants on a panel. We, 
therefore, stopped recruiting panel members once we obtained participation commitment from 35 
panelists for each panel, as this would provide ample margin for some attrition, which invariably 
occurs in studies of this nature. To ensure reliable and valid data, we included a diverse group of 
experts with years of experience in procurement and RAs for the buyer panel. Similarly, for the 
supplier panel, we recruited professionals with rich experience in sales, business development, 
and marketing who had experience both in RA bidding as well as in post-auction negotiation. We 
recruited the panelists using professional connections from the Institute of Supply Management  
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· Each panelist provides at least six risk factors that (s)he 
considers are a major threat to RA use. 
· The researchers consolidate individual lists into one, 
matching duplicate items, and grouping similar items 
together.
· The panelists narrow down the consolidated list of 34 
(buyers) and 49 (suppliers) risk factors by selecting the 
top 20 items that they consider to be most important.
· The researchers reduce the size of the list, retaining the 
items selected by the majority (each risk factor was 
selected by at least 60% of the panelists).
· Each panelist ranks the randomized list of top risk factors 
in order of priority. 
· The researchers calculate the consensus for the panel 
using Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W).
· The researchers share the results with the panel and 
iterative ranking is used until panelists reach an 
acceptable degree of consensus (Kendall’s W >0.5).
Phase I - Brainstorming
Phase II - Selection
Phase III - Ranking
· Number of 
responses: 28
· Total 174 buyer 
risk factors 
generated
· 34 unique risk 
factors identified
· 18 common with 
suppliers
· Number of 
responses: 31
· Total 189 supplier 
risk factors 
generated
· 49 unique risk 
factors identified
· 18 common with 
buyers 
· Number of 
responses: 23
· Selection phase 
yielded top 16 
risk factors for the 
buyers to be 
ranked in the 
ranking phase
· Number of 
responses: 30
· Selection phase 
yielded top 21 
risk factors for the 
suppliers to be 
ranked in the 
ranking phase
· First round 
responses: 22
· Kendall’s W: 
0.254  
· Second round 
responses: 16
· Kendall’s W: 
0.503
· First round 
responses: 30
· Kendall’s W: 
0.261
· Second round 
responses: 27
· Kendall’s W: 
0.574 
Buyer Panel Supplier Panel
Delphi Methodology Phases
 
Figure 4.1. Delphi Methodology 
(ISM). The industries represented in both panels include retail, IT, utilities, manufacturing, 
hospitality and healthcare. Table 4.1 shows the profile of both panels. 
Platform for the Delphi Study: The Delphi study was conducted asynchronously over the 
Internet due to the impracticality of bringing the panelists together for successive rounds of face-
to-face meetings, since they resided in a variety of different locations around the world. We 
created a web-based interface using the Visual C# programming language and SQL Server 2008 
database. Similar electronic instruments have been shown to provide various benefits that include 
faster data collection and processing of results (Singh et al. 2009). A web-link of the website was 
sent to the panelists who were given two weeks to respond in each phase.  
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Phase I (Brainstorming): We initiated the brainstorming phase by requesting panelists to 
provide at least six items that s/he considered to be serious risk factors when using RAs. The 
objective of asking for six or more risk factors in the first phase was to not make the process too 
time consuming and yet achieve reasonable coverage of the domain. This was an open ended 
solicitation of ideas (Okoli et al. 2004; Schmidt et al. 2001). Each panelist in both panels was 
asked to provide a brief description of each item that s/he supplied. 
 These descriptions helped us to (1) understand the risk factors, and (2) remove duplicates 
by consolidating items with the same underlying meaning. We also required panelists to answer a 
questionnaire that provided us with some basic demographic information, their experience with 
RAs, and their firm’s involvement in RAs. In Phase 1, 28 experts from the buyer panel and 31 
experts from the supplier panel responded. The buyer panel provided a list of 174 risk factors and 
the supplier panel provided a list of 189 risk factors. The four researchers then worked together 
iteratively to consolidate and refine the list by grouping similar items together, removing 
duplicates, and sharpening descriptions to improve clarity. This process yielded a consolidated 
list of 34 unique risk factors for the buyer panel and 49 unique risk factors for the supplier panel. 
In all, 65 unique risk factors were identified, of which 18 were common to both panels. 
Phase II (Selection): We sought to narrow the consolidated list into a more manageable 
set for the ranking phase. Following Schmidt’s (2001) suggestion, we asked each panelist to 
select his/her top 20 risk factors (i.e., those that represented the most serious impediments when 
participating in/using RAs) from the unrated list of 49 (supplier)/34 (buyer) risk factors from 
Phase 1. After reviewing the selection of top 20 risk factors from each respondent on each of the 
panels, we retained only those items that were selected by a significant majority of the panel; 
specifically items selected by 60 percent of panelists, as this gave us a target range of 15-25 items 
for the subsequent ranking phase. A range of 15-25 items is ideal because anything less than 15 
risk factors to rank would not have let us identify the common top risk factors between the two 
panels, and anything more than 25 risk factors to rank would have been excessively cumbersome 
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for the panelists. With this selection process, the initial lists of 34 buyer risk factors and 49 
supplier risk factors were reduced to 16 and 21 respectively. 
Table 4.1. Profile of Delphi Study Panels 
Demographic Variable 
  
Buyer      
Panel 
Supplier 
Panel 
Panel size   28 31 
Average overall work experience 
  
19 years 
[Range 4-45] 
20 years 
[Range 4-40] 
Average experience in sourcing (buyers), 
sales/business development (suppliers)   
15 years 
[Range 3-45] 
15 years 
[Range 4-40] 
  0 to 5 14% 29% 
Number of RAs participated in                6 to 10 0% 29% 
(Buyer panel range 4-550)           11 to 20 18% 0% 
(Supplier panel range (5-4500) 21 to 50 21% 32% 
 
51 to 100 11% 0% 
  101 or more 36% 10% 
Will participate in reverse auctions in future? 
Yes 96% 79% 
No 4% 21% 
Average number of employees in their 
sourcing/procurement department (buyers), 
sales/business development department (suppliers) 
  75 58 
Average number of years since their firm has been 
using RAs   
  5.4 years 6 years 
 
Phase III (Ranking): This phase entailed the buyer panel ranking the top 16 risk factors 
and the supplier panel ranking the top 21 risk factors determined in Phase 2. Each panelist was 
asked to rank the risk factor that they consider the most important as first, and so on. Following 
Schmidt (2001), we used Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W) to measure the degree of 
consensus in the panel. The value of W can range from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating no consensus and 
1 indicating a perfect consensus. A Kendall’s W less than 0.50 indicates low consensus, 0.50 to 
0.70 indicates moderate consensus, and greater than 0.70 indicates strong consensus.  
We conducted two rounds of ranking. Twenty-two panelists for the buyer panel and 30 
panelists for the supplier panel responded in the first round of ranking. For the buyer panel, 16 
panelists responded in the second ranking round, yielding a Kendall’s W of 0.503. For the 
supplier panel 27 panelists responded, yielding a Kendall’s W of 0.574. The Kendall’s W of more  
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Table 4.2. Summary of Data Collection 
Step Methodology 
Data Collection 
Description 
Buyer Supplier 
Step 1 
Delphi Study to 
identify RA risk 
factors  
Total number of risk factors 
identified (raw data)  
174 189 
Number of unique risk 
factors identified in Delphi 
Study Phase 1 
34 49 
Number of risk factors 
discussed: Top ranked risk 
factors from Delphi Study 
Phase 3  
16 21 
Step 2 
Semi-structured 
interviews to 
identify controls 
for key risk 
factors 
Number of key risk factors 
on which panelists were 
interviewed to identify 
controls 
Top 5 buyer risk 
factors                    
+                                 
common risk 
factors in the top 
ranked list of the 
buyer panel (total 
11 risk factors) 
Top 5 supplier risk 
factors                      
+                                 
common risk 
factors in the top 
ranked list of the 
supplier panel (total 
11 risk factors) 
 
than 0.5 suggested that a moderate level of consensus had been reached for each of the panels, 
and that we could have a reasonable degree of confidence in the rankings. Following Schmidt’s 
(2001) recommendation, we stopped the ranking process at this point, since the coefficient of 
concordance indicated a reasonable level of consensus had been reached. While we considered a 
third round of ranking to see if the consensus would improve further, we ultimately decided 
against it as we were starting to see some attrition, indicating that panelists were becoming weary 
of the process.  
4.4.2 Follow-up Interviews for Controls Identification 
 In order to gain in-depth understanding of the controls to address the key risk factors 
identified in the Delphi study, we conducted semi-structured interviews with a smaller focused 
group of panelists. We identified key risk factors based on (1) those in the top five risk factors of 
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each panel, and (2) the common risk factors featured in the top ranked list of the combined 
panels.  
Ten experts from each panel were invited for interviews, of which seven from each panel 
agreed to participate. The average work experience of the interviewees was 26 years (range 12-
40) for the buyer panel and 28 years (range 12-43) for the supplier panel. The average number of 
RAs conducted by the interviewees from the buyer panel was 193 (range 50-550). Suppliers, on 
average, had participated in 1030 RAs (range 500-4000). The summary of data collection for the 
Delphi study and the follow-up interviews is shown in Table 4.2.  
4.5 Results and Discussion 
4.5.1 Classification of Risk Factors 
Drawing on theories of intrafirm governance, auction process governance, and interfirm 
governance, we classified the risk factors identified in our study into theoretical dimensions and 
sub-dimensions that are mutually exclusive and yet collectively exhaustive. Three dimensions and 
11 sub-dimensions were identified. The dimensions represent broad governance concepts 
pertaining to one or more theories. The sub-dimensions represent constructs of the informing 
theories. The dimensions of risk factors are: (i) inadequacy in intangible resources, (ii) auction 
process governance, and (iii) interfirm governance, i.e., agency, transaction and relational risk 
factors. Examples of sub-dimensions include the phases of auction process governance (i.e., pre, 
during and post-auction phases) and the constructs of interfirm governance (i.e., opportunism, 
contractual hazards, etc.). 
We relied on the combination of risk factor title, description, and raw data (collected 
during the first phase of the Delphi study) to map risk factors to the dimensions and sub-
dimensions. First, an elaborate list of dimensions and sub-dimensions to which risk factors could 
be mapped was developed from the intrafirm governance, reverse auctions, interfirm 
governance, and IS literatures. Second, the mapped dimensions and sub-dimensions were retained 
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Table 4.3. Reverse Auctions Risk Factors 
Theoretical 
Dimension 
Sources Sub-dimension Risk Factor Buyer 
/Supplier 
Buyer 
Rank 
Supplier 
Rank 
1. Inadequacy 
in Intangible 
Resources 
Bakos (1997; 
1998), Hur et al. 
(2006), Rai et al.  
(2009), Teo et al.  
(2009) 
1.1 Adoption of 
Mechanism 
1.1.1 Lack of top management support  Common 6 NR 
1.1.2 Resistance by internal clients within buying organization 
to reverse auction procedures and outcomes  
Buyer 5 NA 
1.1.3 Suppliers lack adequate knowledge of reverse auction 
process  
Common 16 NR 
2. Auction 
Process 
Governance 
Jap (2002; 2003), 
Beall et al.  (2003),  
Engelbrecth-
Wiggans et 
al.(2006), 
Elmaghraby (2007), 
Jap (2007), Mithas 
and Jones (2007), 
Charki (2008),  
Aloini et al.  (2012) 
2.1 Pre-Auction 
2.1.1 Inadequate supplier qualification  Common 3 6 
2.1.2 Improper lot structuring  Buyer 9 NA 
2.1.3 Award terms not clearly communicated prior to auctions  Common 7 NR 
2.1.4 Reluctance of suppliers to participate  Buyer 8 NA 
2.1.5 Communication barriers create ambiguity regarding 
buyers' requirements  
Supplier NA 9 
2.2 During-
Auction 
2.2.1 Impulsive bidding leads to unrealistically low bids  Supplier NA 12 
2.2.2 The risk of other suppliers not adhering to the 
specifications and underbidding  
Supplier NA 2 
2.2.3 Early attrition of quality suppliers due to aggressive 
bidding  
Supplier NA 15 
2.3 Post-Auction 2.3.1 Suppliers unable to maintain their offered auction price  Common NR 13 
2.4 Phase-
Independent 
2.4.1 Reduced profit margin  Supplier NA 8 
2.4.2 Commoditizing innovative products/services  Supplier NA 10 
2.4.3 Omission of non-price criteria limits buyer’s 
understanding of suppliers’ full capabilities.  
Common 10 16 
2.4.4 Singular focus on price does not factor in total cost of 
ownership  
Common 2 19 
2.4.5 Lack of awareness of who you are competing with and 
their cost structures  
Supplier NA 18 
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3. Interfirm 
Governance 
Williamson (1991), 
Anderson and 
Dekker (2005b) 
3.1 Contractual 
Hazards 
3.1.1 Inadequately specified requirements  Common 1 5 
Williamson (1991), 
Bakos and 
Brynjolfsson (1993) 
3.2 Small Number 
Bargaining 
3.2.1 Market conditions not conducive for reverse auctions  Buyer 12 NA 
3.2.2 Adverse long-term impact on supply base  Common NR 17 
3.2.3 Lack of competition in the auction  Buyer 4 NA 
Eisenhardt (1989b), 
Sharma (1997),  
Dawson et al. 
(2010) 
3.3 Information 
Asymmetry/Reverse 
3.3.1 Illusion that supplier needs to offer the lowest price to be 
awarded the business  
Supplier NA 14 
Dawson et al.  
(2010), Miller and 
Sardais (2011), 
Hawkins et al. 
(2013) 
3.4 Opportunism 
(Including Goal 
Incongruence and 
Self-Interest)/ 
Agent Opportunism 
3.4.1 A competing supplier may bid low to gain the contract and 
then raises prices once the buyer is locked in  
Supplier NA 21 
3.4.2 Quality of the product could be reduced by suppliers to 
achieve offered price  
Common NR 1 
3.4.3 Quality of service and support could be reduced by 
suppliers to achieve offered price  
Common 13 3 
Eisenhardt (1989b), 
Sharma (1997),  
Poppo and Zenger 
(1998), Dahlstrom 
and Nygaard (1999), 
Madhok et al.  
(2006)  
3.5 Opportunism 
(Including Goal 
Incongruence and 
Self-
Interest)/Principal 
Opportunism 
3.5.1 The risk of buyer manipulating the auction by introducing 
artificially low bids  
Supplier NA 7 
3.5.2 Buyers create distrust when they use reverse auctions to 
test the market with no intention of buying  
Supplier NA 20 
3.5.3 Inclusion of suppliers who will not be awarded the business  Buyer 15 NA 
3.5.4 Buyer not faithful to the auction process  Common 11 NR 
3.5.5 Failure to honor award terms deters future supplier 
participation  
Buyer 14 NA 
Dyer and Singh 
(1998), Camuffo 
(2007), Mithas et al. 
(2008), Klein and 
Rai (2009)  
3.6 Relational Risk 
Factors (Interaction-
based Non-
contractiblity) 
3.6.1 No opportunity for relationship building  Supplier NA 4 
3.6.2 Weakens existing strategic relationships with suppliers  Common NR 11 
NR: Risk factor was identified by the panel but was not selected to be among the top ranked risk factors 
NA: Panel did not identify the risk factor 
  111 
and the unmapped dimensions and sub-dimensions ones were discarded. During this process, a 
few risk factors were found to be counter-intuitive to the known constructs of governance – 
specifically the constructs of agency theory. We devised two new sub-dimensions to maps these 
risk factors. The new sub-dimensions are (a) reverse information asymmetry and (b) principal 
opportunism (Hawkins et al. 2013). Although alluded to by the theory of relationship constraints 
(Dawson et al. 2010), and other studies (Hawkins et al. 2013; Joshi et al. 1997; Wyld 2011b) the 
empirical evidence for these counter-intuitive risk factors has been insufficient.  
The dimensions, sub-dimensions, informing sources, corresponding top ranked risk 
factors from the third phase of the Delphi study, the buyer/supplier panel that identified a risk 
factor, and the ranks of the risk factors are shown in Table 4.3. For brevity and focus, only the top 
ranked risk factors for both panels from the third phase (as shown in Table 4.3) are discussed. We 
discuss the dimensions, sub-dimensions and the associated risk factors. The complete list of risk 
factors and the sub-dimensions is shown in Appendix 4.A
16
.  
4.5.2 Dimension 1: Inadequacy in Intangible Resources Risk Factors 
This dimension encompasses the risk factors that entail organization-wide adoption and 
management of RAs. One sub-dimension and three risk factors were mapped to this dimension. 
The first two risk factors pertain to the adoption and acceptance of RAs as a new mechanism. The 
third risk factor pertains to the adoption of technology and skills necessary to use RAs.   
While studies have emphasized the importance of top management support for 
procurement innovations and success (Rai et al. 2009), the impact of the absence of this support is 
also implicit in their findings. Our findings suggest that a lack of top management support (1.1.1) 
either restricts the use of RAs or prevents the enforcement of their outcome. Likewise, internal 
                                                 
16
 Appendix 4.A also lists the corresponding actual risks. A risk is defined in this paper as a possible negative consequence of an 
undesired outcome resulting from an action or an event. Risk factors identified in this study are the factors that constitute these risks. 
One or more risk factors, therefore, lead to a specific risk (e.g., lack of top management support and resistance by internal clients 
within a buying organization are risk factors that lead to the risk of a buyer’s inability to enforce the outcome of an RA). Since the 
objective of this paper is to identify and theoretically interpret the risk factors and the subsequent controls, our discussion of risk 
factors is organized according to their theoretical dimensions as shown in Table 2. 
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clients also play an important role. Internal clients frequently interact with suppliers and establish 
business relationships. They can oppose the transition of business to new suppliers. Resistance by 
internal clients (1.1.2) can either prevent the use of RAs upfront or block the award of business.  
A third risk factor pertaining to the inadequacy in intangible resources for RAs is 
suppliers’ lack of adequate knowledge about the reverse auction process (1.1.3).  Such a lack of 
knowledge can relate to the adoption of the technology needed to conduct RAs and the skills 
necessary to use RAs, both of which require a firm to enhance its IT capability. Participating in 
RAs can be particularly problematic for suppliers who have no prior experience using the relevant 
technology. Without training suppliers to use the technology and explaining to them the role of 
RAs in the procurement process, a buyer faces failure of the RA process. Thus, suppliers’ lack of 
knowledge of the RA process and procedures hinders a buyer’s ability to extract the benefits of 
RAs.  
4.5.3 Dimension 2: Auction Process Governance Risk Factors 
This dimension entails design and implementation of an RA. Four sub-dimensions and 14 
risk factors were mapped to this dimension. Since the use of RAs entails a methodical process of 
planning an RA (prior to the RA event), executing the RA (managing the RA event), and post-
auction negotiations, each step in RA-driven procurement is a temporal sequence of phases that 
require effective governance. Drawing on process engineering research (e.g., see Davenport 
2005; Davenport et al. 2003) the sub-dimensions are examined according to the phase of the RA 
process in which they occur.
17
 Thus, the identified auction process governance risk factors are (a) 
pre-auction risk factors (2.1), (b) during-auction risk factors (2.2), (c) post-auction risk factors 
(2.3), and (d) phase-independent risk factors (2.4). The phase-independent risk factors represent 
auction process governance risk factors that cannot be exclusively mapped to a particular phase.  
                                                 
17 It should be noted that the risk factors pertaining to the inadequacy in intangible resources (Dimension 1) and interfirm governance 
(Dimension 3) may also have similar temporal characteristics. They, however, lack the linear sequential characteristics that process 
governance entails. Hence, examining them based on the phase in which they occur is inappropriate. Instead, they are examined 
according to the sub-dimensions that exclusively characterize them.  
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Pre-auction risk factors: The pre-auction risk factors pertain to the design of RAs and the 
establishment of an effective communication channel with suppliers. Five risk factors were 
mapped to this sub-dimension. Both the buyer and the supplier panels rated inadequate supplier 
qualifications among the top risk factors (2.1.1). A common cause of concern is an incompetent 
supplier winning the auction. The buyer risks getting lured by a low cost but incompetent 
supplier, while competent suppliers risk losing the opportunity to win the business. It is, however, 
possible that qualified and competent suppliers may not have the capability to handle large 
volumes of business. It is particularly challenging for smaller suppliers when the lots are too large 
for their capability and interest, or when they are interested only in a portion of a larger lot. 
Improper lot structuring (2.1.2) can prevent smaller but competent suppliers from participating in 
RAs rendering the buyer unable to extract full benefits of RA use. 
Once a buyer has chosen qualified suppliers to participate and designed the lots, it needs 
to make sure that it has provided sufficient information to suppliers regarding the RA process. 
Since the buyer’s incentive for using RAs is to reduce price, suppliers often expect that the lowest 
bidder might be awarded the business. However, the buyer may have other criteria to determine 
the winner (Anderson et al. 2005a; Jap 2003; Jap 2007). When suppliers are not informed about 
the award terms prior to the RA (2.1.3), they can expect that low bidding suppliers may win the 
business. When low bidding suppliers are not awarded the business, it can result in supplier 
resentment against the use of RAs and reluctance to participate in RAs in future (2.1.4).  
Our findings also suggest that not only what is being communicated, but also how it is 
communicated matters significantly. Reverse auction tools are not considered to be a rich medium 
of communication. They lack feedback immediacy, social cues, language variety, and 
personalization (Daft et al. 1986; Gattiker et al. 2007) as compared to other mediums of 
communication (e.g., face-to-face, telephone, and email). Using RA tools as the only medium of 
communication adversely impacts suppliers’ ability to communicate with the buyer (2.1.5). 
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Suppliers cannot receive satisfactory response to their queries making it difficult to accurately 
estimate the cost structure. It can also lead to suppliers placing suboptimal bids. 
During-auction risk factors: During-auction risk factors pertain to a supplier’s bidding 
behavior, bidding behavior of its competitors, and the subsequent consequences. Three risk 
factors were mapped to this sub-dimension.  
A supplier’s likelihood of winning the business is largely determined by its bid in an RA. 
It is, thus, important for a supplier to be cautious when bidding. A small miscalculation or a 
typographical error can result in an erroneous bid. A supplier may not be allowed to back track on 
its final bid price after the RA. Hence, it may have no choice but to withdraw from the RA and 
not be considered for the buyer’s business. The undesired bid, however, is not limited to 
misplaced bids. Suppliers can get caught in an auction fever where they bid on impulse to beat the 
competition (2.2.1) In the heat of the moment, a supplier can place an unrealistic bid that negates 
its profit margin.  
Likewise, the bidding behavior of a supplier’s competitors can also affect the likelihood 
of its winning the buyer’s business. The bid price of a supplier is considered competitive only in 
relation to the other suppliers’ bid prices. A supplier determines its bid price by estimating its cost 
structure based on the specifications provided by the buyer. It is, however, possible that other 
suppliers may underestimate their costs by not adhering to the specifications and may underbid 
(2.2.2).  This underbidding can create unrealistic cost differences between suppliers. These 
unrealistic cost differences can result in early attrition of quality suppliers due to aggressive 
bidding (2.2.3). 
Post-auction risk factors: One risk factor was mapped to this sub-dimension.  
A supplier may not be able to sustain the bid price when either the bid placed in the RA event was 
too low or when the supplier’s cost structure changes (2.3.1). This may result in a supplier 
backing out of the RA or the contract with the buyer.  
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Phase independent risk factors: Phase independent risk factors either span multiple 
phases or cannot be mapped to one or more phases. Five risk factors were mapped to this 
dimension. These risk factors are discussed below.  
In RAs, the focus is on price. However, a variety of relevant supplier capabilities 
including innovation, continuous improvements, development of new products, and keeping 
abreast with technological developments can get overlooked. Rather than working with suppliers 
to find alternate ways to reduce cost by involving them in planning and goal setting activities 
(Cusumano et al. 1991), a buyer can force them to cut down on their profit margin by putting 
them through market driven competition (2.4.1). When the buyer users this approach, it signals 
that the suppliers’ products and services are considered to be commodities (2.4.2). 
Use of RAs can be particularly ineffective when acquiring technologically sophisticated 
and complex products or services where suppliers can find it difficult to differentiate themselves. 
Reverse auction tools are generally not robust enough to process intangible and complex supplier 
information, and are not considered to be a rich medium of communication (Gattiker et al. 2007). 
Therefore, it can be difficult for a buyer to evaluate suppliers’ full capabilities including non-
price value adds and alternative products. By not being able to consider suppliers’ non-price 
criteria, a buyer may take away suppliers’ incentives to vie for its business (2.4.3). 
Although most of the activities related to RA planning and execution are under the 
buyer’s sphere of influence, the corresponding risk factors concern suppliers as well. The most 
significant of such risk factors is the total cost of ownership (TCO).  The total cost, in addition to 
the final bid price, can include such things as taxes, transportation, insurance, and switching 
costs. If not accounted for, the TCO can lead to disputes and can create friction between the buyer 
and suppliers (2.4.4).  
While costs other than the bid price concern buyers, suppliers have to not only determine 
their own cost structure but also estimate their competition’s cost structure. Since the identity of 
other suppliers is usually unknown, a supplier is unaware whether other suppliers’ bids reflect 
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lower profit margins or lower cost structures (2.4.5). This lack of awareness makes it difficult for 
suppliers to determine the optimal price and bidding strategy. 
4.5.4 Dimension 3: Interfirm Governance Risk Factors 
Corresponding to the theories of interfirm governance, this dimension of risk factors 
entails agency and transaction cost issues that arise due to RAs and have a damaging impact on 
buyer-supplier relationships. The buyer is identified as the principal and the suppliers are 
identified as agents. Six sub-dimensions and 15 risk factors were mapped to this dimension. Two 
new sub-dimensions, i.e., reverse information asymmetry and principal opportunism, were 
devised to accommodate six risk factors that could not be mapped to any other sub-dimensions 
and were counterintuitive to the known constructs of interfirm governance. The risk factors are 
discussed according to the sub-dimensions.  
Contractual hazards: Contractual hazard risk factors arise from the inability of a party to 
secure its interests through a contract. One risk factor was mapped to this sub-dimension. Unless 
the buyer provides suppliers with detailed specifications (3.1.1) for the products or services being 
auctioned, it can be difficult to rely on the contract to protect its interests when a supplier 
provides inferior products and services.  
Small number bargaining: Small number bargaining risk factors arise from an imbalance 
between supply and demand in favor of suppliers. Three risk factors mapped to this sub-
dimension are discussed below.  
It is important for a buyer to study the market conditions by examining available 
suppliers, their product lines, their client bases, and the relationships among suppliers (3.2.1). A 
buyer should ensure that it has enough qualified suppliers participating and actively bidding in the 
RA. Large suppliers can take advantage of their size, scale, and efficient cost structure to bid 
lower than smaller suppliers. Lower prices can make it difficult for smaller suppliers to withstand 
the market pressure that leads to their elimination from the market. Smaller suppliers getting 
eliminated from the market can result in adverse long-term impacts on the supply base (3.2.2). 
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When the market is consolidated due to fewer suppliers, the buyer can find it difficult to generate 
sufficient bidding activity during an RA. Lack of competition and bidding activity in RAs 
precludes the buyer from obtaining lower prices (3.2.3).  
Reverse information asymmetry: We find evidence for reverse information asymmetry 
being a risk factor associated with RAs. Reverse information asymmetry arises when conditions 
resulting from the use of technology or the principal’s behavior is such that the agent is unable to 
gather critical information needed to make important business decisions. One top ranked risk 
factor and four overall risk factors were mapped to this dimension.  
The problem of hidden information is a well-explored agency problem, but the focus 
traditionally has been on the principal’s perspective (i.e., information asymmetry for the 
principal). While some studies have called for examining the agent’s perspective (Ahuja 2000; 
Gulati et al. 2007; Lawson et al. 2008), only a handful have tried to address the problem of 
information asymmetry for the agent (Dawson et al. 2011; Dawson et al. 2010). Since RAs induce 
competition among suppliers and the buyer determines to whom the business should be awarded, 
it has a stronger power position over suppliers. Reverse auctions condition suppliers to believe 
that by making them compete the buyer is looking for a supplier who offers the lowest price 
(3.3.1). However, the buyer alone knows what factors it takes into account when awarding the 
business. Suppliers, on the other hand, are aware only of the price they bid in the RA. Suppliers’ 
decisions, therefore, are influenced by the assumptions they make regarding the buyer’s actions. 
This lack of critical information creates an illusion that a supplier needs to be the lowest bidder.  
Opportunism (including goal incongruence and self-interest): Opportunism risk factors 
arise when suppliers act in their self-interest due to misalignment with the buyer’s goals. Three 
RA risk factors were mapped to this sub-dimension. Both agency theory and transaction cost 
theory address supplier opportunism risk factors.  
Reverse auctions negatively affect the supplier’s goodwill towards the buyer since the 
buyer uses them to cut down on its procurement costs and suppliers are forced to compromise on 
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their profit margins. Suppliers can act opportunistically by first bidding low to gain the contract 
and then taking advantage of loopholes in the contract to increase prices (3.4.1). While this 
affects the buyer, it also precludes other suppliers from earning the business. Moreover, to 
maintain profits, a supplier can introduce hidden costs not anticipated by the buyer that were not 
included in the contract. Not only does this hurt the buyer, but it also hurts the supplier’s own 
credibility in the long run. The most common form of supplier opportunism, however, arises 
when the supplier compromises the quality of the product (3.4.2) or the quality of service and 
support (3.4.3) in order to cut the total cost and honor the offered RA bid price.  
Principal opportunism (including goal incongruence and self-interest): Reverse 
auction risk factors pertaining to principal opportunism arise when the buyer (a) takes 
advantage of the information generated through RA tools that are not accessible to 
suppliers, and (b) uses its power position over suppliers to reduce procurement costs and 
extract relation specific rent. Five risk factors were mapped to this dimension.  
Although there has been growing interest in the agent/supplier perspective 
pertaining to principal opportunism, only a handful of studies have tried to address this 
problem (Dawson et al. 2010; Hawkins et al. 2013; Joshi et al. 1997). If the agent can act 
in self-interest due to conflicting goals, then the principal too can be opportunistic when 
its goals are different from those of the agent. When a buyer uses RAs, it makes it 
obvious that it wishes to increase its profit margin by cutting down on procurement costs. 
Reduced procurement costs, however, are achieved by making suppliers compromise on 
their profit margins. By using RAs, therefore, the buyer acts in its self-interest at the 
expense of its suppliers.  
While it can be argued that the principal opportunism risk factors identified by suppliers 
could be perception driven (Jap 2007), we suggest that those identified by buyers are not. The risk 
factors identified by the buyers are an acknowledgement of their own actions and behavior. Thus, 
we divide our discussion of these risk factors based on two attributes: (a) principal opportunism 
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risk factors identified exclusively by suppliers, and (b) principal opportunism risk factors 
identified by buyers or both buyers and suppliers. 
Principal opportunism risk factors identified exclusively by suppliers: Two principal 
opportunism RA risk factors were identified exclusively by the supplier panel. A buyer can 
manipulate RAs by introducing artificially low bids, a phenomenon known as shilling (3.5.1). 
Findings from prior studies suggest this risk factor to be more a perception than an actual risk 
factor (Jap 2002; Jap 2003; Jap 2007). Our findings suggest that the low richness of online RA 
tools as a communication medium (Daft et al. 1986; Gattiker et al. 2007) drives these perceptions. 
Suppliers can only see either their rank or the bid price. The limited information causes suppliers 
to become suspicious of the buyer’s behavior, believing that the buyer is acting unethically or 
opportunistically. This lack of information and feedback, however, can also create suspicion 
among low bidders who later do not get invited for contract negotiations. When a non-incumbent 
supplier is not awarded the business, it may perceive that the buyer used the RA only to test the 
market and determine the current price. The supplier may suspect that the buyer has no intention 
of buying from other suppliers, but rather intends to use the RA outcome to exert pressure about 
pricing on its incumbent suppliers (3.5.2). The incumbent suppliers, on the other hand, can 
perceive that the buyer is using the RA only to re-negotiate the current price. Since it is difficult 
for suppliers to verify the buyer’s true intentions these perceptions can lead to loss of trust for the 
buyer.  
Principal opportunism risk factors identified by buyers or both buyers and suppliers: 
Three principal opportunism RA risk factors were identified by the buyer panel, one of which was 
also identified by the supplier panel. These risk factors relate to the inappropriate use of RAs by 
the buyer. A buyer can opportunistically use RAs by intentionally including certain suppliers who 
will not be awarded the business (3.5.3). These suppliers are included in the RA only to induce 
competition and drive prices down. A buyer can also be unfaithful to the RA process by accepting 
quotes outside of the RA and negotiating with suppliers that were not invited to bid (3.5.4). A 
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buyer acts opportunistically and in self-interest when it denies sincere and competent suppliers 
the opportunity to win the business. When a buyer does not honor the award terms by awarding 
business to participating suppliers, it risks either their outright refusal to participate, or their 
unwillingness to provide their best bids in future RAs (3.5.5).  
Relational risk factors: The relational RA risk factors correspond to interaction-based 
non-contractibility between the buyer and suppliers (Mithas et al. 2008). Two risk factors were 
mapped to this sub-dimension. Interaction-based non-contractibility encompasses responsiveness, 
trust, and flexibility, which are three aspects critical to the longevity of interfirm relationships. 
The higher the degree of non-contractibility in an interfirm relationship, the less likelihood the 
buyer will use RAs (Mithas et al. 2008). Our findings suggest that using RAs prevents the growth 
of a long-term relationship (3.6.1). Buyers that use RAs are perceived to (a) treat suppliers’ 
products as commodities, (b) prioritize short-term monetary gains over long-term relationships 
with suppliers, and (c) weaken existing relationships by not considering their relationship with 
suppliers to be strategically important (3.6.2).  
4.5.5 Expert Interviews to Identify Controls 
In order to gain insight into the controls that could be used to address the most highly 
ranked risk factors that surfaced in our Delphi study, we interviewed 14 experts, seven from each 
panel. The experts were asked to suggest their controls to address (a) the top five risk factors 
identified by their panel in the ranking phase of the Delphi study, and (b) other top ranked risk 
factors identified by their panel in the ranking phase that were common to both panels. Two lists, 
each with 11 risk factors, were developed to interview the experts from the buyer and supplier 
panels. Table 4.4 lists the risk factors and the corresponding panel of the interviewed expert. Risk 
factors for which experts from both panels were interviewed have been indicated as “Both”. The 
average duration of each interview was 40 minutes (range 25-70 minutes). One expert from each 
panel was interviewed in person and the remaining interviews with 12 experts were conducted by 
phone or Skype. All the interviews were audio recorded and transcribed.  
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Table 4.4. Interview Round Risk Factors 
Dimension Sub-dimension Risk factor 
Panel of the 
interviewed 
experts 
Inadequacy in 
Intangible 
Resources 
Adoption of RA 
Suppliers lack adequate knowledge of 
reverse auction process 
Buyer 
Resistance by internal clients within buying 
organization to reverse auction procedures 
and outcomes 
Buyer 
Lack of top management support Buyer 
Auction 
Process 
Governance 
  Inadequate supplier qualification Buyer 
 
Award terms not clearly communicated 
prior to auctions 
Buyer 
 
Singular focus on price does not factor in 
total cost of ownership 
Both 
 
Omission of non-price criteria limits 
buyer’s understanding of suppliers’ full 
capabilities 
Both 
 
Suppliers unable to maintain their offered 
auction price 
Supplier 
  
The risk of other suppliers not adhering to 
the specifications and underbidding Supplier 
Interfirm 
Governance 
Contractual hazards Inadequately specified requirements Both 
Small number 
bargaining 
Lack of competition in the auction 
Buyer 
Opportunism (including 
principal opportunism) 
Buyer not faithful to the auction process  Buyer 
Quality of service and support could be 
reduced by suppliers to achieve offered 
price 
Both 
Quality of the product could be reduced by 
suppliers to achieve the offered price 
Supplier 
Relational risk factors 
(Interaction based non-
contractibility) 
No opportunity for relationship building Supplier 
Weakens existing strategic relationships 
with suppliers 
Supplier 
 
Multiple control actions were suggested by the panelists to address each risk factor. 
Using an approach similar to the first phase of the Delphi study, we consolidated and refined the 
list of suggested control actions by grouping similar items together, removing duplicates and 
sharpening some descriptions to improve clarity. This process yielded a consolidated list of 33 
unique control actions. A one-to-many relationship was observed between the risk factors and the 
control actions, i.e., one risk factor could be addressed by one or more control actions and one 
control action could address one or more risk factors. After examining the objective of each 
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control action, we determined that when grouped together the 33 control actions constituted 8 
unique controls as shown in Table 4.5. Each control, thus, has a common objective that is 
achieved by one or more control actions.  
We found seven controls to be input controls and one control to be an outcome control. 
No behavior controls were suggested to address the key risk factors. Input controls regulate the 
antecedent conditions of performance and are enforced prior to a contract (Cardinal 2001). Unlike 
behavior controls that manage task activities, and outcome controls that regulate products and 
service quality, input controls screen the suppliers for their capability, establish expectations for 
business practices, and provide incentives to achieve those expectations. Input controls are also 
implemented to educate internal stakeholders and suppliers about the RA process, and assess the 
market conditions prior to using RAs. Additionally, our findings suggest that (a) both buyers and 
suppliers are responsible for implementing input controls, and (b) input controls are both internal, 
i.e., a party monitors its internal activities, and external, i.e., one party monitors the other. 
Table 4.5 shows the controls, the corresponding control actions, and the type of control 
(input or outcome control). The control actions are assigned codes to specifically identify each 
individual control action. These codes are used in our discussion and analysis of the risk factor 
dimensions and corresponding controls. Our discussion and analysis of the controls is organized 
according to the theoretical dimensions of the risk factors. Table 4.6 maps the relationship 
between controls and the RA risk factor dimensions and sub-dimensions. The discussion of 
controls and control actions is organized according to the corresponding RA risk factor 
dimensions. 
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Table 4.5. Controls and Control Actions 
Type of 
Control 
Control Control Action Code 
Input 
Buyer's Pre-Auction 
Evaluation of 
Suppliers 
Buyer performs a stringent RFP process C1 
Buyer performs a stringent RFI process C2 
Buyer performs a background check on suppliers.  C3 
Buyer asks for pre-bid price C4 
Buyer asks suppliers to show samples C5 
Buyer evaluates suppliers by comparing capabilities C6 
Buyer estimates low threshold bid price and ignores low bids C7 
Input 
Buyer Designs 
Auction Rules and 
Incentives 
Buyer establishes rules and ethical guidelines and adheres to 
them 
C8 
Buyer establishes the benchmarks for the expected quality for 
service and support  
C9 
Buyer establishes the benchmarks for the expected quality of 
the products 
C10 
Buyer determines the award criteria upfront C11 
Buyer awards the business pending qualification. C12 
Buyer assures suppliers of a long term contract to give 
incentive 
C13 
Buyer uses advanced e-sourcing tools and technology features 
to account for additional factors other than price 
C14 
Input 
Buyer-Supplier 
Communication 
Buyer communicates outside of the e-sourcing tool to explain 
specified requirements in detail 
C15 
Buyer communicates with supplier(s) outside of the e-sourcing 
tool regarding their  total cost structure  
C16 
Buyer provides suppliers the opportunity to inform the buyer 
about their capabilities  
C17 
Supplier communicates with the buyer face-to-face by 
requesting a personal meeting 
C18 
Supplier asks clarification questions  regarding the specified 
requirements 
C19 
Buyer sends to the suppliers a sample(s) of the product(s) to 
enable them to comprehend the requirements better 
C20 
Input 
Buyer Develops 
Readiness for RAs 
Buyer allocates sufficient preparation time C21 
Buyer have sufficient staff  C22 
Middle level management educates and convinces the internal 
stakeholders/top management  
C23 
Buyer communicates with internal stakeholders to ensure 
adequacy and accuracy of requirements, and the expected total 
cost 
C24 
Input Supplier Readiness 
Supplier validates the requirements and attest to its capability C25 
Supplier determines its lowest bid price  and not bid below it C26 
Supplier maintains its integrity and does not cheat the buyer on 
quality 
C27 
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Type of 
Control 
Control Control Action Code 
Input 
Buyer's Pre-Auction 
Assessment of 
Supplier 
Competition 
Buyer uses reverse auctions selectively which there is a 
sufficiently large supply base 
C28 
Buyer conducts RAs only when it has sufficient number of 
participating suppliers 
C29 
Input 
Buyer Facilitates 
Supplier Readiness 
for RAs 
Buyer trains suppliers on the reverse auction tool and the 
process 
C30 
Buyer provides sufficient time for suppliers to prepare bid C31 
Outcome 
Buyer Evaluates 
Post Auction 
Performance 
Buyer constantly monitors and provides feedback to suppliers 
on the quality of service and support 
C32 
Buyer holds its procurement managers accountable for their 
performance 
C33 
 
4.5.6 Controlling Inadequacy in Intangible Resources RA Risk Factors  
The experts were interviewed regarding three RA risk factors associated with inadequacy 
in intangible resources. Three controls were identified for these risk factors. The primary controls 
pertain to the readiness of the buyer and suppliers, and are complemented by effective buyer-
supplier communication. The buyer needs to cross two hurdles when it comes to addressing risk 
factors characterized by the adoption of RAs. First, it needs to create internal conditions 
conducive for the RA process to succeed. Without sufficient internal support, the buyer may not 
be able to award business based on the outcome of the RA. Second, it needs to make sure 
suppliers understand the RA process and are able to place proper bids during the RA event.  
Addressing both issues requires education and training. First, the buyer needs to educate 
internal stakeholders and top management about the RA process and obtain their approval prior to 
using RAs (C23). The buyer should also make sure that participating suppliers are aware of how 
the RA process works, because suppliers unfamiliar with the process and the technology are not 
likely to successfully place their best bids (C30). The buyer should therefore train them by 
running mock RA events and answering their queries regarding rules and award criteria (C16).
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Table 4.6. Mapping Controls and Risk Factors 
Risk Factor 
Dimension  
Inadequacy in 
Intangible 
Resources  
Auction Process 
Governance 
Interfirm Governance 
Sub-dimension  
Adoption of 
RA 
All Phases 
Contractual 
Hazards 
Small Number 
Bargaining 
Opportunism 
(including 
principal 
opportunism) 
Relational Risk 
Factors 
(interaction based 
non-
contractibility) 
Key Control 
Buyer develops 
readiness for 
reverse 
auctions 
Buyer's pre-
auction 
evaluation of 
suppliers 
Buyer-supplier 
communication 
Buyer's pre-
auction 
assessment of 
supplier 
competition 
Buyer's pre-
auction 
evaluation of 
suppliers 
Buyer-supplier 
communication 
Supportive 
Control  
Buyer 
facilitates 
supplier 
readiness for 
reverse 
auctions 
Buyer designs 
auction rules and 
incentives 
Buyer's pre-auction 
evaluation of 
suppliers 
Buyer's pre-
auction 
evaluation of 
suppliers 
Buyer 
designs 
auction rules 
and 
incentives 
Buyer's pre-
auction evaluation 
of suppliers 
Additional 
Complementary 
Controls  
Buyer-supplier 
communication 
Buyer-supplier 
communication 
Buyer develops 
readiness for 
reverse auctions 
  
Supplier 
readiness 
Buyer designs 
auction rules and 
incentives 
  
Buyer develops 
readiness for 
reverse auctions 
Buyer facilitates 
supplier readiness 
for reverse 
auctions 
  
Buyer 
evaluates 
post auction 
performance  
Buyer's pre-
auction 
assessment of 
supplier 
competition 
Supplier 
readiness 
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4.5.7 Controlling RA Process Governance Risk Factors 
The experts were interviewed regarding six RA risk factors that mapped to this 
dimension. Five controls were identified to address these risk factors. The risk factors 
characterized by the process governance of RAs have several consequences. For a buyer, these 
risk factors result in it not being able to extract the desired benefits of RAs. To address these risk 
factors, the buyer should first evaluate suppliers by performing stringent request for proposal 
(RFP) and request for information (RFI) processes, and examining their prior records (C1, C2, 
and C3). After qualifying eligible suppliers, the buyer should make sure that it understands their 
capabilities beyond the qualification criteria (C5, C6) so it knows whether or not they have any 
value adds (i.e., non-price factors other than the offered price). To do so, the buyer should give 
suppliers the opportunity to communicate their capabilities (C17) and hold face-to-face meetings 
(C18) where suppliers get the opportunity to attest to their capabilities and validate the buyer’s 
requirements (C25). The buyer, however, should keep in mind that any added value that these 
qualified suppliers offer often come with a price, and that the offered bid price may not be the 
total price of the product or service being auctioned. The buyer, therefore, should take the total 
cost into account (C16). One suggested method for taking the total cost of ownership into account 
is the use of advanced e-sourcing tools and technology features that can factor in the majority of 
these costs (C14). Since managing all these tasks can be time consuming, it is important that the 
buyer allocate sufficient staff for such projects (C22) and provide them with enough time to 
prepare for the RAs (C21). When ready to conduct the RA, the buyer should determine the award 
criteria upfront (C11), communicate it to all the participating suppliers, adhere to the award 
criteria when awarding the business (C12), and hold its own procurement personnel accountable 
for the suppliers selected to participate in RAs (C8, C33). These are important steps to ensure 
fairness since suppliers invest valuable time and resources to participate in RAs. If not done, 
suppliers may lose confidence in the buyer’s integrity and the RA process. As one expert from the 
supplier panel said “I have seen cases where award terms were communicated but were not 
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followed. It hurts buyer’s credibility in the market. I would much rather prefer a situation where 
suppliers did not win the award but believed the reverse auctions were conducted fairly.”  
Like buyers, suppliers too are not always able to extract the desired benefits of RAs due 
to the risk factors associated with auction process governance. It is, however, also contingent on 
the buyer to address the supplier risk factors because, if these risk factors materialize, they may 
have repercussions for the buyer as well. Suppliers tend to bid low when they do not adhere to the 
specifications and underestimate their cost structure. This not only denies other capable suppliers 
the opportunity to win the business, it also denies the buyer the true market price. The buyer 
should therefore carefully examine the prices provided by suppliers in their proposals, during the 
RFP process (C1); and establish benchmarks for expected quality to ensure that the offered low 
price is genuine (C9, C10). If not done, low bidders may win the business, but will not be able to 
sustain the offered price for very long. The buyer can address this issue by estimating a low 
threshold for the offered price and ignoring any bids that go below that limit (C7). Suppliers too 
should do their part by establishing their own threshold and not bid any lower than that limit 
(C26).  
4.5.8 Controlling Interfirm Governance RA Risk Factors 
Controlling contractual hazard risk factor: Experts were interviewed regarding one RA 
risk factor that mapped to this sub-dimension. Four controls were identified to address the risk 
factor. In the interviews, experts from both the panels indicated that inadequate specification of 
requirements is one of the most common reasons for the failure of RAs during bidding and 
negotiations. Two critical steps were identified to address this risk factor. First, the buyer should 
ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the requirements by consulting internal stakeholders (C24). 
Second, the buyer should establish a strong communication channel with suppliers to allow them 
the opportunity to clarify specifications (C15, C19, and C20). Sometimes, however, even if the 
specifications are sufficient, some suppliers may not be able to interpret them accurately due to 
incompetence or a lack of sufficient preparation time. The buyer should evaluate and compare 
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suppliers prior to the RA, select competent suppliers, and provide selected suppliers with 
sufficient time to prepare for the RA  (C31). 
Controlling small number bargaining risk factor: The experts were interviewed regarding 
one RAs risk factor that mapped to this sub-dimension. Two controls were identified to address 
the risk factor. Risk factors associated with small number bargaining shift the power equation in 
favor of suppliers. Thus, it is important for the buyer to address them prior to the RA. The buyer 
should assess the competition by making sure that there is a large enough supply base that can be 
invited to participate in an RA (C28). The buyer should then invite a sufficient number of capable 
suppliers to compete (C29). Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Jap 2007) that suggest five or 
more suppliers, experts from our panel suggested that at least six suppliers should be included, 
and that caution should be exercised if there are three or fewer suppliers participating in the RA. 
A buyer should also request pre-bid prices to ensure that the participating suppliers are likely to 
quote a reasonable price during the RA (C4).  
While buyers were interviewed about the risk factor of lack of competition, suppliers 
were interviewed about the risk factor of adverse long-term impact on the supply base. No 
controls were suggested to address this risk factor. Experts suggested that this risk factor could 
not be controlled. Therefore, this risk factor has not been listed in Table 4.4.  
Controlling opportunism risk factors: The experts were interviewed regarding three RA 
risk factors (one of which was principal opportunism) that mapped to this sub-dimension. Four 
controls were identified to address these risk factors. While prior studies suggest several post-
contract controls to address agent opportunism, our findings suggest the need for both pre and 
post-contract controls. We suggest that strong pre-contract input controls lead to less taxing post-
contract controls. To enforce input controls the buyer should evaluate and compare suppliers on 
their capability (C1, C2, C3, and C6) and enforce strict auction rules by establishing benchmarks 
for expected quality of products, and service and support (C9, C10). Suppliers too should 
determine a bidding strategy and not bid below their threshold price so that later if awarded 
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business, they are not forced to cut corners on quality to honor the price (C26, C27). After 
awarding business the buyer can constantly monitor suppliers and hold them accountable by 
providing feedback based on the quality benchmarks determined prior to the RAs (C32). 
Though several controls are suggested to address agent opportunism, no tenable measures 
were proposed to address principal opportunism. This is because when using RAs the power to 
make informed decisions lies with the buyer and it is not possible for suppliers to gather or 
purchase information from the buyer. Moreover, the buyer is not legally bound to award business 
to suppliers based on the outcome of the RA. Suppliers have little to no control over how RAs are 
conducted by a buyer and how the buyer makes award decisions. As one expert from the buyer 
panel put it “It is fairly common where buyers feel empowered to deviate from the process that 
they may or may not have communicated with suppliers. You get into borderline of ethics and 
integrity issues here.” In fact several experts from the buyer panel admitted to having been either 
directly involved or having first-hand knowledge of being unfaithful to the process. One expert 
when explaining such an incident said “We were not faithful to the auction process; we were not 
faithful to the suppliers.” Another expert said, “The integrity of the auctions depends on the 
group responsible for conducting the auctions. Yes I have seen and been a part of such auctions. 
It was something I was asked to be involved in where there were separate negotiations going on 
while the auction was taking place. It was happening backstage. It was clear what was going on 
was less than ethical. There were phone calls going on during the auction where separate 
negotiations were taking place.” The only control factor suggested to address buyer opportunism, 
therefore, was for the buyer to establish and adhere to the rules and ethical guidelines (C8).  
Relational risk factors: Experts were interviewed regarding two RA risk factors that 
mapped to this sub-dimension. Four controls were identified to address these risk factors. 
Relational risk factors were ranked highly by suppliers. By putting suppliers through RAs and 
making them compete over price, the buyer communicates that it prefers lower costs over strong 
business relationships. Findings from the interviews suggest that the more experienced with RAs 
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the suppliers are, the more they are aware of the nature of the business and the market. Experts 
from the supplier panel seemed to suggest that RAs are today’s reality and suppliers should be 
willing to accept the competitive nature of the business. An expert from the supplier panel said: 
“To be very honest, we (suppliers) need to know that we are not alone in this world. There is 
tough competition out there. Though you always strive for good relationship with buyers but it is 
the nature of the business where you can lose your client.” It is not losing out to the competition 
that they consider problematic but how the buyer kept them in the loop through the RA process 
that affects their perception about the buyer. Suppliers seem to have a positive impression of 
buyers who are willing to communicate outside of the online RA tools by either talking over the 
phone or meeting with them in person (C15, C16, and C18). As long as suppliers are given the 
incentive of a long-term contract if awarded the business (C13) and are aware that the buyer 
evaluated all suppliers on their merit alone, they do not consider the buyer to have acted 
opportunistically (C1, C17, and C28). Incumbent suppliers who are able to maintain their 
business after cutting down on their profit margin, however, consider RAs to be damaging to the 
relationship unless the buyer provides them detailed feedback on their performance in the RA 
process. One expert from the suppliers’ panel said: “The use of reverse auctions and forced price 
reduction takes away the suppliers’ incentive to be flexible for their customer. Why would a 
supplier be willing to accommodate the buyer’s requirements when it is selling its products at a 
very lean profit margin?” and another panel member suggested: “Reverse auctions should be 
used selectively. The buyer suggests that it is not in need for relationship with any of its suppliers 
when it uses reverse auctions for all of its categories.”  
4.6 Implications of the Study 
We developed a comprehensive list of RA risk factors from both the buyer and supplier 
perspectives. We examined the similarities and differences in their perspectives of RA risk 
factors, and developed a list of controls that can be used to address the key risk factors. We now 
discuss the implications of our findings for research and practice. 
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Theoretical elaboration of the concept of risk factors in RA: Based on the differences and 
similarities between the buyer and supplier ranking of the risk factors we identified three key 
findings. First, buyers emphasize risk factors pertaining to transaction costs, and inadequacy in 
intangible resources for RAs. Second, suppliers emphasize opportunism and relational risk factors 
that arise due to RAs. Third, the majority of the risk factors are associated with governing the RA 
process. Buyers are most concerned with the pre-auction risk factors, while suppliers are focused 
on during-auction risk factors, and both buyers and suppliers are concerned about phase- 
independent risk factors. These findings suggest that theoretically it is meaningful to differentiate 
RA risk factors based on buyers’ and suppliers’ perspectives and the orientation of the risk factors 
towards inadequacy in intangible resources, auction process governance, and interfirm 
governance,   
Extensions of the theory of relationship constraints: While IT is traditionally seen as a 
facilitator of information sharing and diffusion, we find that IT can also be used to induce 
information asymmetry by giving buyers an advantage in a transactional exchange. A buyer can 
use its advantageous position over suppliers to extract benefits and generate extra rent. Through 
these findings, we extend the theory of relationship constraints (Dawson et al. 2010) in two 
respects. First, the theory of relationship constraints suggests that a party with an information 
advantage signals some meaningful information about itself to a disadvantaged party. The 
information-disadvantaged party screens the advantaged party by assessing its suitability to be a 
business partner. Since both parties may have some advantageous information, they can 
simultaneously signal and screen one another. Our findings suggest that use of RAs leads to 
circumstances in which the information-advantaged party can also screen the disadvantaged 
party. When a buyer already has an established relationship with an incumbent supplier, it can use 
RAs to assess market price, accurately estimate the incumbent’s and other suppliers’ cost 
structures, and use this information advantage to reduce its procurement costs. Thus, we find that 
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RA use can induce information asymmetry in favor of the buyer, which is a situation that we refer 
to as reverse information asymmetry.  
We also contribute to the theory of relationship constraints by finding evidence of 
principal opportunism. We find that reverse information asymmetry begets principal opportunism  
as previously suggested by Dawson et al. (2011; 2010). The principal opportunism risk factors 
that we identified from the buyer panel represent a principal’s perspective. In fact, the buyers who 
served on the panel admitted during individual interviews to have opportunistically used RAs. 
Thus, our findings support the idea of principal opportunism and contribute to the prior research 
(Hawkins et al. 2013; Joshi et al. 1997; Miller et al. 2011) by showing how principal opportunism 
can arise due to the use of technology for a business activity.  
Role of input controls: Our findings reveal the importance of establishing and enforcing 
stringent input controls to cut the costs of post-contract controls. Specifically, controls pertaining 
to readiness and preparation for RAs and buyer-supplier communication are particularly 
important. First, pre-auction evaluation of suppliers and design of auction rules and incentives are 
effective to address risk factors associated with RA process governance and opportunism, and 
these controls can be complemented by controls related to buyer-supplier communication, and 
controls related to buyer and supplier readiness to use RAs.  Second, buyer-supplier 
communication and ensuring buyer and supplier readiness to use RAs are effective to safeguard 
against contractual hazards, small number bargaining, relational and adoption risks.  Third, pre-
auction assessments of competition along with post-auction evaluation of performance are also 
effective in addressing small number bargaining risk factors. Overall, these findings underscore 
the need for tighter input controls to mitigate post-contract risk factors.  
Practical implication:  Buyers and suppliers can utilize RAs more effectively by being 
aware of the other party’s perspectives on RA risk factors and establishing controls to mitigate 
the risks. They can use the elaborate list of risk factors and control actions to guide their RA 
facilitated procurement projects and can revise their strategy for future participation in RAs. 
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4.7 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Although our study generated important insights on risks and controls in RAs by utilizing 
multiple Delphi panels and elaborate interviews with experts, it has its limitations that can be a 
basis for related future research. First, we identify and characterize the risk factors and controls. 
Future research can follow up on our study with a survey to assess the extent to which the risk 
factors affect the success of RAs. Second, future research can examine the extent to which 
controls identified in our study can mitigate the risk factors in different buyer contexts (e.g., type 
of good/service being procured). Third, we identify controls only for a select number of risk 
factors (i.e., the key risks). Future research can expand the search to other risk factors and identify 
additional controls.  Lastly, methodologies similar to the Delphi methodology have been 
suggested for knowledge generation exercises (e.g., repertory grid methodology). Future research 
can replicate a study like this and examine whether using alternate methodologies can report any 
significant differences in the findings. 
4.8 Conclusion 
Our findings reveal that the classic theoretical perspectives on interfirm governance do 
not adequately explain the risk factors in an IT-enabled B2B exchange context, specifically RAs, 
and that two classes of risk factors— inadequacy in intangible resources and auction process 
governance – are important. We find that there are salient differences in buyer and supplier 
perspectives on risks across all three classes of risk factors.  We extend the theory of relationship 
constraints as we find the risk factors to include reverse information asymmetry and principal 
opportunism, both of which are detrimental to the agent.  Finally, we find that stringent input 
controls can address most of the key risk factors.  
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4.9 Appendix 4.A — Complete List of Reverse Auction Risk Factors and Risks 
 
Table 4.7. Reverse Auction Risk Factors and Risks 
Risk Factor 
Sub-dimension  
Panel Risk Factor Risk 
Adoption of RAs 
Common 
Lack of top management support  Buyer unable to enforce 
outcomes of the RA 
Common 
Suppliers lack adequate knowledge of 
reverse auction process  Buyer unable to extract 
RAs’ desired benefits  
Buyer 
Lack of technology resources and 
skills limits participation by suppliers 
Buyer 
Resistance by internal clients within 
buying organization to reverse 
auction procedures and outcomes  
Buyer unable to enforce 
outcomes of the RA 
Supplier Custom challenges  
Auction Process 
Governance (Pre-
Auction) 
Common Inadequate supplier qualification  
Buyer unable to extract 
RAs’ desired benefits  
Common 
Award terms not clearly 
communicated prior to auctions  
Buyer Improper lot structuring  
Buyer Reluctance of suppliers to participate  
Buyer 
Risk of price increase if pre-bids are 
not used  
Supplier 
Communication barriers create 
ambiguity regarding buyers' 
requirements  
Supplier unable to place an 
optimal bid 
Supplier 
Suppliers are forced to disclose 
sensitive information (e.g., pricing 
structure, manufacturing processes)  Supplier's critical 
competitive information 
compromised  Common 
Unreliable technology  
Auction Process 
Governance 
(During Auction) 
Common 
Increasing levels of price visibility 
can discourage supplier participation  
Buyer Too high or too low starting bids   
Buyer unable to extract 
RAs’ desired benefits  Supplier 
Early attrition of quality suppliers due 
to aggressive bidding  
Supplier 
Impulsive bidding leads to 
unrealistically low bids  
Increased financial 
vulnerability of suppliers 
Supplier 
The risk of other suppliers not 
adhering to the specifications and 
underbidding  
Supplier's unsuccessful 
participation due to unfair 
actions/rules by the buyer or 
other suppliers 
Supplier 
Security of suppliers' bid 
compromised  
Supplier's critical 
competitive information 
compromised  
Supplier 
Inability to correct bids that are 
mistakenly placed  
Increased financial 
vulnerability of suppliers 
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Risk Factor 
Sub-dimension  
Panel Risk Factor Risk 
Auction Process 
Governance 
(During Auction) 
Supplier 
Technology features (e.g., auto bid) 
reduce supplier control over bidding 
process  
Supplier unable to place an 
optimal bid 
Supplier 
Lack of transparency of loading (or 
weighting) factors placed by buyer on 
a supplier's bids hampers bidding 
strategy  
Supplier 
Suppliers unable to bid strategically 
when last submitted bid price is not 
revealed  
Supplier 
Lack of flexibility in payment terms 
disadvantage some suppliers during 
bidding process  
Auction Process 
Governance 
(Post-Auction) 
Common 
Suppliers unable to maintain their 
offered auction price  
Increased financial 
vulnerability of suppliers 
Supplier 
Lack of post-auction feedback erodes 
supplier's confidence in the reverse 
auction process.   
Loss of 
credibility/reputation among 
business partners 
Auction Process 
Governance 
(Phase 
Independent) 
Common 
Omission of non-price criteria limits 
buyer’s understanding of suppliers’ 
full capabilities.  
Buyer unable to extract 
RAs’ desired benefits  Common 
Singular focus on price does not 
factor in total cost of ownership  
Common 
Inappropriate time allocation for 
auction  
Buyer 
Legal risk  Buyer unable to enforce 
outcomes of the RA 
Buyer 
Dependency on third- party auction 
service provider  
Buyer unable to extract 
RAs’ desired benefits  
Supplier Reduced profit margin  
Increased financial 
vulnerability of suppliers Supplier 
Commoditizing innovative 
products/services  
Supplier 
Lack of awareness of who you are 
competing with and their cost 
structures  
Supplier unable to place an 
optimal bid 
Supplier 
Suppliers cannot recoup their design 
and engineering costs 
Increased financial 
vulnerability of suppliers 
Supplier 
Overhead costs required for ongoing 
participation puts stress on already 
tight budgets  
Information 
Asymmetry 
Common 
Suppliers withholding their best price 
for post auction negotiation  
Buyer unable to extract 
RAs’ desired benefits  
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Risk Factor 
Sub-dimension  
Panel Risk Factor Risk 
Reverse 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Supplier 
Unclear standards of compliance 
because of lack of maturity of reverse 
auction process  
Supplier's unsuccessful 
participation due to unfair 
actions/rules by the buyer or 
other suppliers 
Supplier 
Lose an auction to a supplier who 
subcontracts to a lower quality 
foreign supplier  
Supplier 
Illusion that supplier needs to offer 
the lowest price to be awarded the 
business  
Supplier 
Award volume not guaranteed 
making it difficult to price 
Supplier unable to place an 
optimal bid 
Agent 
Opportunism 
Common 
Quality of service and support could 
be reduced by suppliers to achieve 
offered price  Supplier's breach of 
contract/loss of goodwill for 
the buyer 
Common 
Quality of the product could be 
reduced by suppliers to achieve 
offered price  
Supplier 
A competing supplier may bid low to 
gain the contract and then raises 
prices once the buyer is locked in  
Supplier's unsuccessful 
participation due to unfair 
actions/rules by the buyer or 
other suppliers 
Supplier 
Suppliers lose credibility by having to 
introduce hidden costs in order to 
maintain profitability  
Loss of 
credibility/reputation among 
business partners 
Principal 
Opportunism 
Common 
Buyer not faithful to the auction 
process  
Supplier's unsuccessful 
participation due to unfair 
actions/rules by the buyer or 
other suppliers 
Buyer 
Failure to honor award terms deters 
future supplier participation  
Buyer 
Inclusion of suppliers who will not be 
awarded the business  
Supplier 
The risk of buyer manipulating the 
auction by introducing artificially low 
bids  
Supplier 
Buyers create distrust when they use 
reverse auctions to test the market 
with no intention of buying  
Contractual 
Hazards 
Common 
Inadequately specified requirements  Buyer unable to extract 
RAs’ desired benefits  
Supplier 
Intellectual IP risks   Supplier's critical 
competitive information 
compromised  
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Risk Factor 
Sub-dimension  
Panel Risk Factor Risk 
Small Number 
Bargaining 
Common 
Adverse long-term impact on supply 
base  
Increased financial 
vulnerability of suppliers 
Common Supplier collusion  
Buyer unable to extract RAs’ 
desired benefits  
Buyer Lack of competition in the auction  
Buyer 
Market conditions not conducive for 
reverse auctions  
Buyer 
A supplier has more power than the 
buyer  
Buyer unable to enforce 
outcomes of the RA 
Buyer 
Empowering uncompetitive 
incumbents  
Buyer unable to extract RAs’ 
desired benefits  
Relational 
Buyer 
Risk of losing investments with the 
incumbent supplier  Loss of relationship specific 
investments 
Supplier 
Being stuck with inventory when 
incumbent supplier loses auction  
Buyer 
Damage to buyer’s reputation  Loss of credibility/reputation 
among business partners 
Supplier 
Reverse auctions give incumbents 
unfair advantage 
Supplier unable to place an 
optimal bid 
Supplier 
Buyers practice favoritism with 
preferred suppliers 
Supplier's unsuccessful 
participation due to unfair 
actions/rules by the buyer or 
other suppliers 
Common 
Weakens existing strategic 
relationships with suppliers  Weak buyer-supplier 
relationship 
Supplier 
No opportunity for relationship 
building  
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